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Since my intention is to say something that will prove of practical use to the inquirer, 
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ABSTRACT   
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, former communist republics started the 
process of integration into the global economy by joining the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). To become members, transition economies were forced to adopt a broad array of 
commitments which went well beyond the boundaries of the formal WTO agreements, 
including the need to deregulate foreign direct investments (FDI) and to transform the former 
closed, centrally planned economies into open market economies. Although the WTO had little 
knowledge of the nature of such a transition, and could not predict the results of the reforms, it 
presented these demands as an opportunity to turn these countries into knowledge-based 
economies. For the governments of transition economies this provided an imagined future and 
they started to implement reforms advocated by the WTO based on this sociotechnical 
imaginary. This research seeks to understand whether implementation of radical reforms by the 
governments of transition economies to pursue an imaginary, formed by the neoliberal rhetoric 
of the WTO, was an adequate course of action. This is a qualitative single case study research 
project, which uses a crucial-case research design to verify that the hypothesis holds across a 
cluster of cases to which it is applied.  
There are three major aims of this thesis: the first is to explore the impact of accession 
to the WTO in the context of its demands to transform former closed, centrally planned 
economies into open market economies. This perspective has been largely ignored by 
innovation policy literature to date. I argue that such a task represented a paradigm-shifting 
undertaking, the main challenge of which lay not in changing formal structures, but in making 
them fit with the long-established informal, tacit elements of the system, such as codes of 
conduct, practices, norms, routines, and values. The second aim is to carry out an empirically 
detailed and contextually attuned examination of the feasibility and effectiveness of 
governmental policies, based on the imaginary of transforming former centrally-planned 
republics into knowledge-based economies through establishment of open market relationships 
and attraction of FDI. Finally, it has been my intention to conduct rigorous, in-depth research 
which explores the process of international technology transfer through FDI as a method of 
catching-up by economies in transition.  
This thesis contributes to the field in three main ways. Firstly, the analysis provides a 
critical appraisal of WTO policies applied to former centrally planned economies. The research 
shows that changing the mindsets of domestic actors was paramount in transitioning because 
their values, codes of conduct, norms, practices, and routines were formed over the course of 
decades of socialist rule which proved to be incompatible with the ways things are done under 
open-market relationships. Secondly, this research empirically refutes neoliberal claims by the 
WTO that the entry of multinationals into a host country’s market automatically leads to 
occurrence of spillover effects. I argue that successful integration into supply chains of 
multinationals requires developing entrepreneurial spirit and incentivising capability building 
of domestic firms. The inability of domestic firms to supply high-quality intermediate inputs 
prevents the relocation of value-added, knowledge-intensive stages of production processes of 
multinationals into the host country, limiting their activity to last-stage assembly and the 
exploitation of the country’s natural resources with no evidence of positive externalities to local 
firms. Thirdly, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the relationships between 
policymaking and innovation by shifting attention from scientific actors and institutions 
towards the specificities of the pathways of technological development, shaped by how the 
authorities envision the country's future. I show that by following the recommendation of the 
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WTO as a guideline for technological development, transition economies overlook real 
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1.1. Background  
I was inspired to embark upon this research journey after I spent many years closely 
witnessing the attempts of Kazakhstan’s authorities to turn a former centrally-planned, closed 
economic system into a knowledge-based, outward-oriented market economy. My prolonged 
employment by the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative Development and 
Entrepreneurship of the Senate of the Parliament has not only shaped my research interests, but 
also enabled me to realise the importance of the questions my colleagues and I had been 
working on. We saw that despite the fact that Kazakhstan experienced severe social and 
economic problems after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the authorities had placed 
technological development high on their agenda and were eager to implement the necessary 
institutional and organisational reforms required to achieve the ambitious goal of turning the 
country into a new benchmark of successful innovative development. The problem was, 
however, that neither we, nor the representatives of the executive branch had any real 
knowledge of what needed to be done in order to catch-up with industrialised market 
economies. As Kern (1992, p. 6) puts it: “Reformers in the socialist nations can observe the 
features of market economies which serve as something of a blue print for their efforts, but 
they have little clear guidance about how to bring such institutional structures into existence in 
their own countries. The situation is akin to that of a person armed with a blueprint of a "dream 
home," but without any carpentry skills”. Accordingly, in the absence of guidelines, knowledge 
and tangible plans for how to spur technological development in former centrally-planned 
economies and turn them into booming market economies, policy-makers had to act on abstract 
ideas, anecdotal evidence and personal instincts. While the task of providing answers to all 
these questions was long overdue, I decided to devote myself to finding ways of improving the 
technological performance of economies in transition.  
My attention was particularly drawn towards the impact of accession to the WTO, not 
only because of the magnitude of the effects it produced on the former centrally-planned 
economies, but also because at the outset of transition, the governments of former Soviet 
republics commonly viewed membership of the organisation as a free ride towards catching-
up in technological development. Since the rules of the WTO require acceding countries to 
adopt a hands-off approach towards multinationals, membership of the organisation is 
associated with a significant increase in the flow of inward FDI. Despite being unable to use 
various investment measures, such as local content requirements, under the regime of the 
WTO, governments of transition economies strived to gain membership in the organisation in 
order to attract multinationals, which according to conventional wisdom, bring new 
technologies, marketing techniques, managerial skills and financial capital to host countries. 
Accordingly, in December 1998 the Kyrgyz Republic became 133rd member of the WTO, the 
first among the countries of the former Soviet Union. Kyrgyzstan’s officials managed to 
complete negotiations in a little more than two years, which became the fastest in the history 
of the organisation. While the terms of accession were extremely burdensome, Kyrgyzstan’s 
authorities decided that the benefits would outweigh the downsides of accession. After all, 
acceding countries are often forced to accept the terms and conditions imposed by the WTO, 
mainly due to the importance of being part of a global trading system, but also as a result of 
the intransigence of WTO member states (United Nations 2001). However, by following the 
path of economic reforms insisted upon by the WTO the attempts by the government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic to bring levels of technological development up to those of industrialised 
market economies were unsuccessful. According to assessments of the World Economic Forum 
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(2013) the Kyrgyz Republic was ranked 145th out of 148 countries by development of 
innovations. Not only did Kyrgyzstan’s accession demonstrate that the terms of accession to 
the WTO are unfavourable for latecomers and those lacking bargaining power, but it also made 
me realise that there are certain pitfalls that needs to be thoroughly examined.  
I was primarily interested in finding out how the governments of transition economies 
have performed their functions during the process of transformation, not so much because I 
was a civil servant myself, but more because of my firm belief that it was the most important 
factor affecting the outcome of accession to the WTO. Despite the fact that no proper research 
was ever conducted to estimate the consequences of an abrupt transition towards market 
relationships, WTO officials strongly encouraged the governments of former centrally-planned 
economies to accelerate the process of accession by arguing that delays significantly increase 
the level of obligations placed upon the applicant country (WTO 2018). Moreover, even though 
there was no knowledge on how to transform former Soviet republics, the recommendations of 
many respectable economists had a strong bias towards market fundamentalism – the belief 
that when markets are left to operate on their own, they can solve most economic and social 
problems (Becker and Becker 1996). However, the outcomes of Kyrgyzstan’s fast accession to 
the WTO clearly demonstrated that market forces do not solve all economic and social 
problems on their own, and that targeted governmental intervention was needed. While 
Kyrgyzstan’s unsuccessful experience contained a valuable lesson, it did not provide an answer 
to the question what the governments of transition economies should focus on while they 
perform their functions.  
1.2. Aim and research questions 
My main intention was to conduct research that would be of practical use to 
policymakers in all former centrally-planned economies. The task was challenging, considering 
that innovation policy remains one of the most neglected dimensions in the field of innovation 
studies. Smits et al. (2010, p. 417) argue: “Until now scholars in innovation studies did not pay 
sufficient attention to innovation policy as an object of research. Phrased differently, policy is 
considered as a trivial application of ‘other’ knowledge but not a field of knowledge in itself”. 
Since innovation policy literature is based on the assumption that policy-makers need to 
intervene only when the system does not function well, that is when systemic problems occur, 
the scarce studies that exist in this subject area consist mainly of theoretical attempts of 
different authors to identify various problems that may affect a system’s proper functioning. 
However, while such knowledge might be useful when the innovation system is well-
established, in situations where a fully-functional innovation system is yet to be established 
because a country undergoes transition from centrally-planned to market relationships, policy-
makers need something more empirically grounded than a checklist of potential systemic 
problems. In my opinion, for policymakers in transition economies, a story that used ‘the force 
of example’ would be a better source of information for making well-informed decisions than 
context-independent knowledge based on theoretical deliberations or statistical analysis. As 
Abbott (1992, p. 79) puts it: “A social science expressed in terms of typical stories would 
provide far better access for policy intervention than the present social science of variables”. 
Therefore, I aimed to tell a story which not only would depict experience of transition 
economies but would also leave ample scope for readers to make their own interpretations and 
to draw their own conclusions on how the governments of former centrally-planned economies 
should perform their functions in order to catch-up with industrialised market economies.  
The choice of research questions was dictated by the aim of this thesis to produce 
practical recommendations for policymakers in transition economies based on context-
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dependent knowledge. While formulating the research questions I also aimed to contribute to 
the scarcely developed body of innovation policy literature by identifying system-level 
problems inherent to former centrally-planned economies. King et al. (1994, p. 15) argue that 
ideally “a research project should pose a question that is ‘important’ in the real world” and 
“make a specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature by increasing our collective 
ability to construct verified scientific explanations of some aspect of the world”. The three 
main research questions are as follows:  
1. In what ways does the interplay between the formal arrangements the governments 
of transition economies had to set up in the process of reforms, and the long-established 
informal elements, embedded in the mindsets of domestic actors affect the transformation of 
former centrally-planned economies into open market economies?     
2. How did the governments of transition economies envision technological 
development and was their strategy efficient in terms of turning former centrally-planned 
economies into open market economies? 
3. To what extent did joining the WTO enable transition economies to benefit from FDI 
spillover effects and what are the system-level factors that may inhibit integration of domestic 
research and development (R&D) and industrial players into global value chains?  
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
 Moving forward, the second chapter articulates the research design applied and 
provides rationalisations for all major decisions involved in planning this research project. 
First, I discuss the usefulness of different methodological approaches in relation to my research 
goals, analyse their limitations, and clarify why I chose to use a single-case research design for 
answering the research question raised in this thesis. I also provide an explanation of how a 
single case research design can be implicitly comparative and present a solution which enables 
the establishment of generalisable causal patterns across a population of cases based on the 
examination of a crucial case. After that, I describe epistemological and ontological 
assumptions, underpinning the choice of methodology and the way I interpret findings of this 
thesis. I then outline the process of data collection, explain the selection criteria of the 
interviewees, and provide a detailed account of the methods and tools used to analyse the data. 
Lastly, I discuss the methodological limitations of this research project by explaining why I 
opted to solely conduct elite interviews.  
Chapter three brings together theoretical and practical debates about how accession to 
the WTO influences the technological performance of acceding countries. The chapter starts 
with an overview of catching-up economies motivations’ for joining the organisation. Given 
my interest in transition economies, I further provide a detailed review of how terms of 
accession affect latecomers to the WTO and those lacking bargaining power by showing that 
in the absence of criteria that would specify the extent of the demands that can be made by 
incumbent members, they were pushed for commitments that go well beyond the boundaries 
of formal WTO agreements. I then discuss the tendency of researchers to focus almost 
exclusively on examining the effects produced by the rules stipulated in the formal WTO 
agreements and explain how it affects our understanding of the real consequences of accession 
to the WTO. After that the literature review shifts the focus towards examining international 
technology transfer literature and its ambiguity regarding the factors determining the existence 
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of spillover effects. Finally, the discussion in this chapter turns to examination of the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, underpinning the demands of the WTO to establish 
open market relationships and deregulate FDI from the perspective of innovation policy 
literature.  
Chapter four examines how the Kazakhstan’s government allocated financial resources 
on development of new technologies through ‘borrowed’ policy instruments in an attempt to 
shift to a new model of technological development. I start this chapter with a review of a model 
of technological development adopted in the Soviet Union, highlighting the fact that it was 
designed to fit with socialist values and principles. I then explain how a mismatch between the 
formal arrangements that the government set up in the process of transition towards a new 
model of technological development and well-established informal elements affected the 
ability of the system to incentivise conduct of near-market research, which was required for 
the production of competitive outputs in open market conditions. Further, the chapter describes 
how the adoption of commercialisation of technology policies, typically used by mature market 
economies in order to bring technology to the marketplace affected development of 
technologies in the country. The discussion then analyses attempts by the government to create 
centres of research excellence in order to incentivise multinationals to relocate their 
knowledge-intensive activities to Kazakhstan. The chapter finishes with overview of policies 
put in place to create an environment that would make scientific research more relevant to the 
needs of industry.  
Chapter five analyses how the regulatory environment, established by the authorities in 
accordance with requirements of the WTO, influenced the development of new technologies. 
The chapter starts with explaining how the centrally-planned regulatory framework was viewed 
by market-oriented economists, why the government was encouraged to accelerate the pace of 
reforms and what they imagined the results would be. I then discuss why the authorities adopted 
top-down approach while pursuing the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO and how 
a collision of former and new rationales of public sector managers affected establishment of 
effective regulatory environment. Afterwards, I describe the attitude towards entrepreneurship 
in society and explain how the practice of conducting inspections and issuing permissions 
influenced capability building of domestic firms. Following that, the discussion turns to the 
analysis of the effectiveness of the measures undertaken by the government in order to turn 
Kazakhstan into a major export-based economy. I conclude this chapter with a review of the 
attempts of the government to achieve outward orientation of the national economy by turning 
the country into a platform for export operations of multinationals.  
Chapter six reviews the attempts of the government to accelerate the transformation of 
Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy by replacing weak and sluggish 
market forces with targeted state intervention. First, in order to explain why the authorities 
developed reformist attitudes and adopted interventionist style of governance towards 
coordination of socio-economic processes I examine how they envisioned Kazakhstan’s future. 
I then analyse how integration of domestic firms into supply chains of multinationals, operating 
in oil and gas sector through imposition of local content requirements influenced their 
capability building. Afterwards, this chapter reviews how the programme of industrialisation, 
aimed at reducing the dependency of the national economy on foreign capital was coordinated 
by the government. The discussion in this chapter then turns to the examination of the practice 
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of using state procurement as a method of spurring technological development in the absence 
of domestic rivalry. Finally, I analyse how support of national champions influenced the 
establishment of backward linkages with domestic firms.  
 Chapter seven brings together the findings of this thesis. In this chapter I summarise 
the key policy implications for transition economies, present the theoretical contributions, 
discuss limitations of this research, and present some suggestions for future studies which can 























2. METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
2.1. Introduction 
This is an exploratory qualitative research, which has been designed to gain an 
understanding of the impact of accession to the WTO on the innovative performance of 
transition economies. The use of a single case research design was dictated by the necessity to 
engage in a contextual examination of whether the transformation of formal structures, as 
insisted upon by the WTO, fitted well with long-established informal constraints. As such, the 
specificities of a selected case are used here in order to overcome the main drawback of single 
case studies – ability to produce reliable generalisations. This chapter explains that a country 
can be singled out from a relatively large number of homogeneous cases and analysed within 
the theoretical and empirical context of that set of countries. I argue that a clear-cut distinction 
of transition economies from market economies ensures the representativeness of its cases, 
enabling me to identify generalisable causal patterns across a cluster of cases. Furthermore, I 
show how a crucial-case research design can be used to produce a robust generalisation, based 
on a hypothesis that questions the adequacy of WTO policies in relation to transition 
economies.  
This chapter aims to explain all major decisions involved in planning this research 
project and to provide rationalisations for those choices. In section 2.2. the discussion outlines 
the way research goals shaped the design of this project and clarifies my philosophical stance. 
Section 2.3. describes how a hypothesis can be verified using a single case research design. 
Section 2.4. reviews the process of data collection and analysis. Section 2.5. explores the 
methodological limitation of this research project.  
2.2. Choosing a research strategy 
There are two contrasting methodological approaches, scholars adopted to examine 
how accession to the WTO affects the technological performance of different countries. A 
quantitative share of the research is represented by attempts to explain the relationships 
between specific terms of accession to the WTO and their impact on particular industries, 
drawing from a large amount of cases (Kyle and McGahan 2012; Falvey et al. 2006; Belloc 
and Pagano 2012). The emphasis in these studies is on statistical inter-relationships between 
variables rather than on a detailed understanding of different aspects of accession and the 
specificities of national contexts. In general, isolation from context and a high degree of 
abstraction limits the applicability of the quantitative approach to testing only very general 
theories. Moreover, quantitative approaches overlook the causal complexity inherent to 
innovation processes. This is a critical drawback because innovation processes require a multi-
causal explanation where the importance of various determinants is specified. These 
determinants should support and offset each other, as opposed to operating independently 
(Edquist 2005). The remainder of the literature is focused on finding causal relationships 
between accession to the WTO and innovative performance through contextual examination of 
experiences of individual countries (Suttmeier and Yao 2004; Das 2003; Fomin et al. 2011). 
The problem of these studies is that the case-oriented strategies tend to individualise the 
experience of each particular country. As a result, the findings of the conducted research are 
difficult to extrapolate to other cases. Esping-Andersen (1997, p. 179) notes: “the point of 
generalisation is economy of explanation – to be able to see the forest rather than the myriad 
of unique trees”. While the studies that utilised both approaches contributed to our 
understanding of how membership in the WTO influences technological development of 
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acceding countries, they had certain methodological limitations, which I aimed to overcome by 
means of the research design.  
At the beginning of this research journey my overall goal was to examine how accession 
to the WTO influenced technological performance of economies in transition, and as a result 
my initial research had the ambitious aim of including all former Soviet Union republics in the 
analysis. This stemmed from the intention to produce a reliable generalisation, which is crucial 
for proper understanding of social phenomena. Michael Porter (1990) after analysing a number 
of studies based either on single case research designs or bilateral comparisons concluded that 
their findings lack in robustness, which became evident when these cases were analysed within 
larger set of countries. Inclusion in the analysis of all former centrally-planned economies 
would have brought the overall number of cases to 15, thereby allowing for very robust 
generalisation. At the same time, I assumed that a relatively small number of cases would 
enable me to engage in a contextual examination of the consequences of accession to the WTO, 
necessary for unravelling causal complexity. The problem with the simultaneous examination 
of 15 cases was that conventional quantitative and qualitative techniques fall short when 
applied to analysing an intermediate-N set of cases. A qualitative approach is applicable only 
to a very small number of cases because it tends to analyse simultaneously a large amount of 
causal conditions. When the number of cases increases, the researcher faces the problem of 
unmanageable complexity (Ragin 1987). In contrast, quantitative analysis based on only 15 
cases would lack statistical significance. Besides, if multiple regression models try to include 
complex assumptions, they rapidly exhaust the available ‘degrees of freedom’ (Ebbinghaus 
2005). Attempts to choose a method that would fit well with the research goals of this thesis 
made me realise that trade-offs and compromises in the design of my study would be inevitable. 
I tried different research strategies in order to find out which one would be best suited 
for analysing available data and producing reliable generalisations. Initially, I intended to 
overcome the limitations of traditional qualitative and quantitative methods when applied to 
analysing an intermediate-N set of cases by using fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis 
(fsQCA). FsQCA is based on the application of algorithms of Boolean algebra also known as 
the algebra of logic (Ragin 1987). It was developed as a middle way between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, a bridge between complexity and generality. One of the most 
important features of fsQCA is that it treats cases holistically. In fsQCA cases are compared 
with each other not as separate variables but as sets of causal conditions. Comparison of cases 
as configurations fosters the preservation of their identity and specificity during the shift from 
a within-case to cross-case level of analysis. Such a holistic approach is extremely important 
because overall performance of an innovation system depends not so much on performance of 
its individual components as on how these components interact (OECD 2003).  An especially 
important feature of fuzzy-set analysis is the opportunity to calibrate independent variables 
(Ragin 2000). A calibration procedure provides the researcher with the opportunity to measure 
causal conditions in a variety of degrees and allows them to reflect on the qualitative 
characteristics of a variable. Calibration demonstrates membership of a variable in specified 
set and should be done using the substantive and theoretical knowledge of the researcher. The 
main goal of fsQCA is to identify the most appropriate configurations of conditions that are 
best able to explain the outcome of interest. For this purpose, each case is represented as a 
combination of causal and outcome conditions, or in other words, as a combination of 
independent and dependent variables. Variables are calibrated through qualitatively defined 
anchors. All cases, including the empirically non-observed, are compared with each other in a 
so-called “truth table”. Afterwards, the data matrix is logically simplified through the 
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application of algorithms of Boolean algebra. Finally, analysis assesses the consistency and 
coverage of each of the produced statements. Despite all the benefits of fsQCA, including its 
ability to produce robust generalisations, I was open to the possibility that other research 
methods might be a better option.  
As my research project progressed, I realised that despite its limited ability to produce 
reliable generalisations, conducting single case qualitative research was the only possible 
option. Research design is not an autonomous domain and needs to be altered in the process of 
discovering new perspectives on the research problem at hand. As Mills (1959, p. 128) puts it: 
“Controversy over different views of ‘methodology’ and ‘theory’ is properly carried on in close 
and continuous relation with substantive problems… The character of these problems limits 
and suggests the methods and conceptions that are used and how they are used”. While 
conducting the research, it became apparent that there was one important issue that needed to 
be explored in-depth in order to formulate a viable hypothesis explaining why former centrally-
planned economies experience significant difficulties during forced transformation into open 
market economies. Specifically, I wanted to examine how participants of innovation processes 
perceive the ‘rules of the game’ of a new paradigm as I did not accept the premise that transition 
was simply a matter of changing formal institutional and organisational arrangements. I could 
not concur with the assertion of market-oriented researchers that command regime was an 
aberration of capitalism, the aim of which was to experiment whether market forces can be 
replaced with planning procedures (section 3.2.). Neither could I consent with the claims of 
market fundamentalists that market forces on their own can solve all problems of transition 
economies (Becker and Becker 1996). I realised that a centrally-planned regime was a fully-
functional system that was based on socialist values and principles that defined not only 
institutional and organisational structures, but also shaped informal elements such as norms, 
practices, routines, and codes of conduct. Hence, by examining perceptions of various actors I 
wanted to verify my assumption that forced transition went wrong because it was viewed in a 
very narrow sense of changing formal arrangements, which led to a mismatch between formal 
and informal set-ups.  
Before proceeding further, I will clarify my philosophical stance. After all, the sciences 
emerged from philosophy, and in the past philosophy was considered the central mode of 
intellectual inquiry. Moreover, epistemological and ontological assumptions inevitably shape 
the way we understands our research questions, affect the choice of methods we use and define 
how we interpret our findings (Crotty 1998). As Saunders et al. (2009) put it: “The researcher 
who is concerned with facts, such as the resources needed in a manufacturing process, is likely 
to have a very different view on the way research should be conducted to the researcher 
concerned with the feelings and attitudes of the workers towards their managers in that same 
manufacturing process”. Ontological assumptions provide a philosophical grounding for 
deciding what constitutes the nature of social reality (Blaike 2010). My ontological assumption 
is idealism. I believe that our perception of an external independent reality is subjective as it is 
mediated by different social constructs and ideas. Epistemology is concerned with the nature 
of knowledge, its possibility and criteria we use for ensuring its adequacy and legitimacy 
(Ibid.). My epistemological assumption is constructionism, which views reality as being 
constructed through social interactions. The constructivist perspective seeks to discover how 
encounters of people with the physical world and their interactions with other people create 
reality through their interpretations of these events. In this thesis I adopted an interpretivist 
perspective as a research paradigm. The primary focus of research undertaken within 
interpretivist paradigm is the way people interpret reality through social constructions such as 
language, documents, shared meanings, etc.  
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2.3. Verifying a hypothesis through a single case analysis – the crucial-case method 
Although the necessity to switch to a conduct of a single case qualitative research by 
the very definition conflicted with my initial intention to produce a reliable generalisation, I 
aimed to overcome its inherent limitations by making the analysis implicitly comparative. In 
my early research design, the goal of causal generalisation was given precedence over the goal 
of historical interpretation (section 2.2.). Accordingly, I was worried that the necessity to 
switch to single case research design might imply the need to compromise on the ability to 
produce a robust generalisation. Indeed, many single case study researchers want to examine 
specific cases because of their intrinsic value and therefore explicitly reject empirical 
generalisation as an appropriate goal. For instance, Eysenck (1976, p. 9) rather convincingly 
argues: “Sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look carefully at individual 
cases – not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of learning something!”. 
While the debate over the role of generalisation in social inquiry is somewhat impossible to 
resolve, it is still possible to point out why it is so difficult to produce robust generalisations 
based on a single case. The key reason why single case studies are rarely suitable for making 
stable generalisations is simply because they are not designed to be comparative. Comparisons 
are crucial for making robust generalisations as they allow to “…control (verify or falsify) 
whether generalizations hold across the cases to which they apply” (Sartori 1991, p. 244). 
Therefore, I intended to make this research implicitly comparative and to seek explanations not 
in the details intrinsic to the national experience of a selected case, but in the factors that form 
causal patterns across a cluster of similar cases.  
Homogeneity of the contexts of former centrally-planned economies and their clear-cut 
distinction from market economies were the key factors that enabled me to conduct analysis in 
such a way as to make it implicitly comparative. One of the main reasons why single case 
studies can rarely become implicitly comparative is because concepts that qualitative-oriented 
researchers usually seek to understand make the national contexts to which they are applied 
too unique and heterogenous to be studied in a comparative perspective. In other words, when 
being altered to include an implicit comparison, single case study studies often experience the 
‘travelling problem’ – the phenomenon that occurs when a concept constructed for one country 
is not really useful or meaningful when applied to another country (Sartori 1970). The most 
common response to the ‘travelling problem’ is to modify a concept in such a way as to make 
it broader and hence increase its scope of application. Unfortunately, such modifications often 
lead to the ‘conceptual stretching’ – a mismatch between the concept and the case to which it 
is applied, that reduces the ability of the concept to relate successfully to substantive questions 
(Ibid.). However, neither the ‘travelling problem’ nor the ‘conceptual stretching’ would be an 
issue if all countries descended from the Soviet Union were incorporated into an implicit 
comparative framework. The fact that for more than seven decades former centrally-planned 
economies were part of a single country that was also paradigmatically different from market 
economies provided me with an opportunity to formulate a hypothesis in a very precise manner 
without worrying about mixing apples and oranges.  
While the aforementioned specificities of former centrally-planned economies would 
enable me to include fifteen countries into implicit comparative framework without resorting 
to conceptual vagueness, I had to be extremely careful while formulating a hypothesis. The 
main reason for that is because there is no theory on transition (Turley and Luke 2011, Becker 
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and Becker 1996, Stiglitz 1994, Levine 1992, Lavigne 1995). As Papava (2005, p. 14) puts it: 
“It may be stated without reservation that there is no economic theory of transition at all… It 
must be emphasized that, from the standpoint of Western economists, even the problems of 
centrally planned development, not to mention those of transition to market, have always been 
considered a temporary deviation from the generally accepted capitalist norm. For this reason, 
thinking of transitionary problems is to them nothing but a waste of time”. Due to the lack of 
well-established and verified theory, linking multiple problems experienced by the former 
Soviet republics during forced transition to market relationships to the specificities of the 
centrally-planned regime, I analysed and articulated which of its features still have influence 
on innovation processes (section 3.2.). I expected that by undertaking this step I would put 
analytical constraints on any of my own inclinations to draw the attention of the reader away 
from the factors that explain causality across all cases, and towards details intrinsic to the 
national experience of a selected representative case. Moreover, since my research was entering 
uncharted waters, I realised that I need to employ a research design that would allow me to 
verify conclusively and unequivocally that my hypothesis holds across an entire population of 
cases to which it will be applied.  
Upon examination of the literature and the data available in the preliminary 
investigation, my attention was drawn to the fact that market fundamentalists assume that the 
centrally-planned regime was nothing more than an experiment of the Soviet authorities aimed 
to replace market forces with planning procedures. Since transition economies are viewed as 
aberrations of capitalism now turning into ‘fully-fledged’ market economies, the role of 
informal constraints, embedded in minds of participants of innovation processes was 
completely disregarded (section 3.2.). Accordingly, many respectable scientists and decision-
makers in international organisations suggested it would be best to focus exclusively on the 
speedy transformation of formal organisational and institutional set-ups. For instance, Nobel 
laureate Gary Becker and historian Guity Nashat Becker (1996, p. 259) argue: “The very 
different paths taken toward market economies by the ex-communist nations provide a 
remarkable laboratory on how to transform centrally planned economies. The evidence from 
these experiments is loud and clear: It’s best to introduce large changes rapidly without waiting 
to discover the “right” sequence of reforms. Moving quickly allows the transformation to be 
guided mainly by the spontaneity of innovative market forces rather than by government 
planners or technocrats…”. However, I was convinced that the centrally-planned regime was 
a fully developed, well-functioning system (section 3.2.). I believed that socialist values and 
principles not only defined the formal arrangements pertained during the Soviet era but also 
had a strong influence on formation of informal, tacit elements of the system such as practices, 
routines, and codes of conduct. Unlike formal arrangements, informal constraints are extremely 
sticky and path dependent. Therefore, I hypothesised that the reason why transition economies 
experience difficulties in the process of accession to the WTO is because formal organisational 
and institutional set-ups adopted in the course of forced market-oriented reforms do not fit well 
with long-established informal elements embedded in the mindsets of domestic actors. 
The most definitive way to verify that a hypothesis holds across a cluster of cases to 
which it is applied is to use the crucial-case approach. The idea that a particularly informative 
single case can be employed in order to prove or disprove a hypothesis that describe causality 
in a broader population of cases was first introduced into social sciences by Harry Eckstein 
(1975). The crucial-case approach is based on selection of a case that represents the most- or 
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least-likely scenario for a given proposition and is therefore strongly biased towards exhibiting 
a certain outcome. A most-likely case has an extremely high probability of validating the 
outcome predicted by the proposition under investigation. If the outcome predicted by the 
proposition does not occur, it provides a strong disconfirming evidence. A least-likely case has 
an incredibly low probability of validating the outcome predicted by the proposition under 
scrutiny. If the outcome predicted by the proposition is found to be valid, it provides a strong 
confirmatory evidence. A classic example of a least-likely case is Michels’s (1962) study of 
oligarchy in large-scale organisations. Michels hypothesised that the key reason why the 
society is dominated by those few at the top is because oligarchy is an intrinsic feature of any 
complex social system. The study examined horizontally-structured political parties with 
strongly expressed commitments to extension of democracy. By showing that the organisations 
which had extremely low probability of being oligarchical were in fact undemocratic in their 
internal structure, he proved the ubiquity of oligarchy in bureaucratic, hierarchically organised 
entities. A corresponding example of a most-likely case is Jung’s (2012) study of relationships 
between power sharing and democratisation in civil war-torn countries. According to Jung, the 
United Nations and other international actors that provide external oversight of peace-building 
operations have viewed short-term peace-making and long-term democracy promotion as non-
conflicting, sequential objectives that could be achieved through establishing power-sharing 
institutions. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most likely candidate for long-term democracy 
promotion among countries under oversight of international mediators due to the largest extent 
of power sharing. The author through detailed examination of dysfunctional institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that as a result of rigid power sharing arrangements, military 
stalemate turned into political stalemate, obstructing democratisation efforts in the long run. 
As can be seen from the examples provided, a case can be considered crucial only if 
characteristics of that case are central for confirming or refuting a hypothesis. 
In order to verify my hypothesis that the main reason why former Soviet republics 
experience significant difficulties during the forced transition to market relationships is a 
mismatch between newly introduced formal arrangements and well-established informal 
constraints, I selected a country that would most-likely avoid facing such problems. Much to 
my surprise, Kazakhstan, my home country, represented a crucial case in relation to my 
hypothesis for two reasons. The first is that Kazakhstan’s accession lasted nineteen years and 
became the longest in the history of the WTO. Since Kazakhstan’s institutional and 
organisational set-ups were transformed more gradually then in any other transition economy 
that accessed the WTO, it had the biggest potential to avoid systemic problems, caused by a 
mismatch between the formal and informal elements of the system. It can certainly be argued 
that the policies of some post-Soviet nations could have accelerated the process of adaptation 
of the mindsets of people to new political, social, and economic order more than actions of 
other former centrally-planned economies. In reality, people’s minds are not something that 
are so easily affected by governmental policies, and therefore little could have been done in 
this respect. Nobel laureate, Douglass North (1990, p. 6) notes: “Although formal rules may 
change overnight as the result of political or judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied 
in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies”. 
The second reason that makes Kazakhstan a crucial case is that WTO officials claim it benefited 
the most from the accession (WTO 20181). Since it is claimed that Kazakhstan is the most 
successful case, it is most likely that hypothetical problems associated with a mismatch 
between formal arrangements and informal constraints would not manifest themselves. 
Therefore, if it were found that Kazakhstan failed to avoid the problems caused by a mismatch 
of formal set-ups and informal elements, it is likely that other transition economies would 
experience similar problems as well. Therefore, it would be reasonable to claim that tendency 
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of the WTO to disregard differences in the contexts of former centrally-planned economies and 
market economies by imposing prescriptions of the Washington Consensus on every acceding 
country is fundamentally wrong.  
2.4. Data collection and analysis  
At the core of this thesis are insights drawn from an extensive number of interviews 
with the key actors involved in the evolution, design, and implementation of innovation 
policies. The fieldwork was undertaken over a period of two years. Overall I conducted 73 
semi-structured face-to-face interviews and organised 5 dedicated discussion workshops. 
Interviews were conducted in face-to-face interactions as it was shown through a series of 
experiments that quality of data derived from telephone interviews is usually inferior (Bryman 
2012). Three participants were interviewed twice, two persons were interviewed four times. 
The majority of interviews were digitally recorded. The recorded interviews were transcribed 
in full length. Aside from formal interviews, numerous discussions, informal interviews and 
clarifying consultation sessions were held with both interviewees and other people. All the 
interviews and discussion workshops were carried out by me personally. Interviews were 
conducted in Russian because it is the universal language of communication in all countries of 
the former Soviet Union and the mother tongue for a vast majority of the population of 
Kazakhstan. Quotes from interviews have been translated by me. This thesis has been assessed 
against the University of Edinburgh’s Research and Research Ethics Committee’s self-audit 
procedure for ethical review and deemed not to require further ethical review (Appendix). 
Interviews were conducted only after obtaining informed consent from participants. Other data 
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Table 2.1. Interviewees  
In-depth, elite interviews were my primary data sources. Interviewees for this thesis 
were selected on the basis of their involvement in decision-making processes, knowledge of 
subject and seniority within the public, quasi-public and non-governmental sectors. By 
conducting interviews with individuals involved in devising the national strategy for 
technological development and who bore responsibility for the transformation of the 
innovation system (table 2.1.), the research aimed to obtain vital information on decision-
making processes undocumented in official sources. I was particularly interested in conducting 
interviews with representatives of the Ministry of Investment and Development and four main 
governmental agencies, charged with implementation of Kazakhstan’s strategy technological 
development (diagram 2.2). The primary data sources also included interviews with informants 
from academia, industry, and business community. I opted for semi-structured interviews 
because structured interviews are more suitable for quantitative approaches where it is 
important for the researcher to maximise the reliability of measurement of key concepts 
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(Bryman 2012). Meanwhile, semi-structured interviews allow some flexibility, in comparison 
with structured interviews, due to an ability to vary the sequence of questions and the tendency 
to keep asking further questions in response to significant replies. I paid specific attention to 
information provided by four key informants – Oleg Gavrilenko, Borisbiy Zhangurazov, 
Nurzhan Altaev and Aydin Kulseitov (table 2.1.). As key informants they possessed special 
knowledge and had access to observations and perspectives denied to others. Therefore, I tried 
to ask them open-ended questions in order to give them an opportunity to talk about things they 
considered important. Aberbach and Rockman (2002, p. 674) note: “Elites specially – but other 
highly educated people as well – do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended 
questions. They prefer to articulate their views, explaining why they think what they think”. 
Such tactics proved to be highly effective because they did not try to avoid difficult questions 
and sought to focus my attention on the most problematic matters, brining fresh insights to this 
















Diagram 2.2. Governmental agencies, responsible for technological development. 
Source: Official websites of governmental agencies. 
Since negotiating access to elite interviewees represents a challenging task for many 
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have a lot of things to say and participation in a research project provides them with an 
opportunity to draw attention to the issues that they believe are overlooked or misinterpreted 
by mass media. This is especially relevant for countries like Kazakhstan, where freedom of the 
press is heavily curtailed and media content reflects only mainstream views, formed by the 
established ideology (section 4.3.). I figured that the best way to convince elite interviewees 
that I possess the required level of competence was to send them in advance a list of preliminary 
interview questions. While such strategy seemed risky, as it would ruin my chances of ever 
gaining access if elites found my questions dull, vague, or predictable, my expectations were 
very high because I intended to proceed only after having undertaken several important steps. 
What I did not expect, however, was that well-elaborated interview questions had a signalling 
value, for as one respondent pointed out, the evident effort put behind their preparation had 
clearly indicated that the goal of the enquirer was to seek knowledge, rather than pursue some 
ulterior motive, such as establishing contacts that could have been used for personal gains.  
There were several steps that I needed to undertake in order to make sure that the choice 
of preliminary interview questions would persuade the elites to participate in my research 
project. Firstly, I conducted an excessive number of interviews with regular respondents of 
various backgrounds to understand which questions to ask elite interviewees and how exactly 
to formulate them. This was vital because despite my understanding of the ‘real world of 
policymaking’, knowledge of local context and academic involvement, I could not clearly 
identify systemic problems without getting feedback from different stakeholders. Secondly, I 
analysed every media interview in which potential respondents recently participated. Not only 
it enabled me to identify the focal points which they consistently tried to bring up, but could 
not discuss in-depth due to the format of media interviews, but also allowed me to demonstrate 
the level of my preparedness by incorporating references to these interviews into the questions. 
Thirdly, I examined thoroughly the national legislation in order to find out where exactly lay 
boundaries of responsibilities of governmental agencies that elite interviewees represented. 
The importance of this step is easy to overlook, but I was aware that the responsibilities of 
different governmental agencies frequently overlap and high-ranking officials might be 
reluctant to answer questions if they think that they mostly fall under the authority of another 
governmental agency. Finally, I included in the list some questions that would enable elite 
interviewees to discuss in-depth impact produced by the organisations they represent. My 
assumption was that by doing so I would ease the process of negotiating access to the elites as 
they would more likely agree to participate in the research project if the interview would 
provide them with an opportunity to promote values and interests of the entities they represent 
in academic circles. I approached the process of selecting interview question with extreme 
diligence because I relied on their depth and soundness in gaining access to elite interviewees 
rather than on my status, connections, or luck.  
On many occasions it was evident that the choice of interview questions rather than any 
other factor influenced the decisions of the elites to contribute to my research. I would like to 
discuss two of such instances because they offer some interesting observations. In the first case 
I negotiated access to the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs. Initially, the list of questions was passed to the Press Secretary, who informed 
me that the Deputy Chairman has a terribly busy schedule and arranging a research interview 
would be impossible. However, I was assured that the Deputy Chairman would receive the list, 
so that he could decide which department would provide me with a written response. That 
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seemed as an acceptable compromise because I needed data, possessed solely by the Chamber. 
Obvious downside of a written response would be inability to ask clarifying questions or 
change them because of what a respondent would have said. Much to my surprise, I was 
contacted the next day and face-to-face interview with the Deputy Chairman was organised. 
The second occasion I wish to discuss is related to how my interview with the Vice Minister 
of Investment and Development was arranged. Originally, I aimed to interview another high-
ranking official, who decided to decline my request. Nevertheless, in our phone conversation 
he offered his help in arranging an interview with a person whom he thought would be better 
suited to answer my questions. Within just one hour an interview with the Vice Minister was 
arranged. As the meeting was organised so fast, the Vice Minister never saw the interview 
questions, which is why some questions caught him off guard, making him very defensive and 
creating a distrustful atmosphere. The fact that the questions cornered him was confirmed a 
few hours after the interview was over, when his secretary contacted me and asked to send 
them the list of interview questions. When I asked why, she explained that the Vice Minister 
found the questions very tough and would like to be prepared in case if one day mass media 
would start asking similar questions. What is interesting about these two cases is that they 
demonstrate that sending questions in advance may benefit a researcher in several ways. Firstly, 
a researcher can gain access to otherwise unavailable data because busy elites may choose to 
provide a written response, which is a popular option for large organisations and governmental 
agencies. Secondly, elites who for some reasons are reluctant to participate in a research project 
can find a suitable substitute among their junior colleagues if they think that the interview 
questions raise important issues. Thirdly, the knowledge of what issues would be raised may 
help interviewee to prepare for tough questions that may otherwise sound confrontational and 
undermine attempts to establish a trusting environment.  
I opted to rely solely on quality of research questions in the process of negotiating 
because gaining trust of elite interviewees was as important as gaining access to them. It is 
frequently assumed that the researcher’s own status and connections is what largely defines 
whether the process of gaining access to elite interviewees would be successful (Vaughan 
2011). And surely, my long-term civil service employment provided me with many useful 
contacts, which meant that using them would be the easiest way of arranging interviews. 
However, I realised that pulling the strings would not produce a good impression on elite 
interviewees, which was vital for getting access to sensitive information. In Kazakhstan, too 
many things depend on connections and tendency of people to rely mostly on personal 
networks seriously annoys those in senior positions whose achievements are of their own (as 
is evident in my interviews with the Senator Bortnik and the Director of East-Kazakhstan’s 
Chamber of Entrepreneurs). So, knowing that, I decided to let the quality of interview questions 
to speak for themselves in gaining access. That worked out perfectly not only because most of 
my requests were approved, but also because casually mentioning common acquaintances and 
civil service background during the interview, rather than in the process of negotiating access 
produced a very positive effect on participants and enabled me to gain their trust. The fact that 
I was identified by interviewees as one of them was indicated not only by their willingness to 
discuss the most sensitive matters, but also by various subtle signs, such as their tendency to 
refer to other elites by mentioning solely their first names instead of full names or the titles of 
their official positions (note my interviews with the Vice-Rector and the Chairman of the Board 
of National Agency for Technological Development). While that might not seem as important 
a detail in the context of other countries, in Kazakhstan it was a distinctive sign that I gained 
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their trust because elites in conversation with an outsider would never refer to other people in 
senior positions only by their first name.    
The secondary data has been collected from surveys, official statistics, periodical 
publications, and public records. I paid specific attention to the annual Addresses of President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev to the nation, which serve as guidelines for the government and reflect 
his visions for Kazakhstan’s development. While I used statistical data in this research, I was 
aware of its limitations. Official statistics in Kazakhstan are often criticised for being an 
unreliable source of information. A recent scandal with statistical data happened on the eve of 
10-year anniversary of Kazakhstan’s new capital, Astana. Statistical reports published in May 
2016 show 880 thousand people living in Astana. However, in July 2016, a couple of days 
before the city’s anniversary celebration, akimat (the municipal government) of Astana 
announced that millionth inhabitant of the city was just born. Akim (mayor) of Astana 
congratulated the parents of new-born and in front of the press handed over to them keys from 
new apartment as a gift. The fact that population of capital somehow increased by 120, 000 
people in just two month was met with plenty of scepticism amongst citizens (Bekmaganbetov 
2016). While it is assumed that international statistics are more reliable, one high-ranking 
official clarified to me that it is still largely based on data provided by Kazakhstan’s Committee 
on Statistics.   
Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry Development 
Institute, comments on the accuracy of statistical data:  
It is claimed that approximately 75 percent of works and services in oil 
production are localised. In services up to 80 percent. But in fact, we understand that 
in oilfield services the numbers are much smaller. When a completely foreign-owned 
company simply register here, it is already regarded as local. Although competences 
do not transfer, and all profits go abroad. On the subject of goods: localisation 
allegedly reaches from 30% up to 60-70%, but we know what is happening here... 
[refers to well-known fact that certificates of origin CT-KZ were issued with 
violations] That is to say, I do not vouch for the accuracy of the statistical data that 
we have. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016) 
Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken", 
Nurzhan Altaev argues: 
Official statistics show that we are doing great, and we have an exceedingly 
high share of local content. Ask any national company, they will claim that they have 
80-90% of domestically produced share. Although, what is really happening is when 
they purchase from Kazakh SP [sole proprietorship] or Kazakh LLP [limited liability 
partnership], it is immediately regarded as local content. The SP and LLP buy 
everything from abroad: equipment, components, building materials, etc. It is all 
imported. (Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)  
Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological 
Development also elaborates on the accuracy of statistical data:   
The definition [of innovation] in the State Programme of Industrial and 
Innovation Development is that it is a new or improved product or service and that’s 
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it. Therefore, anyone who launches new product in Kazakhstan is considered as an 
innovator because of this definition. Out of 100 allegedly innovative firms only 30 
really are. So, you can safely disregard the other 70. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, interview, 
26th July 2016)       
To analyse collected qualitative data I followed well-established analytical procedures. 
In this research project data collection and primary analysis were conducted in conjunction 
with each other. I followed a standard set of sequential analytical moves suggested by Miles et 
al. (2014), which included the following stages:  
• Assigning codes to initial set of materials obtained from interviews, observations, 
media-coverage, document analysis, etc.  
• Sorting through coded materials to isolate similarities, common sequences, patterns, 
and relationships between variables.  
• Taking identified patterns out in the next wave of data collection to use it as a focusing 
device.  
• Gradually elaborating assertions and generalisations that explain discerned 
consistencies. 
• Comparing the obtained assertions and generalisations to existing theories.  
In order to analyse collected qualitative data further I used mind mapping software as 
an auxiliary analytical tool. In qualitative research it is difficult to find an analytical path due 
to an abundance of data (Miles 1979). Therefore, I used Mind Genius – a mind mapping 
software which helped me to visualise, structure, and brainstorm my ideas. A mind map is a 
diagram created around a central concept, drawn as an image in the centre of a page, to which 
associated representations of ideas in the form of branches and sub-branches are added. Since 
the diagram represents an image that depicts the interplay among different ideas, it enables a 
researcher to visually examine various causal relationships, analyse the validity of the 
arguments, and keep track of developing ideas. Although it is possible to use hand-drawn maps, 
computerised mind maps are more convenient. Firstly, computerised mind maps usually 
integrate with Microsoft Office, which enables user to export project data and mind maps to 
Word, Excel, Outlook, and PowerPoint. Secondly, they make the process of alteration more 
flexible. Thirdly, they allow to use hyperlinks and search function. The process of mind 
mapping is very intuitive and does not require high level computer skills. However, traditional 
set of sequential analytical moves described above should be followed first in order to produce 
parsimonious assertions and generalisations, which then could be effectively visualised in the 
diagram.  
Triangulation was a crucial part of data collection and analysis because the primary 
data for this research was drawn exclusively from elite interviews. It is frequently argued that 
power imbalance between inquirer and interviewee is both an inevitable and problematic 
characteristic of elite interviews (Richards 1996). Specifically, the power imbalance is 
considered to constitute a significant risk because elites may take control over the interview 
process and express their dominance by ignoring questions, making pre-emptive statements or 
simply saying whatever they want (Lilleker 2003). However, I have managed to establish trust 
and a sense of equality with the interviewees due to the fact that for many years I have been 
employed by the Senate of the Parliament and did not feel threatened by the power of elites. 
The interviews were conducted in the atmosphere of mutual respect and I detected no attempts 
on behalf of the interviewees to establish their dominance. I was perceived by interviewees not 
only as their colleague, but also as a person who understands the underlying contexts and would 
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not try to misinterpret their words. Therefore, triangulation was meant not to minimise power 
imbalance but to ensure the validity of data. I realised that sometimes the responses of elite 
interviewees were influenced by the interests of entities they represent. This was particularly 
noticeable in interview with the Vice Minister of Investment and Development when he tried 
to deny the fact that the industrialisation programme failed to achieve its goals. It was not 
something I did not expect because interviewees have motives of their own and they are not 
bound to be objective and tell researchers the truth (Berry 2002). Such moments were easy to 
detect not only because I was experienced civil servant, but also due to triangulation. As evident 
from many interviews I either asked subjects the same questions or asked their opinions about 
insights provided by other interviewees (note my interview with the Vice-Rector). This helped 
me to analyse data because I was able to triangulate respondents' views not only with secondary 
data but also with the opinions of other elite interviewees.   
Since my intention was to produce robust generalisations encompassing all countries 
of the former Soviet Union, I conducted data analysis through the prism of cross-case patterns 
that can be observed in other transition economies. Gerring (2007) argues that examination of 
a single case should also necessitate conduct of a cross-case analysis, or at least encourage the 
researcher to keep in mind a broader set of cases because otherwise it becomes impossible to 
answer the primary question all case studies should answer, and that is ‘what is this a case of?’ 
For me, bearing this question in mind was absolutely crucial because there was no theory on 
transition that would put analytical constraints on my reasoning and therefore I might be 
inclined to include in my analysis factors that were intrinsic to the case study under observation 
but irrelevant to other economies in transition. Therefore, I kept reminding myself that this 
research project was never about examining solely the case of Kazakhstan, as from the very 
beginning I was interested in unravelling causal relationships between the poor economic and 
technological performance of transition economies and their accession to the WTO. I also had 
to remember that the only reason why I chose to examine the case of Kazakhstan was because 
it was the crucial case that would enable me to verify my hypothesis encompassing all transition 
economies while conducting in-depth contextual analysis. However, I realised that the validity 
of extrapolation from the case of Kazakhstan to the parent universe hinged not so much on the 
fact that it was a crucial case, as on cogency of my interpretation, something achievable only 
if I analysed the case in a comparative context. Therefore, every factor that I discovered in the 
process of examination of case of Kazakhstan served as a peg or a signpost that upon implicit 
comparison helped me to establish generalisable causal patterns across all economies in 
transition.    
2.5. Methodological limitations  
From the very beginning of this project I was aware that making research in social 
science inevitably implies the need to make compromises. The famous French mathematician, 
Henri Poincaré, once remarked: “natural scientists always discuss their results while social 
scientists discuss their methods” (Bierstedt 1977, p. 43). The necessity to discuss methods in 
social sciences stems from the fact that every researcher needs to make certain trade-offs while 
designing their project. The biggest compromise I had to make was related to the 
representativeness of interviewee participants because I chose to conduct only elite interviews. 
The reason for that was ethical concerns regarding safety of interviewees. When it comes to 
rights of expression and freedom of speech, Kazakhstan is ranked as one of the least free 
countries in the world, holding only 22 out of 100 aggregate freedom scores (Freedomhouse 
2019). At the beginning of this research I tried to interview different groups of people in order 
20 
 
to get diverse first-hand feedback. However, I realised that due to a lack of knowledge about 
what can safely be said publicly, some interviewees could jeopardise themselves if this thesis 
became publicly available. On one occasion, a participant became extremely nervous at the end 
of the interview and asked me whether he could be imprisoned for the things he said. Therefore, 
I decided to interview only members of the elite, and to delete all the interviews in which 
participants endangered themselves. While I was concerned about the safety of interviewees, I 
felt comfortable about interviewing the elites because they are used to being asked their 
opinions and know what can be said without consequences.  
Another methodological limitation of my research relates to the necessity to mediate 
the transfer of meanings from one language and, more importantly, one context to another. 
Primary data for this research was collected in Russian and therefore needed to be translated 
into English. The main difficulty in performing such a task lay not in finding linguistic 
equivalents in two languages but in providing the reader with valid equivalencies in terms of 
conceptual meanings. Every language has zones of “intermittent untranslatability” (Ricoeur 
2004, p. 6), caused not so much by the difference in vocabulary and syntax as by the difference 
in cultural heritage and history. Consequently, my task was to find comparable meanings that 
would replace untranslatable concepts, thereby bringing the context closer to the reader. 
Because of my familiarity with the nuances of both languages and understanding of the context 
of transition economies I was able to provide communication between informants and the 
reader, which makes my intervention legitimate. In many instances, however, my intervention 
was not only legitimate but also vital because cultural, historic, economic, social, and political 
differences between the republics of the former Soviet Union and the Western world are 
paradigmatic. Owing to these differences, many things that need not to be explained in one 
setting, require thorough articulation in another. The problem was that since interviews were 
conducted in their native language, respondents felt no need to be explicit about things that 
would be obvious to any other member of their society. For example, as can be seen in my 
interview with the Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological Development, 
the informant felt no need to clarify to me that corruption was a byword for the jobs in the 
government, the quasi-public sector, the customs and the traffic police. My intervention was 
necessary because for the reader from the Western world, such jobs would not necessarily be 
associated with corruption. While my main task was to make primary data clear to the reader, 
I also wanted to minimise my intervention in order to avoid any potential bias. Therefore, I 
provided explanations to information that was implicit in the statements of respondents in 
comments to each interview.  
2.6. Conclusion  
Since it is generally assumed that the centrally-planned regime was merely a deviation 
from generally-accepted path adopted by market economies, the WTO encouraged 
governments of transition economies to focus exclusively on transforming their formal set-ups. 
The use of a single-case research design in this thesis allows to emphasise paradigmatic 
difference of norms, values, codes of conduct and practices intrinsic to former centrally-
planned economies from that of market economies, needed for providing a detailed explanation 
of why the imposition of the WTO requirements caused a mismatch between formal set-ups 
and well-established informal constraints. While normally it is impossible to generalise from a 
single case study, the fact that transition economies represent a fairly homogenous cluster of 
countries with clear cut differences from market economies makes this research implicitly 
comparative, thereby providing reference points for establishing generalisable causal patterns 
across a number of cases. Moreover, I argue that a crucial case research design can be used in 
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order to produce a robust generalisation on the basis of a hypotheses that the key impediment 
for successful transformation lies not in the task of changing formal structures of transition 
economies, but in making them fit with long-established informal constraints, entrenched in 

























3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the theoretical basis upon which empirical, 
theoretical, and practical contributions of this thesis are made. Section 3.2. addresses some 
common misconceptions about the centrally-planned regime by describing the arrangements 
that pertained during the Soviet era. Section 3.3. examines what the literature provides with 
regard to impact of the rules governing the process of accession to the WTO on technological 
development of latecomers and those lacking bargaining power. Section 3.4. scrutinises how 
the literature has addressed the very controversial topic of the spillover effects associated with 
FDI. Finally, section 3.5. reviews how rationales for governmental intervention are 
conceptualised in innovation systems studies and neoclassical economic theory.  
3.2. Command economy – an aberration of capitalism or a fully functional system? 
The specificities of the model of technological development, adopted by the Soviet 
Union are frequently examined independently of the goals for which they were created, leading 
to misinterpretation of the command economy as an aberration of capitalism. Although the 
literature is full of detailed descriptions of how the Soviet model of technological development 
had functioned, the reasons why it was adopted in the first place are rarely discussed. The 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2012, p. 51) explains the specificities of 
the innovation system of the Soviet Union in the following way: “The National Innovation 
System of centrally planned economies had a number of unique characteristics. New 
knowledge generated by basic research was transferred in a planned manner to applied research 
institutes, design offices, pilot factories, and, in the end, to final production. The main 
producers of knowledge, i.e., R&D organisations, were isolated from both education and 
industry. State resources were allocated in a centralized manner to achieve specific goals, but 
the role of bottom-up initiatives was virtually non-existent”. It is evident from this quotation 
that while the emphasis is placed on the most salient organisational features of the command 
system, no real attempt is made to explain the reasons why they were adopted. Such 
descriptions are ubiquitous, which is why so many researchers are inclined to make false 
assertions about the nature of the centrally-planned regime. For instance, Shields (2012, p. 12) 
argues: “The planned economy was an historical anomaly, an aberration, an experiment that 
has been tried, found wanting and rejected”. In reality, the establishment of the command 
regime was neither an experiment, nor merely an attempt to replace market forces with 
planning procedures, but rather the result of a conceptually different paradigm of development, 
adopted by the Soviet Union in order to achieve the goals of socialism.  
The main goals of the socialist society were eradication of inequality, speculation, 
unemployment, and exploitation. Therefore, the operation of the entire centrally-planned 
system, including functioning of its formal set-ups as well as informal, tacit elements such as 
practices, routines, and codes of conduct were adapted to fit with the socialist values and 
principles. It aimed to overcome one of the main problems of capitalism – the accumulation of 
wealth in the hands of a few. Due to this flaw in the market relationships model, the most 
deprived 20 percent of the world’s population account for only 1.3 percent of total private 
consumption expenditure, while the richest 20 percent account for 86 percent (UNDP 1998). 
In market economies “technology is created in response to market pressures - not the needs of 
poor people, who have little purchasing power” (UNDP 2001, p. 3). For instance, according to 
the Global Forum for Health Research (1999) only 10 percent of all investments made by both 
public and private sectors are used to research health problems of 90 percent of the world’s 
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population whereas 90 percent of all funds are spent on research into health problems that 
concern only 10 percent of the people. In contrast, the innovation process in the Soviet Union 
was targeted towards the needs of most of the population, rather than its wealthiest part. 
Considering that the model of technological development adopted by the Soviet Union was 
designed to fit the values of the socialist society, it makes more sense to talk about two 
conceptually different models of technological development rather than simply assume that the 
Soviet model was an aberration of capitalism. The Soviet Union’s model of technological 
development can be described as science-push, which sharply contrasted with market-pull 
model adopted by market economies.  
Market-oriented researchers have a tendency to disregard how the main purpose of 
adopting the science-push model was to pursue the communist values and principles, which 
led them to draw spurious causal links between technological performance and specificities of 
the model of technological development adopted by the Soviet Union. Different researchers 
put forward different arguments about why certain specificities of the innovation system of the 
Soviet Union made it inferior to the one adopted by the market economies. Essentially, focus 
was placed upon different features of the science-push model vis-à-vis its ability to produce 
high-end consumer products, while the fact that the choice of the model of technological 
development was defined by the goals of socialism was completely ignored. So, Siemaszko 
(1982) argues that the absence of competition and isolation of manufacturers from users 
impeded the progress of technological innovation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR). Hanson (1982) mentions that the inability of production units to switch their sphere 
of operation in accordance with their own vision, disincentivised the introduction of new 
technologies. Berry (1982) asserts that the technological development of the Soviet Union was 
held back by the tendency of industrial players to ignore improvements in the manufacturing 
process that would benefit the customer, but which increase labour input or cost for the 
producer. To sum up, criticism of the Soviet regulatory framework was usually based on how 
“in the Soviet system…the drive for technical progress comes not from a competitive market, 
but from central government” (Zaleski et al. 1969, p. 404). However, the science-push model 
was there not to increase labour productivity or enable manufacturers to produce high-end 
consumer products, but to deliver cheap, accessible goods which could be equally distributed 
among the entire population while providing as many jobs as possible in the process of their 
manufacturing. Neither competition between different production units, nor feedback 
relationships between manufacturers and consumers would improve the ability of the system 
to achieve the goals for which it was designed.  
While market-oriented researchers attributed the Soviet practice of separating R&D 
players from industries and end-users to a linear understanding of the innovation process, the 
reality is that the innovation process was deliberately fragmented in order to exclude pressures 
exerted by consumer demand and downstream implementation concerns. The organisational 
arrangements of the science-push model make little sense from the point of view of market-
oriented researchers. Hanson and Pavitt (1987, p. 24) argue: “One feature of the Soviet 
organizational structure for RDI [research, development and innovation] is its fragmentation… 
Frequently, at least in the past, a Soviet industrial design bureau, for example, would design a 
machine without having any information about the particular machine-building enterprise at 
which that machine might first be made, let alone the enterprises where it might eventually be 
used”. Since the centrally-planned economy is generally considered to be a non-system, 
attempts were made to explain the fragmentation of the innovation process in the Soviet Union 
24 
 
by claiming that the government had a linear understanding of innovation. Linear thinking, 
based on the assumption that the creation of new technologies consists of fixed sequence of 
phases with basic research at the beginning of a causal chain, followed by applied research, 
resulting in the production and diffusion of innovations is indeed a widespread phenomenon 
among policy-makers (Velasco 2015, Tait and Williams 1999). Accordingly, Cooper (2010, p. 
367) states: “In the U.S.S.R. the innovation process was always understood, implicitly by 
government officials and often explicitly by economists, as a linear process”. Such an 
argument, however, does not take into consideration the fact that the science-push model aimed 
to achieve the goals of a socialist society. The Soviet Union did not experience a shortage of 
viable technologies because the lack of practicality in the outputs of academic institutions was 
compensated by imitative and adaptive R&D, which in the Soviet Union was performed on a 
large scale basis (Hanson 2003). At the same time, due to the fragmentation of the innovation 
process under the organisational paradigm of the science-push model, scientists were able to 
pursue research objectives without being held back by matters of commercial practicality or 
downstream implementation concerns.  
In the Soviet Union research was pursued with little regard to limitations of industrial 
players or considerations of commercial practicality because science was viewed as a means 
of solving only strategically important goals. The science-push model provided the authorities 
with total control over innovation processes, enabling them to pursue the goals they considered 
crucial. Graham (1993, p. 201) mentions: “Soviet strengths in “big science and technology” in 
areas such as atomic weapons and space technology came from centralized government control 
over resources and personnel, a degree of control, possessed by few other governments”. The 
lack of commercially viable components in research outputs of Soviet scientists was 
compensated by imitative and adaptive R&D, conducted by science production associations. 
Science production associations – the locomotives of Soviet R&D – were heavily engaged in 
frugal innovation; the process of reducing the complexity and cost of an original good and its 
production. A fully-fledged science production association usually included a research 
institute, a design unit, experimental production facilities, and production plants. Different 
products purchased from abroad were used as prototypes and reverse engineered in order to 
create cheaper equivalents in which nonessential features were removed (Hanson 1982). As 
Berry (1982, p. 91) puts it: “the whole Soviet R and D system was set up to do just this: to 
adapt Western technology for production in Soviet conditions”. Owing to frugal engineering 
of consumer products, it was possible to keep the budget of civil R&D relatively low. 
Accordingly, while the ratio of gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) to gross national product 
(GNP) in the Soviet Union was about 4 percent, more than 70 percent of the R&D budget was 
spent on space and military research (Freeman 1995). Although the view of science as a means 
of solving only strategically important goals was the main reason why the Soviet Union lagged 
far behind Western countries in terms of sophistication of consumer products, it also enabled 
Soviet scientists to focus on ‘big science and technology’ in areas such as space exploration, 
nuclear power and military technology.  
Another prominent feature of the science-push model of technological development 
which makes little sense when being examined from the standpoint of market-oriented 
researcher is the fact that getting the science right was more important than brining technology 
to the marketplace. The structure of incentives and the organisational framework in the Soviet 
Union were designed to pursue scientific objectives with little regard to goals and potential 
limitations of industrial players or end-users (Amann 1982). The reason for that is because the 
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innovation process in the Soviet Union was adapted to economic relationships which were 
based on central planning rather than market principles. The central government acted as a sole 
mediator of science-industry relationships, controlled the supply of inputs and allocated outputs 
to end-users, whether industrial or individual consumers. There was no need to pass on all 
achievements of R&D to the customers because materialism and consumerism contradicted the 
values of a socialist society. However, it was extremely important to create an environment 
that would incentivise researchers to contribute to the goals of a socialist society. Accordingly, 
while production and distribution stages were heavily controlled by the government, R&D 
activities were much less so. Neither ministries nor other central planning agencies were in 
position to determine research priorities or to terminate questionable lines of investigation 
which often reflected pet interests of individual researchers (Ibid.). Moreover, in the Soviet 
Union successful completion of projects was not compulsory, because the key indicator of 
fulfilling the requirements of the plan was utilisation of the research organisation’s budget 
(Berry 1982). Not being exposed to time pressure under the science-push paradigm meant that 
researchers were able to engage in the pursuit of risky research projects, the strategic value of 
which was expected to be high.   
The specificities of technological development of the Soviet Union were the result of  
a strict adherence to the communist values and principles that not only defined its formal 
organisational and institutional structure, but also shaped the system’s informal, tacit elements 
such as routines, practices, and codes of conduct. It is important to emphasise the fact that the 
science-push model was neither a failed experiment of Soviet authorities, nor the result of a 
linear understanding of the innovation process. Rather it was a well-elaborated system that was 
designed to pursue the goals of a socialist society by enabling participants of innovation 
processes to get the science done right, to focus on ‘big science and technology’ and to create 
technology that responded to the needs of most of the population. Adopted ways of doing things 
influenced the interaction process and shaped values and attitudes of researchers, industrial 
players, and end-users. Most of them sharply contrasted with the ones inherent to market 
relationships. For instance, Amann (1982, p. 16) remarks: “Research institutes are pervaded by 
an academic ethos or ‘ivory tower attitude’. Since the projects initiated by the institute often 
reflect the pet interests of individual researchers (frequently corresponding to the subject of 
doctoral theses of the junior staff) there is no rational trade-off between novelty and 
commercial practicality and in extreme cases R and D personnel actively resist alterations to 
their designs suggested at enterprise level”. Over the course of decades of the central planning 
regime, routines, practices, and codes of conduct become deeply rooted in the minds of 
participants of innovation processes. This is something that should not be ignored because it 
caused some serious policy errors in managing the transition. As Pickel (1993, p. 147) notes, 
the view that “the old communist order has collapsed, leaving only ruins to be cleared out of 
the way for a complete new construction of a market system” is naïve because “while political 
regimes and ‘economic systems’ can collapse and vanish, the people with their knowledge, 
habits, practices, affiliations, informal networks and organizations remain”. Instead of being 
viewed as a non-system which is struggling to turn itself into a ‘fully-fledged’ open market 
economy, the command economy should have been treated as a distinct paradigm of socio-
economic development which not only had now-gone formal structures, but also informal 
constraints that still remain.  
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3.3. Accession to the WTO  
A growing number of developing countries have embarked on investment promotion 
measures as a policy priority, offering costly financial incentives in order to attract FDI. 
According to conventional wisdom, FDI play a key role in closing the technology gap between 
industrialised and developing countries through the international diffusion of technical 
knowledge. Smith (1993, p. 190) argues: “…in the contemporary world, knowledge and 
technological innovation are produced by an organized R&D industry. This requires elaborate 
and expensive infrastructures: sophisticated laboratories, legions of highly trained specialists, 
and extensive education systems. The associated costs may make competitive R&D activities 
difficult, or even impossible, in all but the most wealthy advanced societies”. Indeed, it is well-
established that new technological advancements are largely made in the developed countries. 
In 2013, the share of the world’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D by high-income and 
upper middle-income economies constituted 69.3 and 25.8 percent, respectively, while that of 
the lower middle-income and low-income economies was only 4.6 and 0.3 percent, respectively 
(UNESCO 2015). Consequently, various studies suggest that the outcomes of R&D, conducted 
in industrialised countries trickle down to developing nations mainly through FDI. According 
to the estimations of Held et al. (1999), multinationals carry out about 80 percent of global 
trade in technology along with the bulk of private R&D. As a result, the governments of 
countries aiming to catch-up in terms of technological capabilities place attracting FDI high in 
their agendas, often providing foreign companies more favourable conditions than those 
granted to domestic companies.  
Since the regime imposed by the WTO requires governments of acceding countries to 
adopt a hands-off approach towards multinationals, membership in the organisation 
significantly increases the inflow of FDI. In theory, the governments of host countries may 
unilaterally introduce changes in regulations, tariffs, taxation or use selective law enforcement 
in order to gain more benefits from the presence of multinationals, thereby negatively affecting 
their own interests. However, risks for investors would be much lower if their rights were 
guaranteed by a multilateral binding agreement rather than by a treaty with a host country. 
Investment protection measures of the WTO include prohibiting different practices commonly 
used by host governments in order to nudge multinationals into cooperation with domestic 
firms, such as local content requirements. Therefore, membership of the WTO can “increase 
the perception of a safer investment climate with a strong rule of law and the protection of 
property rights, similar to the negotiation of international and bilateral investment agreements” 
(UNCTAD 2013, p. 82). Accordingly, a number of statistical studies show that accession to 
the WTO positively correlates with an increase in the flow of inward FDI. For instance, analysis 
of data from 168 countries for the 1971-2012 period conducted by Dreher et al. (2015) shows 
that membership of the WTO and other investment-related international organisations 
considerably increased the flow of inward FDI. Similarly, after conducting statistical analysis 
of data of 122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 Buthe and Milner (2008) conclude that 
those nation states that have joined the WTO experience significantly higher FDI inflows. 
Despite the binding nature of WTO commitments, developing countries aiming to catch-up in 
terms of technological capabilities with industrialised economies access the organisation in 
order to harness the benefits of FDI for sustainable development. 
Whilst in theory membership of the WTO is expected to unequivocally benefit the 
technological development of acceding countries, in practice there are many complexities 
involved, the impact of which can be easily overlooked. As it is shown in the case study 
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presented by Fomin et al. (2011), purposeful governmental intervention might be necessary in 
order to help domestic firms to overcome consequences of accession to the WTO. When China 
joined the WTO in 2001, it had the biggest DVD manufacturing industry in the world. DVD 
players use codecs - programmes capable of encoding/decoding a digital data stream. Before 
2001, Chinese manufacturers used MPEG-2/H.263 codec without paying royalties. After 
joining the WTO, Chinese manufacturers found out that they needed to pay patent fees 
amounting to some 10-20% of the cost of DVD units, leaving them with marginal profits. 
Indigenous companies lacked the capability to create an alternative codec standard. As a result, 
the Ministry of Information Industry established the Audio Video Coding Standard 
Workgroup, consisting of 192 members. More than one fifth of the workgroup members were 
multinationals. However, key members, contributing to the most essential patents in the Audio 
Video Coding Standard Workgroup, were public entities, including universities and research 
institutes. Even though the Chinese government managed to unite the efforts of  the various 
actors, the workgroup was only able to present a new codec, which became an usable 
alternative to the dominant MPEG standard by the end of 2006. Despite experiencing a number 
of difficulties while developing the Audio Video Coding Standard, “the Chinese state showed 
its willingness to develop a long-term perspective, to review and learn from experiences, and 
to make major investments” (Williams et al. 2011, p. 722). What should be kept in mind, 
however, is that being one of the most dynamically developing economies in the world, and 
having immense bargaining power and strong governmental control over economic actors, 
China’s capacity to overcome the complexities of joining the WTO was far greater than that of 
any other catching-up country.  
The terms of WTO accession can become especially burdensome for latecomers and 
those lacking bargaining power, due to the nature of the rules governing the conduct of the 
negotiation process. The nature of the process of WTO accession is best described in the words 
of Grynberg and Joy (2006, p. 711): “WTO officials are fond of saying that the multilateral 
trading system is a rule-based system. Yet the accession process has no rules, except precedent 
and power, and is the very antithesis of what the members publicly state to be the intention and 
design of the WTO”. The process of accession to the WTO consists of two substantive phases. 
During the first phase, the applicant country submits a Memorandum on the Foreign Trade 
Regime, which provides a detailed summary of the country’s policies that affect international 
trade and investment flows. In the second phase, members of the Working Party, which 
includes all interested members of the WTO, conduct bilateral negotiations with the applicant 
country. However, since any unresolved issue between the applicant country and any single 
WTO member can halt the entire process, acceding countries are placed in a highly 
disadvantageous bargaining position. Trying to improve their access to the markets of acceding 
countries, incumbent members often impose extremely burdensome demands without taking 
into consideration how it may affect the economy of the acceding country. Since there are no 
guidelines that would specify the extent of the demands that can be made by incumbent 
members, or criteria according to which applicant’s level of commitment can be judged, the 
terms of accession depend largely on the bargaining power of negotiating parties and economic 
interests of particular WTO members. Accordingly, members of the Working Party can abuse 
their power over the applicant country in order to obtain considerable concessions in their own 
interest (Grynberg et al. 2006). Allegedly flexible terms of accession for developing countries 
such as longer transition periods or smaller commitments are “undermined by the realities of 
negotiations, where the developing countries are routinely subject to bullying and deceit” 
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(Chang 2004, p. 688). Typically, the requirements of the incumbent members go well beyond 
the boundaries of the WTO agreements and have become known as WTO-plus demands. 
Whilst it is the WTO-plus demands that impose the most significant compliance costs 
on acceding countries, the literature focuses almost exclusively on examining the side effects 
of formal WTO agreements. Normally, attempts by the incumbent members to obtain 
concessions from acceding countries during membership negotiations mean pressing them for 
commitments which extend far beyond the boundaries of formal WTO agreements (Jones 
2010). Nevertheless, the bulk of the literature on international technology transfer consists of 
cross-country evaluations of the effects produced by specific formal WTO agreements e.g. the 
impact of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement caused by the commitment to the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. In these studies 
researchers generally assume that accession to the WTO consists solely of bringing the national 
legislations into compliance with the norms stipulated in formal WTO agreements (Falvey and 
Foster 2006, Watson 2011). Evidently, the obligations stipulated in the specific WTO 
agreements represent a convenient reference point for conducting cross-country comparisons. 
However, such studies can only take us so far and can mislead the reader into overlooking the 
pitfalls of the accession process. The explanatory power of cross-country comparisons of the 
effects produced by formal WTO agreements is greatly diminished by the fact that the 
commitments stipulated in these agreements constitute the tip of the iceberg of the demands 
faced by applicant countries. In this respect, Przeworski (1987, p. 35) convincingly argues: “A 
consensus exists that comparative research consists not of comparing but of explaining. The 
general purpose of cross-national research is to understand”. Accordingly, the research efforts 
should move away from cross-country evaluations of the side effects produced by formal WTO 
agreements to a detailed analysis of the compliance costs imposed by the WTO-plus demands 
of its incumbent members. 
One of the reasons why it is the WTO-plus demands that affect acceding countries the 
most is the imperative requirement imposed on latecomers to adopt a hands-off approach to 
FDI. Although the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures that came into force in 
1995 prohibited use of certain investment measures, such as local content requirements, it 
contains no specific provisions regarding trade balancing rules, domestic sourcing, technology 
transfer or export performance requirements. Nevertheless, during accession incumbent 
members of the WTO usually insist upon full deregulation of FDI. WTO members justify the 
enforcement of a hands-off approach on the basis of an argument that deregulation and creation 
of a ‘fair-play environment’ enables catching-up countries to attract more FDI, thereby 
facilitating international technology transfer. Moreover, the WTO recommends that catching-
up economies focus on attracting FDI because various international technology transfer studies 
show that multinationals have played a crucial role in building up the national industries of 
now-developed countries. For instance, Saggi (2002, p. 357) argues: “Many governments have 
increasingly recognized that multinational firms serve as conduits of superior technology, as 
well as of management techniques. This realisation stems from the success of countries such 
as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand that rely heavily on FDI and from a quest for the sources 
of their success, which include international technology transfer and local investments in 
infrastructure and education that facilitate absorption of technology”. What such studies do not 
mention, however, is the fact that the Asian tigers as well as other now-developed countries in 
preceding waves of industrialisation were not bound by the WTO rules. In the past these 
countries used a wide range of FDI regulatory policies in order to achieve industrialisation, 
including: insistence on joint ventures with domestic firms, limits on ownership, barriers to 
brownfield investments (take-overs of domestic enterprises by foreign investors) and so on 
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(Chang 2004). Therefore, Rodrik (2002) argues that as the Asian Tigers only had to pay a small 
fraction of the costs of integration into the global value chain during their formative industrial 
growth, it would be wrong to mark them out as exemplars of modern globalisation. The WTO, 
in seeking to follow its own agenda, intentionally overlooks the fact that in the past, now-
developed countries used a wide range of measures to regulate foreign investment and uses 
neoliberal rhetoric in order to deregulate FDI. 
Another important WTO-plus demand which has significant compliance costs is that 
an acceding country must establish a market economy with minimal level of governmental 
intervention into economic activity in order to become a member. Even though the rules of the 
WTO do not prescribe what type of economic system the applicant country should have, being 
classified as a non-market economy results in deadlock and delays the negotiation process. The 
United Nations (2001, p. 34) states: “While the WTO Agreements do not have an explicit 
requirement that a member must have fundamentally a market economy, such a requirement is 
being imposed de facto by existing members as part of the leverage they have in the accession 
process for new members”. Acceding countries have to demonstrate their adherence to the 
principles of the WTO by letting market forces determine prices, reducing the extent of 
governmental intervention and removing control over certain sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, most existing members press actively for the reforms that also pave the way to 
brownfield investments such as privatisation of state-owned enterprises, provision of 
information on privatisation programme, etc. The implementation of such radical reforms in a 
compressed time frame might be a challenging task not because legal institutions have to be 
changed, but because of path-dependency and inertia of the mindsets of different actors who 
follow implicit guidelines such as well-established practices, codes of conduct, tendencies to 
trust, entrepreneurial culture, risk averseness, cooperative spirit, etc. Chaminade and Edquist 
(2010, p. 103) argue: “The government can play a significant role in the development of the 
formal rules whilst in most cases this role is marginal when the most tacit elements are to be 
influenced (culture, firm routines, social networks, etc.)”. Due to the need to adapt both formal 
and informal institutions the WTO-plus demands to establish a market economy with minimal 
level of governmental intervention might represent a massive undertaking for a country 
acceding to the WTO due to the fact that informal institutions are sticky and impervious to 
change. 
The important question that needs to be answered here is whether the reform package 
imposed by the WTO benefits all acceding countries. Charnovitz (2015) mentions that 
incumbent members use the promise of membership to influence applicant countries to make 
changes to their economic policies. He clarifies that the normative reason used to justify this 
approach is that putting in place these changes will both help the applicant country, as well as 
benefit exporters and investors of incumbent members. The literature, however, is ambiguous 
on whether or not a hands-off approach to foreign investment is beneficial. On the one hand, 
the international technology transfer literature is full of optimistic appraisals regarding the 
impact of FDI liberalisation (Romer 1993). On the other hand, Chang (2004, p. 700) notes: 
“however ‘liberal’ a country may be towards foreign investment, a targeted and performance-
oriented approach works better than a hands-off approach, which is recommended by the 
developed countries today”. The same ambiguity can be found in relation to an argument 
whether establishing market economy relationships with a minimum of public intervention is 
beneficial for catching-up countries. According to OECD (1999, p. 16, my italics), 
“Deregulation is a subset of regulatory reform and refers to complete or partial elimination of 
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regulation in a sector to improve economic performance”. In contrast, Gu and Lundvall (2006) 
argue the tendency of different international organisations to regard a market economy system 
with a minimal level of governmental intervention as a benchmark model is misleading because 
certain elements that worked well in one innovation system will not necessarily have the same 
impact on economic performance in another system. In order to estimate whether the claims 
that deregulation of FDI and establishment of market economic relationships unequivocally 
benefit catching-up economies are correct, this research aims to examine experiences of former 
command economies, as they have undergone the most significant change during the process 
of accession and, following the WTO reasoning, should have benefited from it the most.    
3.4. FDI spillovers  
Earlier literature suggests that domestic firms can benefit not only through vertical 
(inter-sector) spillovers, but also through horizontal (intra-sector) spillovers. Theoretically, 
multinationals may generate positive externalities to domestic competitors within the same 
industry through three channels: labour turnover, competition, and demonstration/imitation. 
Labour turnover is the first channel through which the presence of multinationals may benefit 
domestic firms. Multinationals tend to put significant efforts into training local employees. 
Domestic firms are not burdened by the expense associated with employees’ training and 
therefore have the potential to pay higher salaries and lure trained workers away from rival 
multinationals (Lindsey 1986). Hence, well-performing domestic firms gain the opportunity to 
hire former employees of multinationals who have obtained knowledge and experience of 
working with superior technology (Fosfuri et al. 2001). The second channel is related to the 
possibility of the occurrence of positive externalities as a result of competitive challenge. The 
intensified competition induced by multinationals on the market of the host country may force 
indigenous firms to adopt new technologies, update production methods, or use existing 
resources more efficiently given that domestic firms have a sufficient level of competence 
(Blomström and Kokko 1998). A final channel refers to the technological upgrade of local 
firms through imitation (by indigenous firms)/demonstration (by multinationals). Adopting 
new technologies can be costly and can also contain unforeseen risks for domestic companies. 
Uncertainty over the results and costs of obtaining new knowledge may discourage local firms 
from updating their production techniques. However, technologically advanced domestic firms 
may imitate the practices of multinationals by using cutting-edge technologies and 
management techniques, thereby improving their technological performance (Zhang and Li 
2014). While theoretically horizontal spillovers are possible, the assertions about positive 
effects produced by the presence of multinationals are based on various interpretations of 
aggregate data or cross-sectional surveys with no evidence to support causal claims (Djankov 
and Hoekman 2006, Hoekman and Javorcik 2006).  
Whereas the claims about occurrence of intra-sector spillovers have been refuted by 
more recent studies, they played their part in building up the expectations of the governments 
of acceding countries regarding the impact of FDI on technology catch-up. Policy-makers are 
often cautious about deregulating FDI due to reasonable concerns that competition with 
multinationals may supress the development of domestic firms. However, technology transfer 
studies offer various hypotheses regarding the potential channels of intra-sector spillovers, 
rationalising WTO-plus demands to deregulate FDI and allowing policy-makers to overcome 
their concerns. As Cox (1981, p. 128) puts it: “Theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose”. In reality, however, spillover effects occurring within the same industry, would 
improve the performance of the local competitors of multinationals, which provides 
multinationals with strong incentive to prevent technology leakage (Javorcik 2006). For 
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instance, if host country has weak IPR protection, multinationals usually choose to locate 
production that requires specialised complementary assets in that country, making imitation 
too costly to profit from (Zhao 2006). While it is assumed that domestic firms may update 
manufacturing technologies in order to meet competitive challenges, Aitken and Harrison 
(1999) show that competition with multinationals crowds out domestic firms by attracting 
demand away from their indigenous rivals. The suggestion that domestic firms might attract 
trained workers away from rival multinationals is refuted by Sinani and Meyer (2004), who 
argue that multinationals attract the best workers from domestic industries by offering higher 
salaries. Besides, multinationals may impose non-competition clauses on key personnel 
(Hoekman and Javorcik 2006). Accordingly, Rodrik (1999, p. 37) mentions: “Today’s policy 
literature is filled with extravagant claims about positive spillovers from FDI, but the evidence 
is sobering”. Statements about technology transfer within the same industries are based on 
unconfirmed hypothesis and mostly serve as normative reason in WTO rhetoric in order to 
force deregulation of FDI.  
Potentially, backward and forward linkages represent the most probable channels for 
technology spillovers. Vertical technology transfer takes place in downstream and upstream 
industries when multinationals transmit technology to domestic suppliers or customers in the 
production chain. Multinationals create backward linkages with indigenous firms by 
purchasing intermediate inputs locally or forward linkages by selling technologically advanced 
products to domestic companies. Multinationals have no incentive to prevent vertical 
technology transfer because improving the productivity of local suppliers of inputs and services 
may reduce sourcing costs (Hoekman and Javorcik 2006, Saggi 2006). Moreover, establishing 
vertical linkages with local firms allows multinationals to avoid being held-up by any single 
supplier (Blalock and Gertler 2008), cut logistics costs (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2011), and to 
adapt their products to the local market and receive tax concessions or other benefits from host 
governments. In theory, multinationals may upgrade a host economy towards the higher end of 
the value chain by integrating indigenous firms into worldwide production networks and 
transferring their knowledge of world markets (Lipsey 2002). Radosevic (1997, p. 386) 
mentions: “FDIs are a potentially powerful channel of integrating an SI [system of innovation] 
into global networks and influencing its structural change. They enable, though do not ensure, 
the creation of linkages with domestic suppliers and the introduction of modern technology”. 
Hoekman and Javorcik (2006) argue that unlike the mixed results on horizontal technology 
transfer, the evidence on benefits of vertical integration has been consistently positive.  
Governments of catching-up countries put significant effort into attracting 
multinationals, believing that they might establish vertical linkages with domestic companies. 
Apart from accessing the WTO and joining different binding international treaties, catching-
up countries offer generous financial incentives to foreign investors. For example, in order to 
convince Fiat to locate their plant in Serbia, the government subsidised approximately 
€105,000 per job in 2008 (Jovanovic 2015). Similarly, in the mid-1990s Brazil tried to attract 
investments in automotive manufacturing by offering incentive packages in the range of 
$54,000 to $340,000 per job (World Bank 2005). Needless to say that such offers exceed 
incentive packages provided to domestic firms. However, in their pursuit of FDI policy-makers 
often neglect the need to build capabilities of domestic firms, facilitate collaboration between 
actors or improve regulatory environment. As a result, domestic firms might not be able to 
meet the quality standards required in order to become a part of supply chain of a multinational 
(Gage and Lesher 2006). Accordingly, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005, p. 47) argue: “In the 
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face of difficulties associated with capturing spillover effects and the multitude of factors that 
can influence the extent of spillovers in each economy, we caution researchers about drawing 
generalized conclusions about the existence of externalities associated with FDI in developing 
countries”. Although in general multinationals are inclined to establish linkages with local 
suppliers, their entry to host countries does not guarantee that domestic industries will be 
integrated into the global production chains. 
There is no consensus among scholars about the factors that determine the existence 
and magnitude of spillover effects. Statistical data has been interpreted in many different ways 
in order to demonstrate the existence of causal links between certain aggregate-level 
characteristics of firms, industries or countries and occurrence of FDI spillovers. To illustrate 
this point, it might be useful to examine how researchers interpret data in order to draw causal 
links between the degree of foreign ownership in investment projects and technology transfer. 
For instance, Dimelis and Louri (2002) examining a sample of 4,056 manufacturing firms 
operating in Greece in 1997 found that the technology transfer to domestic firms increases with 
the degree of foreign ownership. The authors argue that parent firms have no inhibition to 
transfer more advanced technology to its affiliates if the foreign share over investment projects 
is larger. In contrast, Takii (2005) analysing the Indonesian manufacturing between 1990 and 
1995 came to the conclusion that the magnitude of spillovers was smaller in industries with 
high foreign ownership because parent firms could easily control personnel assignments in 
wholly or majority-owned affiliates and therefore prevent diffusion of firm-specific 
knowledge. Among the factors that supposedly define the magnitude of spillovers, the literature 
identifies: the age of domestic firms (Gorodnichenko et al. 2007), level of absorptive capacity 
(Chen et al. 2011), technology gap (Kinuthia 2016), degree of competition (Sjöholm 1999), 
human capital (Ali et al. 2016), and the existence of preferential trade agreements between 
countries (Javorcik et al. 2004). However, in the absence of a verified and well-established 
conceptual framework such studies lack robustness. As Lipsey and Sjôholm (2005, p. 40) put 
it: “If country and industry differences are important to the impact of inward FDI on host 
countries, the main lesson might be that the search for universal relationships is futile”. 
Determinant factors of spillover effects do not operate in isolation. Moreover, a specific cause 
may have contradictory effects depending on other conditions. Therefore, the research efforts 
in this thesis are shifted towards examination of system-level explanatory factors by conducting 
contextual analysis of policies and circumstances that inhibit spillover effects.  
3.5. The Washington Consensus and innovation systems approach 
Demands to establish open market relationships and deregulate FDI, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, were a part of broader WTO agenda aiming at the imposition of the 
neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus on the global level. The Washington 
Consensus refers to a set of economic policy prescriptions for developing countries, considered 
to constitute the ‘best-practice’ reform package consisting of 10 rules, including trade 
liberalisation, adoption of a hands-off approach to FDI, privatisation of state enterprises and 
deregulation (Williamson 1990). More generally, the Washington Consensus promotes market 
relationships, openness to the world and minimal level of governmental intervention. The 
neoliberal ideas embodied in the Washington Consensus were imposed on all acceding 
developing countries through the WTO policies regardless of their level of economic 
prosperity, aspects of historical development or institutional specificities (Stiglitz and Charlton 
2005, Peet 2009). Obviously, implementation of neoliberal prescriptions stipulated in the 
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Washington Consensus was an extremely challenging undertaking for former centrally-
planned economies, not so much because of the necessity to change formal set-ups, as due to 
the task of making them fit with long-established elements such as codes of conduct, practices, 
norms, routines and values. It is a well-known fact that informal elements embedded in the 
mindsets of domestic actors are extremely resilient to change (North 1990). Therefore, radical 
transformation of formal structures would cause a mismatch between formal set-ups and 
informal constraints. Nevertheless, it was assumed that the imposition of the ideas of the 
Washington Consensus would unequivocally benefit transition economies. As Serra et al. 
(2008, p. 3) put it: “the Washington Consensus has come to be associated with ‘market 
fundamentalism’, the view that markets solve most, if not all, economic problems by 
themselves”. While no evidence was provided that implementing of the ideas of the 
Washington Consensus would benefit economies in transition, the WTO insisted upon their 
radical transformation.  
Being an active promoter of the ideas of the Washington Consensus, the WTO ensured 
that the governments of transition economies embarked enthusiastically on implementing its 
prescriptions by forming sociotechnical imaginaries. The concept of national sociotechnical 
imaginary is coined by Jasanoff and Kim (2015, p. 4), who describe it as “collectively held, 
institutionally stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by 
shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive 
of, advances in science and technology”. The concept allows to draw attention to the fact that 
policies can be built upon visions of attainable futures rather than knowledge or tangible plans 
and serves as a metaphor of a policymaking process in real life. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union there was no theory or guidelines on how to transform former centrally-planned systems 
into market economies (Turley and Luke 2011, Becker and Becker 1996, Stiglitz 1994, Levine 
1992, Papava 2005, Lavigne 1995). The reason for this was twofold. On the one hand, during 
the communist era attempts by the Soviet economists to discuss transition towards a market 
economy would have caused serious repercussions because it would imply consent with the 
capitalist system of values. On the other hand, the theory of transition was not a subject of 
concern for Western researchers as they viewed a centrally-planned regime as a non-system 
(section 3.2.). After the disappointing results of perestroika such imaginaries seemed both 
promising and viable. Turley and Luke (2011, p. 371) argue: “At the outset of transition… 
expectations of almost everything, from the time period involved to the amount of external 
assistance and FDI flows to the accrued benefits from transition, were excessive”. Despite the 
fact that neither the governments of transition economies nor the WTO had a tangible plan on 
how to transform former centrally-planned economies into functioning market economies, the 
reality of policymaking is that their decisions were often based on imaginaries rather than 
knowledge and tangible plans.  
One of the key reasons why policy-makers in transition economies continue to rely on 
the sociotechnical imaginaries, shaped by the WTO, is because neither economic theory nor 
innovation systems literature offer clear answer on what exactly needs to be done in order to 
catch-up with industrialised market economies. In the absence of this knowledge, policy-
makers in transition economies had to act based on abstract theories, anecdotal evidence, and 
personal instincts. The WTO, however, offered to follow a path of socio-economic 
development based on the visions of an imagined future which implementation of prescriptions 
of the Washington Consensus would entail. Due to a lack of knowledge about the way open 
market relationships work, policymakers in former centrally-planned economies were easily 
manipulated by promises of desirable futures. For example, WTO’s Deputy Director-General 
Alan Wolff asserts: “Far-reaching economic reforms are taking place in a number of countries 
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following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A number of countries in the region have 
consolidated the gains of domestic economic reform and are building on them by their 
integration into the world economy. To achieve this, they have joined or are taking steps to join 
the multilateral trading system, created, and maintained by the World Trade Organization… 
The dividends of the WTO accession process can be seen in Kazakhstan, which joined the 
WTO in 2015.  Its negotiations for accession, accompanied by an extensive domestic economic 
reform program, resulted in the country's transformation from a Soviet planned economy to a 
modern, knowledge-based economy.  Any can visit Kazakhstan for themselves, as I have, and 
see the transformation in progress” (WTO 2019). Following their own agendas, mature market 
economies and intergovernmental organisations engaged in developmental efforts use 
neoliberal rhetoric in order to convince the governments of transition economies to introduce 
reforms that provide a competitive advantage to multinationals and developed market 
economies.  
The ideas of the Washington Consensus were challenged by proponents of an 
innovation systems approach, who criticised the idea of borrowing ‘best-practice’ policies and 
refuted the rationale for governmental intervention based on neoclassical economic theory. The 
Washington Consensus policy framework is grounded strongly in neoclassical economic 
theory (Fine et al. 2001). Neoclassical economists assumed that innovations are the product of 
a linear process, consisting of fixed sequence of phases. In their view, the innovation process 
was narrowed down to basic research at the beginning of a causal chain, followed by applied 
research, resulting in the production and diffusion of innovations. Private actors have a 
tendency to underinvest in R&D, which leads to ‘market failure’ (box 3.1.). Therefore, policy-
makers need to intervene in order to allocate resources optimally and achieve equilibrium. Over 
the last few decades such a viewpoint was extensively criticised by the proponents of the 
innovation systems approach – an approach that has emerged as a challenge to the Washington 
Consensus and neoclassical economic theory and brought a different perspective on the role of 
government (Lundvall 2007). Firstly, proponents of the innovation systems approach pointed 
out that neoclassic economic theory does not clarify what should be the optimum level of 
investments or what specific areas require intervention (Chaminade and Edquist 2010). 
Furthermore, it was argued that new technologies can develop outside the formal R&D system 
through different forms of collaboration and learning by doing (Edquist 2001). Instead of 
studying the effects produced by actions at the level of individual actors (e.g. customers, 
research institutes, universities, governmental bodies, financial organisations), the innovation 
systems approach focuses on system-level explanatory factors such as system activities (Liu 
and White 2001) or, more recently, system problems (Edquist 2005). The innovation systems 
approach shifts attention away from market failure towards system failure – a set-up in which 
interplay among actors and institutions does not provide the right incentive to encourage the 
innovation process (Smits et al. 2010). Accordingly, policy-makers are supposed to intervene 
in those situations when the system is not operating well, that is when systemic problems occur 
(Hommen and Edquist 2008). Secondly, proponents of the innovation systems approach refute 
the practice of imposing ‘best-practice’ reform packages. For instance, Lundvall et al. (2006, 
p. 16) argue: “Another reason to apply the innovation systems perspective is that it helps to 
avoid naïve borrowing of ‘best-practice’ policy across national borders. What seems to work 
well in one systemic context might not do so in another”. Although the major weaknesses of 
the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus were convincingly demonstrated by the 
innovation systems approach, policy-makers tend to follow the sociotechnical imaginaries 
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 Box 3.1. Theoretical frameworks of neoclassical theory and NSI approach 
 Source: Based on Chaminade and Edquist 2010, Hauknes and Nordgren 1999, Smith 
2000, Woolthuis et al. 2005.  
While the innovation systems approach demonstrates the major weaknesses of the 
Washington Consensus, it offers no alternative path that could be taken by the governments of 
the economies in transition. The irony of the situation is that it is proponents of the innovation 
systems approach who (unlike neoliberalists) strongly believe that governmental policies is the 
main factor that defines innovative performance. For instance, Nelson and Rosenberg (1993, 
p. 512) argue: “Of course much of the current interest in national systems of innovation reflects 
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a belief that the innovative prowess of national firms is determined to a considerable extent by 
governmental policies”. Nevertheless, the attempts of innovation policy studies to formulate 
guidelines for policy-makers consist of purely theoretical attempts to conceptualise potential 
systemic problems that may require governmental intervention (box 3.2.). Even when empirical 
materials are provided, they tend to be merely illustrative and depict primarily the experience 
of the developed market economies (Chaminade et al. 2012). Although the checklist of 
potential systemic problems is exhaustive, it can hardly be used in real policymaking. The 
systemic problems identified in these studies are broadly linked either to the evolution of the 
system over time or the functioning of the elements of the system, including institutional 
arrangements, organisational set-ups, and networking patterns. An examination of the systemic 
problems needs to be context-specific because what might be considered a systemic problem 
in one context may not necessarily be one in another. Chaminade et al. (2012, p. 1477-1478) 
argue: “From the policy perspective, there might be a research infrastructure problem if, for 
example, the universities lack capabilities to conduct research; if there are not R&D centres; if 
the links between university and industry are ill developed, etc. What the literature seems to 
ignore is the fact that the mere existence of weak links between universities and industries, for 
example, might not constitute a (systemic) problem in a country where the main economic 
activities are not based on research”. Considering that the national contexts of transition 
economies are vastly different to that of developed market economies, the systemic problems 
experienced by them are likely to be different as well. Accordingly, this thesis aims to conduct 
context-specific examination of transition economies in order to find out what systemic 
problems their governments need to take into consideration. 
 
Potential systemic problems in the NSI-policy framework 
 
 
• Infrastructure provision problems  
The infrastructure provision problems refer to the inadequate scale and scope of 
physical infrastructure (transport, roads, airports, harbours, accommodation, etc.), network 
infrastructure (information and communications technology infrastructure, telecoms, mobile 
broadband, etc.) and scientific infrastructure (research labs, technical institutes, testing 
facilities, regulatory agencies, libraries, etc.). The technological competitiveness and 
capabilities of national firms depends first and foremost on adequate provision of 
infrastructure since it affects the ability to absorb knowledge, diffuse and apply new 
technologies, generate skills, and form international linkages.  
 
• Transition problems 
Transition problems are related to the inability of national firms to adjust to 
technological paradigm shifts. Most firms tend to focus only on specific technologies that 
they use in their production cycle. Competence building in one narrow area of expertise 
limits the ability of firms to develop capabilities in other areas. Therefore, such firms may 
encounter technological problems when they face the necessity to adjust to change in market 
demand or have to adapt to emergence of new technological opportunities. Adoption of new 
technologies implies high degrees of uncertainty that can deter firms from the necessity to 
change. Moreover, the emergence of new paradigms is difficult to foresee. Consequently, 
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the problem of transition is especially acute for small firms that have limited resources and 
lack technological competence in other areas.   
 
• Lock-in problems 
Lock-in problems arise from inertia and path-dependency of technology systems. For 
instance, national firms might be locked into existing technologies due to substantial and 
irreversible technology-specific investments they have made in past. Path dependency, 
therefore, hinders adaption of new technologies because by switching to new technological 
paradigm, firms would cannibalise the value of their own investments. Similarly, whole 
technological systems also may ‘lock-in’ on existing technologies, impeding the emergence 
and diffusion of more efficient new technologies. However, breaking the ‘path’ of an entire 
technology system is an exponentially more difficult task because it is embedded into a 
system’s essential components, such as skills, procedures, engineering routines, physical 
infrastructure, plant design, social organisation and so on.   
 
• Capability and learning problems  
Capability and learning problems occur when domestic firms lack competences 
(technological, human, or organisational). Insufficient capabilities of firms limit their 
absorptive capacity, flexibility, and ability to adapt to new technologies.  
 
• Hard institutional problems 
Hard institutional problems are rooted in inefficient functioning of national 
regulatory system. Formal institutional mechanisms include laws, regulations, technical 
standards, rules, etc. Together they define the context within which national firms operate. 
Institutional context plays a central role in the production, adoption, and diffusion of 
innovations. Institutional mechanisms influence the behaviour of national firms and shape 
their capabilities and technological opportunities.  
 
• Soft institutional problems 
Soft institutional problems are associated with difficulties that may arise as a result 
of an inappropriateness of tacit and informal rules such as political culture, social norms, 
habits, routines, established practices, and values. NSI approach pays special attention to the 
role of institutions in the innovation process. It should be noted that the implicit ‘rules of the 
game’ are even more path dependent and prone to inertia than formal institutional 
mechanisms.  
 
• Unbalanced exploration-exploitation mechanisms  
On the one hand, the problem of unbalanced exploration-exploitation mechanisms 
may emerge when a system generates diversity but lacks the instruments for an adequate 
selection process. In such cases, domestic industries may be involved in excessive variety 
generation with weak selection procedures. On the other hand, the system may have proper 
selection processes but lack the capability to generate diversity.   
 
• Network problems 
Network problems refer to the intensity and nature of interactions between various 
organisations in the NSI. Both inadequately strong and weak linkages seem to have a 
negative effect on the normal functioning of a system. On the one hand, weak connectivity 
among organisations within a system limits the ability of actors to coordinate research 
efforts, hinders investment opportunities, and prevents interactive learning. On the other 
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hand, extremely, strong ties lead to a blindness to what happens outside the network. 
Analysis of interactions between actors play central role in the NSI approach. However, 
without empirical examination it is exceedingly difficult to estimate which particular links 
matter most in a specific system. 
 
• Complementarity problems 
Complementarity problems refers to situations when the competences of the system 
do not supplement each other. Interactions between complementary technologies, functions 
and actors are vital for the proper functioning of a system. Poor connection between elements 
of the system inhibits learning process and limits ability to exploit the positive effects that 
may arise from the combination of complementary capabilities.    
 
Box 3.2. Potential systemic problems in the NSI-policy framework 
Source: Based on Chaminade and Edquist 2010, Chaminade et al. 2012, Hauknes and 
Norgren 1999, Smith 2000, Woolthuis et al. 2005.  
3.6. Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed, in detail, the theoretical and empirical literature underlying the 
key issues related to the accession of transition economies to the WTO. The first research gap 
that this thesis aims to address concerns the key misconception about the nature of transition, 
stemming from the fact that the centrally-planned regime is viewed by market-oriented 
researchers as an aberration of capitalism. The problem is that various analysts focused solely 
on distinct institutional or organisational features of the centrally-planned regime in order to 
demonstrate that its specificities made it inferior to market relationships. They argued that the 
Soviet model of technological development was a failed experiment by the authorities who had 
a linear understanding of innovation processes. What these researchers failed to consider is that 
the science-push model was not designed to increase productivity, improve collaboration 
among participants of innovation processes, or to effectively pass on the achievements of R&D 
to the consumers. It was adopted to achieve the goals of socialism, such as eradication of 
inequality, exploitation, unemployment, and speculation. Accordingly, not only formal set-ups 
but also informal elements such as practices, routines, and codes of conduct were aimed to fit 
with the principles and values of communism. Over the course of decades, the ways of doing 
things embedded deeply into mindsets of people and formed a path that became self-reinforcing 
and impervious to change. Therefore, while market-oriented researchers assume that transition 
represents merely a transformation of formal arrangements, the reality is that it represents a 
paradigm-shifting endeavour, the main difficulty of which lies in overcoming stickiness of 
informal constraints.  
The second research gap identified here relates to the tendency of the literature to focus 
almost exclusively on examining the effects produced by the rules stipulated in formal WTO 
agreements. I show that whilst formal WTO agreements represent convenient reference points 
for conducting cross-country comparisons, their ability to advance our understanding of the 
consequences of accession for latecomers and those lacking bargaining power is limited due to 
the fact they constitute only the tip of the iceberg of the demands faced by applicant countries. 
The danger lies in the omnipresence of such studies, as it may delude the reader into thinking 
that the consequences of harmonising national legislation with the norms of formal WTO 
39 
 
agreements is the most significant obstacle that the acceding countries have to overcome. The 
reality is that progress in negotiations depends on the interests of incumbent members and the 
bargaining power of the applicant country, rather than the level of demonstrated commitment 
to the principles of the WTO. Therefore, acceding countries can be pressed for commitments 
far beyond the requirements of formal WTO agreements. Accordingly, this chapter posits that 
research efforts should be directed towards examination of the effects produced by WTO-plus 
demands. In the case of transition economies, particular emphasis should be placed on 
examining the effects produced by WTO-plus demands to establish open market relationships 
with the minimal level of governmental intervention and deregulation of FDI.  
The third research gap this thesis contributes to relates to the ambiguity in international 
technology transfer literature regarding the factors determining the existence of spillover 
effects. I demonstrate that the assertions of different authors about positive externalities 
generated by the entry of multinationals are based on various interpretations of aggregate 
statistical data or cross-sectional surveys with no supporting evidence for causation. I argue 
that the attempts to draw causal links between isolated determinant factors and technological 
performance leads to contradictory conclusions due to the tendency of researchers to neglect 
causal complexity associated with international technology transfer. Attention here is drawn to 
the fact that contextual examination is important because different factors can combine in a 
variety of ways to produce a given outcome. As Ragin (1987, p. 24) puts it: “A president’s 
popularity may increase as the result of military intervention in other areas of the world; it can 
also plummet. News about interest rates can cause the stock market to go up or down, 
depending on other economic news. Appeals to patriotic sentiments by political leaders are 
sometimes quite effective, depending on the timing and character of the appeal and the specific 
mix of national symbols used in the appeal. But they often fall flat”. Therefore, this thesis aims 
to move away from aggregate-level evaluations of factors determining the occurrence of 
spillover effects, by conducting a contextual examination of the systemic problems that obscure 
technology transfer. 
The fourth gap lies in the inability of research literature to provide a clear answer on 
what steps the governments of transition economies need to take in order to catch-up with 
industrialised market economies. This chapter shows that since there had been no attempts to 
develop a theory on transition, neither the WTO nor the governments of transition economies 
had a real understanding on how to transform former centrally-planned economies into fully-
fledged market economies. Nevertheless, in the process of accession, transition economies 
were required to deregulate FDI and establish open market relationships as it was a part of a 
broader WTO goal to impose the neoliberal principles stipulated in the Washington Consensus 
on a global level. Although the assertions of the WTO that the reforms would unequivocally 
benefit transition economies were based on the visions of an imagined future rather than actual 
knowledge, policy-makers in transition economies enthusiastically embarked on their 
implementation, because in the absence of a clear understanding of what needed to be done, 
they had to act on the basis of abstract theories, anecdotal evidence and personal instincts. I 
show that problems with the ideas of the Washington Consensus, identified by the innovation 
systems literature were not only the naïve borrowing of ‘best-practice’ policies, but also 
inclination towards market fundamentalism – the belief that free market policies can solve most 
economic and social problems. However, while the innovation systems literature convincingly 
demonstrates that the focus should be shifted away from market failure towards system failure 
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as a rationale for governmental intervention, it does not provide clear guidelines on what needs 
to be done. I argue that this thesis needs to engage in a contextual examination of transition 
economies because the checklist of potential systemic problems that may require governmental 
intervention, as provided by innovation system literature, is based mostly on theoretical 

























4. GOVERNMENT AS ALLOCATOR OF FINANCES   
4.1. Introduction  
This chapter examines attempts of the government to accomplish a shift of 
Kazakhstan’s innovation system from the Soviet era science-push to a market-pull model of 
technological development. I show that in pursuit of a national sociotechnical imaginary of 
turning Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based economy, the government adopted organisational 
and institutional set-ups inherent to open market economies and established a practice of 
allocating financial resources through ‘borrowed’ policy instruments. The concept of a national 
sociotechnical imaginary is employed in this chapter in order to provide a better understanding 
of how the transformation of Kazakhstan’s innovation system was shaped by the neoliberal 
rhetoric of the WTO. The use of the sociotechnical imaginary concept explains how the 
necessity to conduct reforms was presented to the government in the form of an opportunity to 
build a knowledge-based economy, despite the fact that the WTO neither understood the 
problems of transition nor was interested in creating a plan on how it could be carried out. 
Attention here is drawn to the centrality of the role of government, and to the fact that transition 
is a paradigm-shifting undertaking that cannot be successfully conducted solely by 
transforming a country’s formal organisational and institutional arrangements. 
The argumentation in this chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2. shows that the 
authorities adopted the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach due to a conviction that 
neoliberal reforms, insisted upon by the WTO, would turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based 
economy. Here, I draw attention to the fact that in reality the WTO had no plan on how 
transition should be accomplished, but convinced Kazakhstan’s authorities to follow the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus forming a national sociotechnical imaginary. 
Section 4.3. examines how a mismatch between well-established values of researchers and the 
formal institutional and organisational framework that the government set up in the process of 
transition towards a new model of technological development, affected the ability of the system 
to produce competitive outputs in open market conditions. The rest of the chapter considers 
policies put in place to establish a system, based on the national sociotechnical imaginary. 
Section 4.4. pays attention to government attempts to spur the output of commercially-viable 
technologies through the adoption of policies aimed at bringing technology to the marketplace. 
Section 4.5. analyses whether initiatives to allocate funds through technology parks encouraged 
multinationals to relocate their technology-intensive activities to Kazakhstan. Finally, section 
4.6. reviews attempts by the government to make scientific research more relevant to the needs 
of industry by withdrawing itself from the role of a sole mediator of science-industry 
relationships.  
4.2. ‘Economy first, then politics’ 
The departure point of this chapter is a critique which is crucial for any further 
understanding of the problems associated with implementation of the demands of the WTO to 
transform the former centrally planned economies into open market economies. The critique 
concerns the key misconception regarding the nature of transition, stemming from the tendency 
of market-oriented researchers to view the command economy as an experiment of Soviet 
authorities, aimed to replace market forces with planning procedures rather than a fully-
fledged, well-functioning system (section 3.2.). In reality, the centrally-planned regime was 
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established in order to achieve the very specific goals of socialist society, which include 
eradication of inequality, speculation, unemployment, and exploitation. The important part is 
that these goals shaped the values, beliefs, and attitudes of people. However, because the 
centrally-planned regime is viewed as just a market system in limbo, it is frequently assumed 
that transition towards open market relationships can be achieved simply through the 
transformation of formal institutional and organisational set-ups of the former communist 
countries. Accordingly, the WTO and other international organisations, promoting the ideas of 
the Washington Consensus (section 3.5.) have a tendency to build their agendas solely around 
the issues concerning transformation of formal organisational and institutional arrangements 
of the previously centrally-planned economies, while completely neglecting the existence of 
informal constraints entrenched deeply in the public mindset. What these organisations 
overlook is the fact that the ability of a system to function properly hinges on an interplay 
between consciously created formal set-ups and informal, implicit elements of a system that 
evolve spontaneously, such as codes of conduct, norms, practices, and routines.  
The fact that changing the mindsets of people is an extremely challenging endeavour is 
evident from my interview the Vice-Rector on Science and International Cooperation of D. 
Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko, who points out that 
once the implicit ‘rules of the game’ of the science-push paradigm (section 3.2.) were accepted 
by participants of innovation processes, they continued to be followed despite radical 
transformation of formal organisational and institutional set-ups:  
The system that was built in the Soviet Union included academic institutions which 
were a source of knowledge. Then, there was a network of sectoral institutions. Also, 
there were science production associations. In Soviet Union they all constituted a 
chain that carried out innovations to a finishing point. Certainly, they had standards 
of efficiency. Not everything that was invented in academic institutions ended up 
being a final product. Nevertheless, the process was carried out in accordance with 
this chain, and science production associations were the final link where in fact 
industrial prototypes were created and then manufacturing was launched. This system 
still remains in people’s minds and most people continue to work in compliance with 
that system. (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016)  
The Vice-Rector draws our attention to the paradigmatic distinction between the science-push 
model and the market-pull model of technological development, and to the fact that its 
specificities led not only to establishment of formal organisational and institutional set-ups but 
also to formation of informal constraints. Accordingly, in the process of accession to the WTO, 
transition economies have to go through radical reforms, the main difficulty of which lies not 
in transforming formal arrangements, but in making them fit with the long-established informal 
elements of a system embedded in the minds of participants of innovation processes.  
The implementation of WTO-plus demands to establish an open market economy 
implied the abandonment of the well-established science-push paradigm and was presented as 
an opportunity to build a knowledge-based economy. The science-push model of technological 
development fitted well with the goals of the socialist society and was accepted by participants 
of innovation processes. The organisational paradigm, insisted upon by the WTO prescribes 
limiting any governmental intervention in economic processes, rendering the old way of 
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developing technologies obsolete. The WTO possessed none of the knowledge required to 
develop a working plan for Kazakhstan’s transformation into an open market economy because 
Western economists have not been concerned with the problems of transition (section 3.5.). 
Nevertheless, despite lacking a tangible plan on how to handle transition, the WTO made 
Kazakhstan’s government follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus by asserting 
that the accession process has steered Kazakhstan on the path to building a knowledge-based 
economy. In the course of reforms, WTO officials repeatedly assured Kazakhstan’s 
government that the establishment of a knowledge-based economy depends on a country’s 
ability to follow given recommendations (WTO 2019). Due to the rhetoric of the WTO and 
reformist attitude of the authorities, an entire national strategy on technological development 
was built around this sociotechnical imaginary. Moreover, being convinced that the neoliberal 
reforms provide a credible solution to the problems of transition, Kazakhstan’s government 
started to seek ways of ensuring that reforms are implemented exactly in the way envisioned 
by the authorities.  
The strategy of Kazakhstan’s authorities on building a system, based on national 
sociotechnical imaginary, was to demonstrate the country’s political stability to foreign 
investors and ensure smooth implementation of the demands of the WTO by consolidating 
power around the President. In accordance with the recommendations of the WTO, attracting 
FDI was high on the Kazakhstan government’s agenda. In order to attract FDI, the authorities 
intended to demonstrate political stability to foreign investors by delaying democratic reforms 
and concentrating power in the hands of the President. The OECD (2014, p. 63) recapitulates: 
“Kazakhstan justifies the expansion of presidential power with its “special way” theory, 
adjusting the “Asian model,” in which political reform takes a back seat to economic growth – 
“first the economy and then politics”. Accordingly, the vision of Kazakhstan’s forthcoming 
development, based on national sociotechnical imaginary was formulated in the annual 
Addresses of the President to the nation and served as guidelines for respective state agencies. 
The responsibilities of state agencies for implementing the Presidents’ vision of development 
are then detailed in different legislative acts, strategic programmes, and conceptions of 
development. While important for demonstrating the country’s stability to foreign investors 
and implementation of the demands of WTO membership, unquestionable authority of the 
President also made the process of building up a system, based on the national sociotechnical 
imaginary impervious to input of stakeholders and bottom-up initiatives. 
In the 2015 presidential elections, Nursultan Nazarbayev received 97.7% of the vote, 
winning a fifth term in office. Popular support enabled the President to consolidate the nation’s 
resources behind his vision of Kazakhstan’s sociotechnical development. Askhat Kuzekov, 
Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative Development, and 
Entrepreneurship argues:    
You know, it is not only in innovations, in many other matters we don’t have 
centralised, non-departmental, state-level approach. President of our country has such 
approach, but I don’t see such attitude anywhere below. Each one pulls the blanket 
over himself; everyone wants to grab something for himself.  Each department, each 
ministry. And in the end, nothing really works. I am saying that during budget 
meetings when we discuss all these things, everything becomes very complicated and 
you can see there who is fighting for what. They simply want to grab money 
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disregarding what will happen tomorrow.  Sadly, there is lack of thoughts on what it 
will give to our economy and how to act in order to make big impact for development 
of Kazakhstan’s economy in whole.  (Askhat Kuzekov, interview, 1st August 2016) 
My interview with Senator Kuzekov shows that the fear of social and economic instability, and 
to a lesser degree the personal charisma of Nursultan Nazarbayev and public approval of his 
political course, helped the President gain tremendous support from the voters. Ibrayeva and 
Nezhina (2013, p. 64) argue: “Political corruption and fierce competition for power and natural 
resources represent the most serious threats to the development and stability of the country. 
The lack of informal and formal checks and balances in the power system, weak accountability 
of public officials, a powerless Parliament, and corrupt law enforcement stall anticorruption 
measures in political and administrative circles in Kazakhstan. Many people fear that 
withdrawal of President Nazarbayev from the political arena in Kazakhstan may ignite power 
wars between elite groups, which monger for economic and political domination”. 
Consolidation of power around the President became the primary reason for formation of top-
down system lacking checks and balances. The biggest drawback of such a system is that, for 
public sector managers, the zealous pursuit of outcomes demonstrating the results of their work 
to the higher authority became the highest priority.  
Despite possessing no knowledge about the nature of FDI due to the Soviet past, 
Kazakhstan’s authorities had excessive expectations of their potential benefits. One of the main 
priorities of Kazakhstan’s authorities was to facilitate integration of domestic R&D players 
into global research projects in order to accelerate development of new technologies. Due to 
the lack of knowledge about the causes of FDI spillover effects, stemming from the Soviet past, 
the authorities imagined that the entry of multinationals into the domestic market would 
automatically lead to the relocation of their knowledge-intensive activities into Kazakhstan and 
the integration of domestic R&D players into their research projects. Thus, in his Address to 
the nation the President stated: “To accelerate the transfer of knowledge and new technologies 
to the country, we need to fully use the potential of foreign direct investment” (Nazarbayev 
2014). The President’s vision of Kazakhstan’s sociotechnical development was strongly 
influenced by the neoliberal rhetoric of the WTO, which emphasised that inflow of FDI is the 
key factor that defines Kazakhstan’s ability to technologically catch-up with developed 
countries. The strategy ‘economy first, then politics’, adopted by Kazakhstan’s authorities has 
been highly successful in terms of attracting investments. Political stability, achieved through 
concentration of power in the hands of the President guaranteed safety on investments, making 
Kazakhstan an incredibly attractive place for investments. Due to the massive flow of inward 
FDI, Kazakhstan became one of the three most rapidly growing economies in the world, after 
Qatar and China, with the annual real gross domestic product (GDP) average growth about 8% 
for the period 2000-10 (Ernst & Young 2012). Although Kazakhstan attracted a massive 
volume of FDI, there was no plan for how to facilitate integration of domestic R&D players 
into the global research projects because WTO rules protect multinationals from direct 
intervention – the only strategy known to the governments of post-Soviet states.  
The Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological catch-up was based on the 
recommendations of the WTO, which repeatedly emphasised the central role of FDI in the 
process of building of a knowledge-based economy. Speaking at an international conference 
on “Interconnectivity in Central Asia” held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, WTO’s Deputy Director-
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General Alan Wolff asserts: “From a country with GDP per capita at USD 1,350 in 1996, 
Kazakhstan reached a level of per capita GDP at USD 8,900 in 2017, nearly a 600% gain. It 
has been estimated that Kazakhstan's WTO accession has resulted in welfare gains equal to 
3.7% of its GDP.  Much is due to the liberalisation of foreign investment in the services sectors 
following from Kazakhstan’s WTO accession and improved access to the markets of non-CIS 
countries (WTO 2019). Accordingly, the government was given concrete targets on attracting 
multinationals. Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov comments:  
We have two tasks that the President has set: it’s to attract over 100 billion dollars of 
foreign investments within 10 years period. The second task is to attract 10 large 
transnational corporations. This is what we focus on! (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st 
August 2016)    
The Vice Minister was obviously very keen to execute the President’s vision and report the 
results back as soon as possible. However, even considering top-down governmental hierarchy, 
such a position should have implied the need to develop and apply additional criteria to the 
task of attracting FDI. If the end goal is to build a knowledge-based economy, it is important 
to distinguish between brownfield and greenfield investments or multinationals that relocate 
knowledge-intensive activities from those limiting their production cycle to last-stage 
assembly.  
The lack of knowledge on how to facilitate integration of domestic R&D players into 
the research projects of multinationals encouraged Kazakhstan’s authorities to start 
‘borrowing’ policy instruments used by mature market economies. The ‘economy first, then 
politics’ approach enabled the authorities to maintain unilateral control over the course of 
Kazakhstan’s socio-economic development. A top-down approach to decision-making ensured 
that the reforms were implemented in the exact way envisaged by those at the top of the 
pyramid. The problem, however, was that the government did not have a plan on how to 
integrate domestic R&D players into the global research projects because the rules of the WTO 
protect multinationals from direct intervention of host governments (section 3.3.). Being unable 
to use its primary tool of power – direct intervention, the government started to ‘borrow’ policy 
instruments used by open market economies. The fact that Kazakhstani policies aimed at 
developing innovation initiatives were drawn largely from international experience was noted 
by the UNECE (2012) with a side remark that the local context which includes historical 
circumstances and institutional settings should have been taken into account. The government 
introduced a wide range of ‘borrowed’ instruments, such as innovation centres, special 
economic zones, taxation support policies, etc. No evidence was presented that these adopted 
policy instruments would be effective in the context of Kazakhstan. Moreover, for a significant 
period these new policy instruments lacked supporting mechanisms, hampering practical 
coordination and implementation of initiatives (Ibid.). While consolidation of power in the 
hands of the President ensured the transformation of Kazakhstan’s organisational and 
institutional set-ups in the exact way as it was envisioned in the annual Addresses of the 
President to the nation and other strategic documents, it did not make the building of a system, 
based on national sociotechnical imaginary, more feasible.  
An interview with Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry 
Development Institute shows that even officials were sceptical about the practice of 
‘borrowing’ policy instruments from other contexts, without establishing their effectiveness:  
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We claim that attributes [of ‘benchmark’ economic systems] were established, but up 
until 2010 they didn’t have supporting mechanisms. Let me explain why. Because 
back then legislation has defined what grants are, what their types are and what they 
are aimed at, what commercialisation is, how it is supported, what design bureaus are, 
how technology transfer is conducted, what analytical functions the government 
should perform and so on. The rules, prescribing what to do and how to proceed were 
formulated much later. In fact, an omission as you absolutely correctly noticed was 
that local authorities were not included in this system and they had to improvise. The 
law states that local authorities have the right to create their own legal entities which 
will be engaged in the development of innovations in that region. “Astana-
innovation”, “Shymkent-innovation” were created by trial and error, they tried to 
analyse what could be done. Some did well, some did poorly. (Aydin Kulseitov, 
interview, 17th March 2016) 
It is quite clear from this interview that Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development 
was built around vague imaginaries rather than detailed plans. Explaining the concept they 
developed Jasanoff and Kim (2009, p. 123) specify: “Imaginaries, in our view, are not the same 
as policy agendas. They are less explicit, less issue-specific, less goal-directed, less politically 
accountable, and less instrumental; they reside in the reservoir of norms and discourses, 
metaphors, and cultural meanings out of which actors build their policy preferences”. The 
WTO did not need to provide evidence that the reforms they insisted upon will ultimately turn 
Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based economy. Because Kazakhstan has a top-down system of 
governance lacking checks and balances, it was enough to point at certain direction and let the 
zeal of public sector managers to do the rest.  
The next section will examine how a mismatch between formal set-ups and informal 
elements influences attitudes of stakeholders towards the ‘rules of the game’ of a system, based 
on the national sociotechnical imaginary.  
4.3. Imposition of the ‘rules of the game’ of national sociotechnical imaginary  
The adoption of a model of technological development, in which role of science is 
diminished to mere conduct of near-market research was a sensitive matter for domestic 
scholars. The science-push model of technological development, adopted by the Soviet Union, 
provided researchers with the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in ‘big science and 
technology’ because the practice of frugal engineering enabled the authorities to devote a larger 
share of resources to strategically important technologies (section 3.2.). In the context of 
transition to an open market economy, however, frugal innovations were unable to withstand 
competition with mature foreign products (Radosevic 1997). Therefore, the Soviet practice in 
which innovation process was deliberately fragmented in order to devote major part of 
resources to ‘big science and technology’ had to be abandoned. The government, however, did 
not attempt to mitigate the process of transition to a new model of technological development 
by addressing the expectations of researchers. As a result, the ‘rules of the game’, according to 
which the role of science is largely reduced to the conduct of near-market research were, 
rejected by many scientists, who started to seek other positions in different sectors of the 
economy. In Kazakhstan only one out of 60 Candidates of Science (level, classified by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization as 'doctoral or equivalent') 
and one out of 37 Doctors of Science still pursue scientific carriers (Nazarbayev 2011). The 
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mismatch between the long-established system of values of researchers and the formal 
institutional and organisational framework that the government had to set up in the process of 
transition towards a new model of technological development caused the scientists to reject the 
new ‘rules of the game’ of a system based on national sociotechnical imaginary.  
The science-push model of technological development not only enabled researchers to 
engage primarily into ‘big science and technology’ but also met their other expectations. 
Nurlan Musin, former chief executive officer of Ulba Metallurgical Plant recollects:   
I started as a design engineer at an experimental plant where I developed fodder 
equipment. After having read many materials I started to propose various [higher-
end] designs. I was laughed at and was told just to make it certain way. Recalling this, 
I realise that our engineers who invented the first Sputnik satellite could create the 
best machines. Even cars. There was no need to make high-end cars for our citizens… 
Cars had to be produced within such a price range, in which a certain amount of 
population could afford it. Given the level of income of population, we could only 
produce low-end cars… The Soviet Union needed to survive. There was no need to 
create advanced, comfortable machines. Innovations were developing very well. 
They even had to be held back. (Nurlan Musin, interview, 18th July 2016) 
Evidently, the opportunity to be a part of the innovation system that could produce affordable 
technologies, designed to meet the needs of majority of population was a source of pride for 
Soviet engineers. Moreover, it seems that the realisation that Soviet science possessed immense 
capabilities was an extremely rewarding feeling which provided participants of innovation 
processes with validation of the importance of their work. This is a very important factor to be 
taken into consideration because “Beliefs and values…are not just an explanatory ‘‘add-on’’; 
they are essential components of economic, ecological, demographic, organizational, and 
political explanations” (Thompson et al. 2006, p. 324). The process of transformation of former 
centrally-planned economies cannot be adequately explained without taking into consideration 
the well-established ideals, beliefs, and values of domestic scientists. Having no knowledge 
about the potential pitfalls of transition, the government assumed that researchers would 
automatically start performing tasks in the way it was envisioned by those at the top. The 
National Agency for Technological Development is a governmental agency, directly 
subordinate to the Ministry of Investment and Development. The primary task of the Agency 
is support of innovative activity in Kazakhstan. Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board 
describes how the role of scientists is imagined by the government:  
Scientist should pursue science, he should invent. Universities need to have an office 
of commercialisation whose task is to commercialise inventions and get patents. They 
should decide whether they need a patent or not and find application for this 
invention: sell the patent, make licence agreement, or receive royalties. This is his 
task. Scientist will always profit from such arrangement. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, 
interview, 26th July 2016)              
It seems that the Chairman does not take into consideration the fact that since the role of science 
has changed so drastically, many researchers would not accept the ‘rules of the game’ offered 
by the authorities. Under the guidance of the WTO, the government focused solely on changing 
formal organisational and institutional set-ups, while the importance of informal constraints, 
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embedded in the mindsets of researchers was overlooked. The attitude of scientists toward the 
change of the role of science is summarised in the comment of the Vice-Rector on Science and 
International Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg 
Gavrilenko: 
We have prioritised secondary things; we have prioritised money and lost our science. 
We have thrown science away. (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016) 
The remark of the Vice-Rector demonstrates the challenging nature of a task of shifting from 
the science-push to the market-pull model of technological development, facing Kazakhstan’s 
authorities. The way he describes the need to conduct near-market research draws our attention 
to the fact that the ideals, beliefs, and values of researchers, established over many decades, 
became extremely resistant to change. It is quite clear that research in Kazakhstan became no 
longer associated with either ‘big science and technology’ or production of affordable 
technologies that met the needs of masses.  
Being established in a top-down manner, organisational and institutional set-ups 
inherent to a market-pull model of technological development did not fit well with the norms, 
values, and expectations of researchers, hampering the development of near-market research. 
Kazakhstan adopted the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach because centralisation of power 
enabled the government to demonstrate political stability to foreign investors and ensure the 
smooth implementation of the reforms in the way it was envisioned by the President. The civil 
society organisations and the mass media were heavily suppressed in order to maintain absolute 
governmental control over the system during implementation of radical reforms. Accordingly, 
for freedom of the press Kazakhstan was ranked 130th among the 140 countries listed by the 
World Economic Forum (2018). As Ibrayeva and Nezhina (2013, p. 44) put it: “The case of 
Kazakhstan is an illustration of the central role of government in transforming economic, 
political and social order with little input from the people and often against the will of the 
people”. However, due to the lack of checks and balances in terms of the public accountability 
of officials, they tend to focus on their own targets, established in accordance with the vision 
of the President and disregarded the needs of stakeholders. Being convinced that by following 
the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, Kazakhstan is on its way of turning into a 
knowledge-based economy, officials overlooked the fact that the ability of a system to produce 
competitive outputs in open market conditions first and foremost hinges on the creation of an 
environment that would incentivise scientists to conduct near-market research. As a result of 
the top-down implementation of reforms, the ‘rules of the game’ of the system, based on the 
national sociotechnical imaginary, offered no incentives that would motivate scientists to 
switch to near-market research. 
The consequences of the tendency to disregard the needs of scientists in favour of 
pursuing their own plan targets can be illustrated by looking at the reforms, performed by the 
Ministry of Education and Science. In order to demonstrate to the higher authority that funds 
are allocated on competitive basis, the efforts of the Ministry were directed towards introducing 
additional stages to the procedures of allocating funds. However, due to the top-down manner 
of decision-making and the tendency to overlook the needs of researchers, new procedures 
leave no time for conducting research. The Vice-Rector on Science and International 
Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko 
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comments on how changes in procedures of allocating funds influence attitudes of the 
scientists:  
Look, the adoption of the budget [of the university] due to bureaucracy with 
allocation of funds normally gets delayed till March-April. In March-April money get 
transferred to Universities’ accounts. For four months people are starving, sitting 
without salaries or they try to find some side job. Ok, money got transferred in March-
April, but now they’ve launched system of expertise. The fiscal year ends in 
December, but due to the requirement to conduct expertise prior to submission, they 
changed procedures. Whereas earlier, five-ten years ago reports had to be submitted 
in December, nowadays terms are reduced. Until recently, it had to be completed by 
December 20th, later it became by December 10th. Now the Committee threatens that 
it will have to be done in October. Now count yourself. In reality, we cannot begin 
work until moneys are transferred. Let’s assume that money got transferred by middle 
of April. We start in May. In October we have to write a report. We have only five 
months out of twelve for R&D. The rest of the time is spent on getting money, 
approval of report and submitting expertise. The term for conducting R&D shrinks. 
Instead of conducting R&D for 12 months we have only five. What kind of quality 
such research can have? This is without considering the impact of the law ‘On state 
procurement’ which also implies formalities and has time frames. In short, purchase 
of equipment detains for several months in the best-case scenario. Now the question 
is – where is R&D? As a result, all those funds allocated for science turn into money 
circulation instead of getting results… Even if we recall the Soviet Union with all its 
drawbacks, I remember that money was transferred on 1st of January. First 
prepayment we received on 20th of January. Reports were submitted in December. 
(Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016)  
There are two reasons why I consider this comment important. Firstly, the Vice-Rector raises 
a particularly important issue of how the attitude of the authorities towards science has changed 
over time. While in the Soviet Union research was considered as perhaps the most important 
strategic activity (section 3.2.), today it is treated as a liability and approached accordingly. 
Secondly, his comparison of old and new ways of doing things draws our attention to the 
consequences of the adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach. When the practice 
of funds allocation used by the Ministry of Education and Science is compared to the one used 
by the Soviet authorities, it becomes evident that the priorities of public sector managers have 
shifted from pursuit of the goals of the whole society towards following the agenda of one 
ministry.  
Following the WTO’s neoliberal rhetoric, the government prioritised integration of 
domestic R&D players into international scientific projects over development of near-market 
research. Neoliberal rhetoric emphasising the role played by FDI in the process of 
technological catching-up of newly industrialised states raised the expectations of 
Kazakhstan’s authorities regards their strategy of technological development, which was based 
on attracting multinationals. Due to the lack of knowledge about the nature of international 
technology transfer, stemming from the Soviet past, the authorities assumed that the creation 
of a fair-play environment for multinationals would automatically cause relocation of their 
knowledge-intensive stages of production processes into the country, which would allow 
domestic R&D players to be integrated into the global research projects. Therefore, 
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Kazakhstan’s strategy for compensating the lack of commercially-viable technologies was to 
focus on integrating domestic R&D players into the global research programmes, rather than 
creating an environment that would incentivise the conduct of domestic near-market research. 
In his Address to the nation “The Strategy Kazakhstan-2050”, the President argues: “As the 
global experience demonstrates, recreating the whole innovative production cycle in a separate 
country means reinventing the wheel. It is a very expensive and not always fruitful, productive 
activity… Therefore we should establish a realistic and pragmatic strategy… we can actively 
participate in large-scale international R&D projects. This will enable us to integrate the efforts 
of our scientists with foreign R&D specialists on strategic innovative directions. Our aim is to 
become a part of the global technological revolution” (Nazarbayev 2012). The potential 
integration into the global research programmes became viewed as a free ride on the way of 
establishing a knowledge-based economy, rationalising the reduction of the government’s 
responsibility for funding R&D. Accordingly, in 2013 Kazakhstan’s GERD/GNP ratio 
constituted only 0.17 percent (UNESCO 2016). Drastic reduction of R&D funding caused 
further rejection of the ‘rules of the game’ of a system, based on national sociotechnical 
imaginary, by scientists.   
The Kazakhstan Industry Development Institute is a governmental agency, directly 
subordinate to the Ministry of Investment and Development. The Institute is responsible for 
implementation of state programs of industrial development. An interview with Aydin 
Kulseitov, its Chairman of the Board reveals how the government perceived the prospects of 
domestic R&D players to succeed in near-market research:      
The problem is that even if we will make 2% [GERD/GNP ratio], money will not 
give effect. I repeat again, because we don’t have players. Because when we speak 
about cooperation of science and business, our entrepreneurs say: very well, give us 
something. Scientists bring them 30-year old technologies [implies frugal 
innovations]. I experienced that myself. And those entrepreneurs say: “well, listen 
guys, let’s be more serious, develop something new”. They are not capable. Why old 
school is not capable? Because they don’t have neither methods nor understanding 
what world requires... The issue here is in unpreparedness of our scientific school to 
be supplier of ideas and technologies. There were those who were saying: “let’s fund 
the science, let’s build technologies, let’s give a bunch of money to our scientists and 
they will give us superb technologies”. It won’t work. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 
17th March 2016)  
What the Chairman fails to understand is that the shift from the science-push model to the 
market-pull model of technological development could not be accomplished overnight because 
mindsets of people are extremely resistant to change. It may take decades until domestic 
scientists will be able to switch to conduct of near-market research. The most important task 
the government should have focused on was not to let them loose their expertise and scientific 
knowledge. Responding to the argument of the previous interviewee on the reasons why 
scientists are not capable to produce near-market research outputs, the Vice-Rector on Science 
and International Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, 
Oleg Gavrilenko comments: 
Here I disagree with Aydin. I agree that even if it was 2 percent  [GERD/GNP ratio], 
there would be no effect. But I do not agree that the problem is in scientists. Yes, 
some of them are weak. But this problem is solvable. What really is missing is the 
time for research… A scientists should not spend the whole time waiting whether his 
research will be funded or not. Instead, he sits there for months, doing nothing. When 
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a person does nothing, it only corrupts him. He gets used to do nothing and he 
continues on. As a result we get a person who in fact needs to be retrained. In the 
course of five years he was fooling around. He then realises that in order to avoid 
being held responsible he needs to circulate money and make financial documents 
look good. No one cares what is your input or whether you rewrote everything from 
your old papers. The matter of interest is money circulation. (Oleg Gavrilenko, 
interview, 7th July 2016) 
What seems obvious here is that the government failed to preserve qualification of domestic 
scientists. While the government rationalises the reduction of R&D funding on the grounds of 
inability of domestic scientists to catch-up with foreign competitors in terms of output of 
commercially-viable technologies, the reality is that no actual attempts were made to create an 
environment that would facilitate near-market research. Complex procedures to allocate funds 
creates a lot of uncertainties, demoralising scientists who become unproductive in response. 
In the absence of actual results in terms of successful integration of domestic R&D 
players into the global research projects, governmental officials strive to create an illusion of 
achieved progress by applying quantitative indicators inherent to open market economies to 
domestic context. The government had neither a plan nor the knowledge on how integration of 
domestic R&D players into the global research projects can be achieved. Nonetheless, in order 
to ensure the President that his vision for integrating domestic R&D players into global 
research projects was being implemented, the government set plan targets, based on criteria, 
typical for ‘benchmark’ economies, and focused on their implementation. Any deviations from 
‘best-practice’ indicators were regarded as systemic problems that may inhibit the integration 
process. For instance, the 2010-2014 National Program of Forced Industrial and Innovative 
Development draws attention to the fact that the ratio of scientists, engineers and workers of 
pilot productions in Kazakhstan is 25:4:1, while in developed market economies it is 1:2:4. 
Similarly, the National Academy of Science (2014) reports that share of domestic expenditure 
on fundamental research, applied research, and experimental development was 30:54:16 
respectively, while in developed countries it constitutes 15:25:60 respectively. The government 
chose to ignore the fact that targeting ‘benchmark’ indicators is not necessarily the best way of 
integrating domestic R&D players into the global research projects. On the other hand, 
targeting ‘benchmark’ indicators was perhaps the best way of demonstrating progress to the 
higher authority.  
Due to the lack of a unified plan on how to shift from the science-push to the market-
pull model of technological development, and the lack of public accountability of officials, 
different ministries interpreted the vision of the President in such ways that would enable them 
to demonstrate results to the higher authority. Various international organisations mention that 
in Kazakhstan initiatives of authorities, aimed at establishing a knowledge-based economy are 
hampered by inflexible mechanisms of coordination of activities of governmental agencies. 
For instance, OECD (2014) notes that although various coordination mechanisms were created 
in Kazakhstan, their functioning has been very formal which only reinforced top-down 
hierarchical relationships, confining the work of each ministry to the boundaries of their 
strategic plans. Accordingly, it is generally assumed that coordination mechanisms do not work 
properly because Kazakhstan retains top-down system of decision-making. However, the 
reality is that coordinated work would undermine the well-established practice of public sector 
managers to interpret national sociotechnical imaginary in ways that enables them to pursue 
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outcomes, accomplishing of which makes them noticed by the higher authority. In an attempt 
to draw attention to this particular problem, member of the Majilis (lower chamber of the 
Parliament), Dariga Nazarbayeva provided the following example: “The Ministry of Education 
and Science has seen seven Ministers to come and go since 2000. Each of them started his 
career with another wave of large-scale reforms. Neither of those reforms has been put through 
and showed a very modest result despite huge financial investments” (Interfax 2013). The 
tendency of officials to ignore potential benefits of coordinated work in favour of being able to 
demonstrate their personal input became a well-established practice in Kazakhstan, 
undermining attempts to build a system, based on the national sociotechnical imaginary.  
Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship notes:     
In the past, the approach that every minister had was different from what it is today. 
Not purely departmental. Not narrow. A minister saw wider, thought broader. He 
knew exactly what his role was, where competencies of his ministry had. He also 
realised the necessity to concede if it was domain of another ministry or in which 
cases to work together. There is no need for ministers to become family friends and 
pay each other social visits, but they need to develop similar approach. At work they 
should be people of state, have state-level thinking. Unfortunately, I don’t yet see it 
happening. Using administrative methods no one can unite two ministers. It won’t 
happen until ministers understand it themselves, until they start looking at the big 
picture, think about the effectiveness of their work. (Askhat Kuzekov, interview, 1st 
August 2016) 
It is vital to note that unlike well-elaborated plans, sociotechnical imaginaries leave room for 
interpretation. Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological 
Development comments: 
Well, if you want to know the key problem – we do not have a unified innovation 
policy. It simply doesn’t exist. There are elements of the puzzle that are not folded 
together. Consider the new State Programme on Industrial Innovative Development. 
The President is constantly talking about it. Even Oset Orientaevich [Minister of 
Investment and Development] constantly talks about it. But it dies somewhere at the 
level of the likes of Batyrkozha [Director of Department of Technological and 
Innovative Development of Ministry on Investment and Development]. He has one 
vision; another one has another vision. There is no unity. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, 
interview, 26th July 2016)       
The Chairman correctly chose to use the word “vision” rather than “plan” when describing the 
way policy-makers formulate their decisions. The absence of a unified, step-by-step plan on 
how to shift from the science-push to the market-pull model impeded the process of 
transformation of Kazakhstan’s model of technological development. Moreover, eventually the 
very idea that such transformation is necessary became discredited. Due to a well-known 
tendency of officials to interpret the national sociotechnical imaginary in such ways as to 
demonstrate their achievements to the higher authorities, even genuine attempts by officials to 
contribute to building up knowledge-based economy became viewed by stakeholders as 
attempts at self-promotion rather than an attempt to solve problems. 
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The following section explores in detail whether adoption of ‘borrowed’ 
commercialisation of technologies policies facilitated conduct of near-market research.  
4.4. Commercialisation of technologies policies   
The adoption of commercialisation of technologies policies illustrates the tendency of 
Kazakhstan’s government to treat the symptoms while ignoring the causes of systemic 
problems. The lack of commercially-viable technologies in the outputs of domestic R&D 
players encouraged Kazakhstan’s authorities to ‘borrow’ policy instruments used in 
‘benchmark’ economies. Sharing his vision of the way to establish a knowledge-based 
economy, the President in his Address to the nation announced: “The development of a 
knowledge-based economy is, above all, the increase of the capacity of science in Kazakhstan. 
In this area we should improve legislation on venture financing, intellectual property 
protection, research and innovation support, as well as commercialisation of research. I charge 
the Government before September 1 of this year to develop and submit to the Parliament a 
package of relevant bills” (Nazarbayev 2014). Accordingly, in October 2015 the law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan ‘On commercialisation of scientific and (or) scientific and technical 
activities’ was passed. What the authorities did not account for, however, is that the problem 
that arises from a shortage of commercially-viable technologies lies not in the absence of 
mechanisms of diffusing the results of R&D, but in getting those results in the first place. The 
primary reason why scientists do not engage in near-market research lies in a mismatch 
between expectations of stakeholders and the vision of the authorities. Nevertheless, the 
government chose to focus exclusively on adoption of ‘best-practice’ policies aimed at bringing 
technology to the marketplace while continuing to ignore the need to address the expectations 
of stakeholders.  
Elaborating on how the fact that the mindsets of scientists are locked-in on the old ways 
of doing things affected the effectiveness of governmental funding, the Vice-Rector on Science 
and International Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, 
Oleg Gavrilenko notes:  
So far, all the money spent on science by the Committee of Science [Department 
within Ministry of Education and Science] continue to generate some knowledge 
regardless of whether they will be of any use or not. And in the end what happens? 
We create some product and it goes on the shelf. It does not go into production. (Oleg 
Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016) 
The Vice-Rector stresses the fact that the Soviet practice of generating knowledge without 
considering downstream implementation concerns or commercial viability of technology is no 
longer acceptable due to Kazakhstan’s forced transition towards open market relationships. 
However, it should be emphasised that the lack of commercially-viable outputs is caused not 
by the absence of mechanisms of diffusing the results of R&D. It is the result of the 
unwillingness and inability of scientists to switch to conduct of near-market research 
instantaneously. Commenting on the same phenomenon Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the 
Board of the National Agency for Technological Development states: 
We have an Institute subordinate to Ministry of Education and Science which has 
4,000 patents. But if you review them, they are all trash. There is no commercial 
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component. Out of 4,000 perhaps there is 1-2% that theoretically may work.  (Sanzhar 
Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 2016)       
It is important at this point to clarify the reasons for the tendency of different governmental 
agencies to neglect a mismatch between the mindsets of stakeholders and formal organisational 
and institutional arrangements. The Ministry of Education and Science is not largely concerned 
with addressing this problem because its responsibility lies solely with proper execution of 
procedures of allocating funds. Outputs are then measured in the number of patents and 
publications. The Ministry is neither accountable for the lack of near-market research nor for 
the shortage of commercially-viable outputs.  
A lack of transparent governmental action as a result of the ‘economy first, then 
politics’ approach increased the departmentalism of governmental agencies, encouraging 
officials to focus on finding ways of taking control over state funds while neglecting the need 
to fix the real cause of system failure. Public policy studies (Zahra et al. 2000) generally assume 
that government is a uniform entity that acts in the interest of the governed. However, the 
functions and responsibilities of governmental agencies frequently overlap and conflict, 
inhibiting coordinated actions. Moreover, the likelihood of interdepartmental conflict increases 
exponentially in the absence of checks and balances in terms of public accountability of 
officials. In Kazakhstan competencies of the government in the domain of research, 
development, technology, and innovation are divided between two leading ministries: The 
Ministry of Education, and Science and the Ministry of Investment and Development. Both 
Ministries rationalised the need to control the commercialisation of technologies, albeit on 
different grounds, and strived to take charge of the allocation of commercialisation of 
technologies funds. As a result of adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach the 
priorities of the Ministries laid not in addressing the needs of stakeholders but in taking control 
over allocation of funds as it provides them with an opportunity to maximise budgets of their 
departments and the workforce under their supervision. 
Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of the National Agency for Technological 
Development shares his observation on negotiations between the two ministries:  
So, you want to know what the problem is. There is no consensus between Ministry 
of Education and Science and Ministry of Investment and Development. There is no 
clear boundary. Both, Ministry of Education and Science wants to control 
commercialisation and Ministry of Investment and Development wants to control 
commercialisation. I personally was a witness – neither previous ministers nor new 
minsters could not reach the agreement who is doing what. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, 
interview, 26th July 2016)       
The Chairman here clearly wishes to provide his earlier point (interview with the Chairman) 
that there is no unified policy in Kazakhstan with a compelling example. At the same time, he 
inadvertently makes a remarkably interesting insider observation of how certain decisions are 
made within the higher echelon of the government. His observation allows us to conclude that 
the interest in controlling commercialisation of technologies is too strong to be explained solely 
by the ministers’ devotion to duty. Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the Committee on 
Economic Policy, Innovative Development and Entrepreneurship explains why both ministries 
strive to be in control over allocation of funds on commercialisation:       
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I believe that again all this is due to the large amount of budget money. Despite the 
fact that these are budget moneys, they are very strictly controlled. Speaking frankly, 
everybody will be terrorised by inspections, every budget penny will be checked. 
Nevertheless, people think that if they will have that money, then certain people will 
benefit from that. I think that this is how they see it. There is no notable depth in 
justifications, no hard evidence that tomorrow it will be used effectively and there 
will be strong impact on development of production, development of economy. In 
general, that is absent. All that matters is the amount of money. They think that if 
money will go through them, some part will stick to their hands as well. (Askhat 
Kuzekov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
Senator Kuzekov provides very reasonable explanation as to why the commercialisation of 
technologies policies were lobbied at the first place. As I mentioned earlier the lack of 
commercially viable outputs in Kazakhstan is caused not by the lack of mechanisms of 
diffusing the results of R&D, but by the absence of near-market research. The Senator’s 
argument makes perfect sense when we ask ourselves a logical question: why are there no 
attempts to influence scientists’ attitudes towards near-market research but there is active 
struggle to control the mechanisms of allocating state funds.  
Being ‘borrowed’ from the context of mature market economies, the commercialisation 
of technology policies did not fit well with the well-established practices of knowledge 
generation in Kazakhstan. The law ‘On commercialisation of scientific and (or) scientific and 
technical activities’ regulates allocation of funds through the centres of commercialisation, 
based in universities and research centres. According to information provided by 
representatives of Ministry of Education and Science, in October 2018, there were 43 offices 
of commercialisation created in different universities in Kazakhstan, but none in research 
centres. However, unlike Western universities that have always been engaged in R&D, Soviet 
universities carried out purely educational functions. R&D in the Soviet Union was performed 
by science production association and sectoral institutions, all of which were shut down in the 
course of reforms. Nowadays, university personnel consist mostly of former employees of the 
Academy of Science, who were previously engaged in purely academic research and have no 
experience in conducting R&D. Moreover, universities do not possess resources, infrastructure 
and skills to turn R&D outputs into commercially-viable projects. Bergek et al. (2010, p. 124) 
argue: “In turning inventions into economic outcomes the crucial ‘middle term’ is business 
development, which involves a range of complementary assets (skills and capabilities) that are 
crucial for, but not necessarily directly related to, innovation. These include the ability to 
finance capital investment programs, the ability to create efficient production systems on an 
adequate scale, the ability to recruit and coordinate appropriately skilled labour forces, the 
ability to construct and use marketing channels, and the ability to create and deploy logistics 
systems”. Attempts of Kazakhstan’s government to stimulate near-market research using 
‘borrowed’ policy instrument seems to be an ineffective strategy, considering that personnel of 
universities possess neither resources nor expertise required for development of commercially-
viable technologies.  
The Vice-Rector on Science and International Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East 
Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko, elaborates on how path-dependence 
affects attempts to stimulate the development of commercially-viable technologies using 
‘borrowed’ mechanisms:  
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Those people, who used to work in the network of Academy of Science, that is those 
who were engaged in producing fundamental knowledge, they now came to 
universities. Currently they make science. They execute projects funded by 
Committee of Science. There were simply no other personnel available… There 
remained only those people who represented the academic segment and they started 
to work in universities. Those people got used only to knowledge creation, i.e. 
fundamental research. Unfortunately, they were not trained to do anything else. Let’s 
just say that commercialisation of some ideas is something novel and vague to them. 
They simply don’t know how to do it. (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016)  
The Vice-Rector makes a good point that unlike dismissed personnel of science production 
association and sectoral institutions which were shut down in the course of reforms, those 
people who worked in the network of Academy of Science were engaged solely in fundamental 
research. Whereas Western universities traditionally conduct R&D, Soviet universities had a 
purely educational function. Commenting on the usefulness of adoption of commercialisation 
of technology policies, Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for 
Technological Development, asserts: 
Scientists want to invent something and earn money with it. But they don’t see that 
profit can be earned on patents, on licenses, on copyright, on know-how. They only 
see opportunity in the creation of a business. But this is impossible to do. Definitely 
impossible here. Even if it is possible, there is only a handful of people who can do 
it. Because firstly, a team needs people who can invent. Secondly, it needs people 
who know the market, people who know players, who will promote this product. If 
you don’t have them, there is no sense to finance this project, no matter how brilliant 
the invention would be. What matters is whether there are people who are willing to 
pay for it. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 2016)        
Considering university personnel’s lack of experience in business development, it seems 
imprudent to assume that universities have the capability to turn the ideas of scientists into 
commercially-viable projects. Moreover, the adoption of commercialisation of technology 
policies impedes attempts to improve collaboration between science and industry since funds 
allocated on commercialisation of technologies enable scientists to continue the pursuit of their 
existing research projects without the need to actually engage in near-market research.  
Due to the top-down nature of the decision-making process, the government adopted 
commercialisation of technologies policies in accordance with the vision of the President, while 
paying little attention to the fact that research efforts of domestic scientists are locked-in on the 
generation of purely academic knowledge and frugal innovations rather than conduct of near-
market research. In the absence of any near-market research outputs that could be successfully 
commercialised, the goal for which funds are allocated cannot be achieved. Nevertheless, 
officials still needed to meet plan targets on utilisation of budgets because it indicates that the 
President’s vision of Kazakhstan’s technological development was being implemented. Under-
utilisation of the allocated budget indicates that a governmental agency did not meet its plan 
targets, which usually results in different penalties. As a result, budget utilisation rather than 
achieving the goals for which funds were allocated for became a synonym of plan fulfilment. 
Since funds were being allocated with the sole goal of utilising budgets in mind, the decision-
making process regarding the allocation of funds for scientific projects became particularly 
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corrupt, with kickbacks reported to reach up to 50 – 60 percent of the value of grants (Tastanova 
2019). Needless to say that such research projects do not bring viable technologies to the 
marketplace. An investigation of projects funded by the Ministry of Education and Science 
from a $110 million loan from the World Bank showed that moneys are systematically 
allocated to outdated, commercially non-viable ideas that either copied existing foreign 
products or attempted to reintroduce ‘off the shelf’ old Soviet technologies (Kiselev 2016). The 
allocation of funds on commercialisation of technologies, despite the absence of near-market 
research outputs, facilitates the illegal lobbying of commercially unviable technologies. 
Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship makes the following statement concerning the practice of 
fund allocation:     
In any case, when a person is in position to directly allocate funds and he feels that 
the size of funding, the number of grants and so on depend on him, he is tempted to 
use this money to his advantage. The corruption component is constantly there, all 
the time. (Askhat Kuzekov, interview, 1st August 2016)  
Senator Kuzekov is certainly correct to claim that in the process of fund allocation the risks of 
systemic corruption are exceedingly high. What needs to be added is that systemic corruption 
is even more likely in the cases where it is known in advance that the goals for which funds are 
allocated cannot be achieved. It is quite obvious that production of commercially-viable 
technologies is hampered by the lack of near-market research. However, no efforts are made 
to incentivise researchers to engage in near-market research. Instead, funds are allocated on 
commercialisation of technologies regardless of the fact that the shortage of commercially-
viable outputs is not caused by any lack of mechanisms of diffusing near-market research.   
Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological Development 
argues that the government lacks an understanding of the impact of start-ups on university 
budgets:  
Our law on commercialisation suggests that scientist “Ivanov” reads lectures to 
students before lunch, engages in research after lunch, tries to invent something and 
in the evening creates start-up project. After launching this start-up, he goes to the 
National Agency for Technological Development and writes grant application. This 
all meant to be done by a single person… They intend to create start-ups in 
universities. These start-ups are risky ventures. Nine out of ten will fail.  It will drain 
budgets of universities. They will have to start raising tuition fees for students and 
consequences will be irreversible. They don’t understand it... This is utopian model. 
It will never work. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 2016)              
It is true that perhaps the most overlooked risk that the adoption of the law ‘On 
commercialisation of scientific and (or) scientific and technical activities’ may pose is that it 
allows financing of start-up companies from budgets of universities. The fact is very serious, 
considering that illegal lobbying in R&D activities became a widely spread phenomenon in 
Kazakhstan (Tastanova 2019). In the absence of near-market research, the mechanism of 
diffusing the results of R&D may become a mechanism for draining money from the budgets 
of universities.  
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The next section examines attempts of the government to create centres of research 
excellence in order to incentivise multinationals to relocate their knowledge-intensive activities 
to Kazakhstan. 
4.5. Technology parks  
While focusing on the attraction of FDI, governments in developing countries 
frequently overlook the fact that the occurrence of spillover effects hinges on relocation of 
knowledge-intensive activities of multinationals into a host country. Multinationals possess 
superior knowledge that can potentially be transmitted to domestic industries in host countries. 
Therefore, it is frequently assumed that the entry of multinationals into a host country 
automatically leads to technology transfer. For instance, Romer (1993, p. 548) states: “One of 
the most important and easily implemented policies is to give foreign firms an incentive to 
close the idea gap, to let them make a profit by doing so…by creating an economic environment 
that offers an adequate reward to multinational corporations when they bring ideas from the 
rest of the world and put them to use with domestic resources”. However, studies conducted in 
the field of international technology transfer show little evidence of such a relation because 
multinationals are reluctant to move knowledge-intensive activities to locations outside their 
home base (Patel and Pavitt 1991, Niosi 2010). As a result, the technology gap between 
affiliates of multinationals operating in a host country and domestic firms may be too small for 
technology diffusion (Kathuria 2010). Due to the WTO-plus demands to deregulate FDI, 
governments of host countries are not able to directly influence decisions of multinationals to 
relocate their knowledge-intensive activities. Therefore, the governments of host countries 
need to create an environment that would incentivise multinationals to relocate knowledge-
intensive activities.  
The Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov explains the 
efforts put in place to attract FDI:  
First of all, we built a system for attracting investments by mobilising external 
reserves, according to task given by President. Our embassies were given a specific 
directive to focus on economic issues. Ten special advisors were appointed and sent 
to key countries from where we expect inflow of investments. Also, at the central 
level we have an investment headquarters, subordinate to the Prime Minister. 
Ministry for Investments and Development was created. Then we have a National 
Agency Kaznex Invest. At the regional level the Investment Councils under each 
akim [governor] were organised. Vice-governors, specifically responsible for 
attraction of investments were appointed. There are also service centres for investors 
– branches of Kaznex in regions. Besides, we arranged the single-window system for 
investors – this is our Committee on Investments. However, we understand that 
investors choose not only centres – Astana or Almaty. In every region we created 
sectors of service for investors, based in public service centres. (Yerlan Khairov, 
interview, 1st August 2016)    
The fact that the task of attracting FDI was assigned at different levels and across different 
governmental entities suggests that the authorities were convinced that the entry of 
multinationals into domestic market is strategically important for turning Kazakhstan into a 
knowledge-based economy.  
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Kazakhstan’s authorities were convinced that by implementing the requirements of the 
WTO they could create an environment that would facilitate the inflow of technology-intensive 
FDI. Literature on international technology transfer emphasises that requirements of the WTO 
are designed to help acceding countries to attract technology-intensive FDI. For instance, Lall 
(1997) argues that the ability of countries to attract technology-intensive FDI hinges on the 
protection of intellectual property rights. Accession to the WTO implies joining the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which covers basically all spheres 
related to IPR, including some emerging areas and rights that have not been previously 
addressed by international legislation. IPR enforcement by the host country provides 
guarantees that mature foreign product will not be subjected to reverse engineering or other 
forms of duplicative imitation. Announcing policies against violation of intellectual property 
rights Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan said: “I am confident 
such procedures will gather support and encouragement from international producers of high 
technology and science intensive goods and will create an additional inflow of foreign direct 
investment and diversify Kazakhstan’s economy” (Nazarbayev 2006). Kazakhstan’s 
authorities had planned to catch-up with frontier countries by conducting a series of reforms, 
that would encourage multinationals to relocate knowledge-intensive activities, including IPR 
enforcement, implementation of market-oriented reforms, and improvement of investment 
climate.  
Proceeding on the basis that the enforcement of IPR protection leads to technology 
transfer, Kazakhstan’s government initiated a series of reforms at the very early stage of 
accession to the WTO. In order to carry out executive and control functions over IPR, as well 
as general guidance in the field of intellectual property rights, including the protection of 
copyright, patents, and trademarks, the Committee on intellectual property rights of the 
Ministry of Justice was created in March 2001. In order to harmonise legislation with the norms 
of the WTO, in September 2001 the government adopted the resolution ‘On approval of the 
Conception of protection of intellectual property rights’. Additionally, in July 2002, the 
National Institute of Intellectual Property of the Committee on Intellectual Property Rights of 
the Ministry of Justice was established. The institute examines requests on the protection of 
intellectual property, including inventions, utility models, trademarks, appellations of origin, 
industrial design, and plant varieties. In compliance with WTO requirements regarding IPR a 
Special Section of the Civil Code was elaborated. Besides, the laws on “Trade Marks, Service 
Marks, and Appellations of Places of Rules of Origin of Goods”, “Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights”, “Protection of Selective Breeding Achievements” and “Legal Protection of Layout 
Designs of Integrated Microcircuits” were adopted (Abdimoldayeva 2001). Although 
Kazakhstan became a member of the WTO only in December 2015, enforcement of IPR 
protection was carried out in the early 2000s.   
The absence of spillover effects after following the WTO recommendations forced the 
authorities to start seeking new ways of encouraging multinationals to relocate their 
technology-intensive activities in Kazakhstan. Dunning and Lundan (2008) identify the four 
most common motivations for investment: resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency 
seeking and strategic asset seeking. Potentially, countries with first-class research facilities and 
highly skilled human capital may become strategic targets for efficiency seeking and strategic 
asset seeking multinationals. In Kazakhstan, however, the activity of multinationals is mostly 
limited to last-stage assembly and extracting natural resources. The Global Competitiveness 
Report produced by World Economic Forum (2014) provides estimates of the impact of FDI 
on competitiveness of indigenous firms. The assessment is based on a survey question: to what 
extent does FDI bring new technology into your country? According to it, Kazakhstan was 
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ranked only 107th out of 144 countries in category ‘FDI and technology transfer’. In order to 
improve the situation Kazakhstan’s government had to reconsider the strategy of blindly 
following the instructions of the WTO. It is well-established that multinationals are likely to 
move knowledge-intensive activities abroad to locations that possess strategic assets and 
capabilities which they can exploit. For instance, Archibugi et al. (1999, p. 12) argue: “when 
companies decide to move part of their R&D and innovation centres abroad, they generally 
select the fields of excellence of the host countries. In other words, companies are more likely 
to go abroad to exploit the national capabilities of the country they are invading rather than to 
expand their own core competences”. Therefore, in order to create conditions for transfer of 
technologies by multinationals, the government of Kazakhstan needed to create high-quality 
R&D centres, develop infrastructure and human capital.  
According to the plans of the Kazakhstan’s authorities, technology parks were meant 
to become the centres of research excellence, the performance of which would attract 
knowledge-intensive activities of multinationals. Owing to fragmentation of innovation 
processes, R&D efforts in the former Soviet Union were performed largely by science 
production associations and sectoral institutions. The major shortage of commercially-viable 
technologies experienced by Kazakhstan after the science production associations and sectoral 
institutions were shut down in the course of reforms, forced the authorities to look for 
alternative ways of organising R&D efforts. An examination of the experiences of mature 
market economies encouraged the government to focus available resources on ‘borrowing’ the 
practice of creating technology parks. Radosevic and Myrzakhmet (2009, p. 648) note that in 
Kazakhstan “There is an expectation that TPs [technology parks] could create an environment 
that is different from the rest of the economy, which would become a source of growth and 
whose effects would spread to the rest of the economy”. It was imagined that technology parks 
will replace a missing link in the innovation process in the form of science production 
associations and sectoral institutions. The vision of the authorities was based on 
acknowledgement of the fact that due to specifics of the Soviet era science-push model of 
technological development neither Kazakhstan’s industries nor universities possessed 
resources to support R&D efforts on the level that might be of interest to multinationals.  
Commenting on the vision of Kazakhstan’s authorities regarding the role of technology 
parks in the innovation system the Vice-Rector on Science and International Cooperation of D. 
Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko remarks: 
Technology parks were meant to become that bridge, to substitute sectoral institutions 
and science production associations. But they never did because the mechanisms 
didn’t work. (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016)  
The practice of frugal engineering conducted in the past by science production associations and 
sectoral institutions was no longer possible due to transition towards open market relationships. 
Therefore, Kazakhstan’s government tried to establish new mechanisms of engaging in R&D 
efforts by following the ‘best-practice’ experience of ‘benchmark’ economies. Whereas 
expectations of the government were high, establishing centres of research excellence on the 
basis of technology parks was not an easy task, mainly because of a lack of qualified personnel 
capable of engaging in near-market research and a top-down approach to implementation. The 
concreate example of how a top-down approach influenced creation of centres of research 
excellence is provided by Duman Tastanbekov, Director of technology park “Altay”: 
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The building was renovated, and a fourth floor was built here. What for? This is 
budget money. They were allocated to development of innovations. What the fourth 
floor has to do with it? What do we need it for? It was a project of our university. 
Roof is made out of metal sheets. It is impossible to go in there because of the heat. 
In winter it is too cold. It took four years to put it into operation and last year we 
obtained exploitation permit. We refurbished it at our own expense so that it would 
pass sanitary and fire safety regulations. Amortisation constituted 37 million tenge 
[Kazakhstani tenge (KZT)]. That is where money went. Almost 400 million tenge [≈ 
$2.8 million USD]. The decision came from above, it was not bottom-up initiative. 
There was Resolution of the Government prescribing to build the fourth floor. The 
big forum with meeting of two Presidents was organised here. Perhaps that was the 
reason. There are many similar examples in other technology parks. (Duman 
Tastanbekov, interview, 20th July 2016)  
Apparently, the process of establishing technology parks from the very beginning was executed 
in such a way as to pursue outcomes that would enable officials to demonstrate the results of 
their work to the higher authority rather than facilitate innovative effort.  
In the opinion of researchers, the way near-market research was supposed to be 
conducted in technology parks would diminish the role of scientific research in the innovation 
process. The adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach empowered officials to 
focus on implementation of the national sociotechnical imaginary in the way they saw fit, while 
neglecting the need to engage in a dialogue with stakeholders. In order to accelerate 
Kazakhstan’s transformation into a knowledge-based economy, the government integrated 
different elements of ‘benchmark’ innovation systems in top-down manner. The practice shows 
that ‘borrowing’ elements of an innovation system from other contexts is not always the best 
way of boosting technological development. For instance, Gu and Lundvall (2006, p. 298) 
argue: “It is fundamental that you cannot transplant single elements that work well in one 
national system to another and expect the same impact on economic performance”. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of the need to justify its decisions the government proceeded with 
the idea of promoting innovations through technology parks. The government chose to 
overlook the fact that the ‘borrowed’ practice did not fit well with the norms and values of 
research scientists. In particular, the emphasis on getting the science right rather than bringing 
technology to the marketplace during the Soviet era left a strong legacy. The fact that research 
goals were pursued without being held back by matters of commercial practicality or 
downstream implementation concerns was particularly important to scientists. The way R&D 
efforts were supposed to be conducted in technology parks, however, represented a completely 
different system of values which was not acceptable to scientists who chose to pursue research 
carriers for an opportunity to engage in ‘big science and technology’.  
An interview with the Vice-Rector on Science and International Cooperation of D. 
Serikbayev East Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko illustrates how a 
change of attitudes of officials towards the role of scientists in the innovation process made 
them reject the ‘rules of the game’ of sociotechnical imaginary:   
We tried to work with the technology park and directly with the National Agency on 
Technological Development. Now majority of scientists say: there is no way we will 
work with them again. Never. The National Agency on Technological Development 
makes announcements: please come, take funds, but nobody wants. Managers who 
work there are not always qualified and constantly change. Naturally, doctors of 
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science, professors think highly of themselves. And here appears a young man and 
starts bossing them around: you need to submit me such and such document, you 
haven’t done this, you haven’t done that... (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016)  
The fact that the socialist society prioritised input of scientists over concerns and limitations of 
other stakeholders led to the formation of an ‘ivory tower attitude’ of Soviet researchers 
(Amann 1982). Berry (1982, p. 59) mentions: “The fragmentation of the traditional system of 
R and D had led to a clearly hierarchical structure with the research institute looking down on 
the design bureaux and the design bureaux looking down on the factories”. The conduct of 
research through technology parks, however, implied diminishing of the role of scientists in 
the innovation process. A flagship of Soviet industry - Ulba Metallurgical Plant, is one of the 
world leaders in terms of production of beryllium, tantalum, and niobium. Nurlan Musin, its 
former chief executive officer explains how important the system of incentives, adopted in the 
Soviet Union was for engineers:   
Earlier, in Soviet times, R&D efforts and the initiatives of engineers in terms of new 
ideas, introducing innovations into existing or new technologies were welcomed at 
every stage. Factories had enough funds and legal grounds to pay rather large bonuses 
and many engineers were successfully engaged in doing this because it gave them the 
opportunity not only to receive monthly salaries, but also to earn extra money for 
their families. Besides, it was considered honourable, it distinguished a person. Such 
people then grew up in the ranks…  If you had attended a meeting of the Science 
Technology Council [governing body on the matters of scientific and technological 
development] of a university and then attended one held by the Science Technology 
Council of enterprise, you would have realised which council members worked more 
actively. At the enterprises Council, discussion could almost turn into a fight because 
everyone was emotionally invested. (Nurlan Musin, interview, 18th July 2016)  
Under the science-push model of technological development, the innovation process was 
deliberately fragmented to enable scientists to pursue research goals regardless of interests of 
central planning agencies, industrial players, or end-users. The lack of practicality in the 
outputs of academic institutions was compensated through R&D efforts conducted by 
industrial players. However, while scientists occupied a higher place in the hierarchy, it seems 
that the interests of personnel of industrial enterprises were not infringed and they were also in 
favour of the way the science-push model functioned.  
Apart from the top-down integration of ‘borrowed’ elements of ‘benchmark’ innovation 
systems, the government’s failure to take into consideration the values of stakeholders 
manifested itself in a tendency to privilege the procedures of allocation of state funds over 
achieving of scientific results. Radosevic and Myrzakhmet (2009) argue that Kazakhstan’s 
technology parks operate merely as business incubators for locally oriented firms, which are 
no more innovative than other domestic firms. One of the key reasons why technology parks 
are occupied with non-innovative firms is the unwillingness of scientists to undergo the 
bureaucratic procedures, required for getting funding. Scientists viewed such practices as 
unacceptable, as during the Soviet era the research process rather than following the procedures 
of allocating finances was the most important part of the innovation process. However, 
officials, responsible for allocation of grant money are not throwing up obstacles on purpose. 
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Procedures must be handled by the book or they run the risk of being prosecuted for 
embezzlement or other corruption-related crimes by various controlling agencies. The 
controlling agencies do not tolerate even the slightest breach of procedures because they are 
not responsible for development of innovations. The controlling agencies are infamous for their 
tendency to overstep their authority in prosecuting real or imaginary crimes in order to meet 
their targets. For instance, during Parliamentary hearings in November 2016 General 
Prosecutor Zhakip Asanov reported that half out of 9 thousand criminal processes carried out 
by the Economic Investigation Service were initiated illegally (Davidova 2016). Despite being 
centrally controlled by a top-down system of decision-making, governmental bodies pursue 
conflicting goals, causing a rejection of the ‘rules of the game’ of national sociotechnical 
imaginary by stakeholders.  
The Vice-Rector on Science and International Cooperation of D. Serikbayev East 
Kazakhstan State Technical University, Oleg Gavrilenko comments: 
Mechanisms, offered by National Agency of Technology Development, including the 
one they offer through technology parks are not aimed at carrying out R&D process. 
Let me now explain why it is so. The main concern of officials who work there is 
whether or not money went through. It is all about allocation of funds and expenditure 
reporting, whereas the essence of the work disappears. The R&D process itself 
vanishes. That is to say, that everything is only about money circulation procedures: 
allocation of money, finishing by deadline, submitting reports and that is it. You see? 
Meanwhile, real life is a little bit more complex than that. Creative process, process 
of research is complicated. For instance, I realise that I need certain device [for the 
research]. I submit application that I need that device. However, our reality can be 
difficult and such device is not available or the dollar jumped up or something else 
happened. I was not able to buy it, but bought another device, which happened to be 
even better than the device I initially planned. Do you understand what is R&D 
process? It is path of trial and error. That is to say, I experimented today and realised 
that different device is required. Nevertheless, National Agency of Technology 
Development says: “Your application says that you have this device, but you 
purchased slightly different modification”. There also can be issues with law ‘On 
state procurement’. They say: “We won’t accept that. You have to return money”. In 
essence, they don’t care what the result is, but whether or not device that you bought 
was in the application. Paradoxically, scientific result doesn’t matter, only financial 
reports on spending money. (Oleg Gavrilenko, interview, 7th July 2016) 
The fact that for public sector managers means eventually became more important than ends is 
not the only stand out factor here. It comes as little surprise that over time, officials developed 
a tendency to pursue only those goals visible to the higher authority due to the top-down 
governmental hierarchy and the lack of checks and balances. More interesting is how strongly 
the values of scientists manifested themselves. Their unwillingness to accept the new ‘rules of 
the game’ regardless of potential access to funds demonstrates how strongly a mismatch 
between formal arrangements and informal constraints can affect attempts to establish a new 
order of things. 
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The next section analyses whether withdrawal of the government from the role of a sole 
mediator of science-industry relationships facilitated collaboration between R&D and 
industrial players.  
4.6. Collaboration of science and industry  
 The authorities assumed that their ability to turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based 
economy hinged largely on the advancement of scientific research, which they expected to 
become more relevant to the needs of industry. The authorities imagined that the transformation 
of the national innovation system from the science-push to the market-pull model of 
technological development would be conducted in such a way that it would nudge R&D and 
industrial players towards collaboration, thereby creating favourable conditions for 
technological breakthroughs. In his Address to the nation the President announced: “During 
the second [2015-2019] and subsequent five-year plans, we should establish the industries of 
mobile and multimedia technology, nanotechnology and space technology, robotics, genetic 
engineering, and future energy exploration… In the next 10-15 years, it is necessary to develop 
a knowledge-intensive basis for the economy. Without this basis we cannot join the group of 
developed countries. And it must be founded on advanced science” (Nazarbayev 2014). While 
the authorities acknowledged the fact that advancement of science plays an important part in 
building up the national economy, it was expected that the priorities and boundaries of 
scientific research would be defined by the needs of industrial players. What was not taken into 
account, however, is the fact that the Soviet era science-push model of technological 
development prioritised scientific research over the needs and limitations of other stakeholders. 
Not only did it create ‘ivory tower’ attitudes in the scientific community, but it also established 
a system of values, in which research goals were placed on a higher hierarchical level.   
The National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken" is Kazakhstan’s largest and most 
influential non-governmental organisation, headed by the Kazakhstan President’s son in law. 
The Chamber protects the rights and interests of the business by representing it in negotiation 
with the government and public authorities. Its Deputy Chairman, Nurzhan Altaev describes 
the science-industry relationships as follows: 
As a representative of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, as a businessman I 
argue that our science should primarily work for the benefit of our business, for our 
industry. Not in the way it happens now. Unfortunately, I have to state that we have 
no connection between science and business. Science works on its own, inventing 
some spaceships, so to say, that business does not need in its work. There is no 
application for it in industry. It turns out that large state funds are allocated to science, 
mostly fundamental and scientists come up with ideas that have no application. 
(Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)   
This quotation captures the key reason why the authorities are unable to identify what inhibits 
collaboration between business and science. Businessmen and public sector managers assume 
that in the open market relationships, scientists should first and foremost focus on solving the 
problems of industry. However, they do not consider the fact that researchers have a completely 
different point of view about the goals of science because they are heavily influenced by the 
values that were formed during the Soviet era. Research in the Soviet Union was directed 
towards solving strategic goals of the socialist society and completely disregarded interests of 
65 
 
industrial entities or end-users (section 3.2.). Mindsets of people are impervious to influence 
governmental policies and change only in path-dependent ways (North 1990). Accordingly, 
what the authorities and businessmen overlook is that the attitudes of researchers towards the 
goals of science would not change simply because Kazakhstan undergoes transition towards 
open market relationships.  
Whereas the harmonisation of scientific and industrial objectives is inherent to the 
market-pull model (if not always achieved in practice), the transformation of organisational 
and institutional set-ups of Kazakhstan’s innovation system did not automatically encourage 
collaboration between R&D and industrial players. In the market economy collaboration 
between R&D and industrial players enables them to respond quickly to changes in markets 
and technology, accelerates the diffusion of technology, and facilitates the transfer of tacit 
knowledge. Accordingly, Kazakhstan’s government implemented a series of reforms aimed to 
adapt organisational and institutional set-ups inherent to a market-pull model of technological 
development. The authorities imagined that transformation of formal arrangements would 
create the same environment as in ‘benchmark’ open market economies, encouraging R&D 
and industrial players to cooperate. However, despite formal arrangements aimed to increase 
the role of market forces have been introduced, the rift between scientific and industrial 
objectives remains significant. UNECE (2012, p. 22) notes: “There is a wide gap between the 
worlds of business and science in most countries. In Kazakhstan, the problem has been 
particularly acute given the legacy of the planned economy, where there was a rather strict 
separation between the research sector and companies”. Even when major efforts are made to 
put institutional and organisational structures in place, it does not necessarily change the nature 
of relationships among actors because informal constraints remain unaffected. In reality, it is 
the interplay of formal and informal institutions rather than mere transformation of 
organisational or institutional set-ups that defines whether scientific and industrial objectives 
can be harmonised.  
Implementation of reforms aimed at increasing the role of market forces have neither 
changed values and attitudes of participants of innovation processes nor influenced science-
industry relationships. Duman Tastanbekov, Director of technology park “Altay” recounts:      
We hosted the Scientific and Technical Council under the akimat [office of the 
governor] and invited Mutanov, the rector of Al-Farabi Kazakh National University. 
He brought team of scientists. They arrived and said that they have some technologies 
for our region, in particular for Titanium and Magnesium Plant. Although funds were 
allocated on it, they invented something that no one in fact needed. It was waste. At 
the end of the meeting President of Titanium and Magnesium Plant got up and said: 
“Why did you bring all this? We don’t need that”. She said: “We have technologies 
in this field, we have foreign experts and we consult with them. We have other 
problems. We need to solve recycling of a waste problems, and so on…”. It turned 
out that they were exploring something that no one needed. (Duman Tastanbekov, 
interview, 20th July 2016) 
Although the government expected that transformation of formal arrangements would 
incentivise domestic actors to network, Kazakhstan is ranked only 88th among 144 economies 
in university-industry collaboration in R&D (World Economic Forum 2014). Evidently, 
mindsets of participants of innovation processes, their practices, routines, values, and codes of 
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conduct are too sticky and path-dependent to be influenced solely by change of organisational 
and institutional set-ups.   
While the withdrawal of governmental control encourages collaboration of R&D and 
industrial players in the context of countries with established market relationships, it produced 
the opposite effect in the country that only undergoes the process of transition. The reduction 
of governmental intervention is perceived as a way of bridging the rift between R&D and 
industrial players in countries where the market relationships are well-established. For instance, 
Intarakumnerd (2006) mentions that financial autonomy, granted to universities by the Thai 
government have encouraged them to conduct industry-relevant research and forge links with 
enterprises through training activities. As a result, not only did Thai universities become more 
relevant to the needs of industry, but they also reduced their dependence on funding from the 
national budget. However, in the countries of the former Soviet Union the mindsets of 
participants of innovation processes are locked-in on the paradigm in which the government 
supplies inputs, allocates outputs to end-users and essentially controls every aspect of 
innovation processes. Accordingly, OECD (2017, p. 26) notes that in Kazakhstan: “Most 
universities are not well-acquainted with the task of collaborating with industry on innovation. 
In return, many business firms – partly because of their limited absorptive capacity – do not 
see universities as sources of useful research results or as trustworthy and promising partners 
for contract or collaborative R&D”. The withdrawal of the government from the role of a sole 
mediator of science-industry relationships only increased the gap between science and industry 
in Kazakhstan. 
Mikhail Bortnik, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship describes the vision of the authorities:  
There are certain industries that constitute the backbone of our economy. This relates 
to the oil production, mining, and metallurgy. Bunch of innovations can be introduced 
there in order to reduce prime cost or achieve better quality of metals. There should 
be the main field for innovations, for our scientists. First of all, this is direct 
application of innovations because if you invented something, companies probably 
will be interested in you. Second of all, those companies can support you at the initial 
stage and support you financially. You don’t necessarily need government grants. 
(Mikhail Bortnik, interview, 22nd May 2017) 
Similarly, Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs 
"Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev notes:  
Representatives of our science are not interested in solving problems of business 
because it is easier to win some state grant, take a lot of money and spend them 
somehow, since no one will bring you to account for them, rather than work with 
business and execute particular tasks that it needs. (Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th 
July 2016)   
These statements reflect the general misconception of the authorities stemming from the 
exposure to the ideas of market fundamentalism that the reduction of state funding might 
encourage scientists to engage in industry-relevant research. The problem is that such 
viewpoints do not account for the specificities of the science-push model of technological 
development, which make state support and mediation absolutely crucial during the process of 
transition. In the Soviet Union, science production associations were deeply engaged in frugal 
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engineering of consumer products, which substituted near-market research. After science 
production associations were shut down and their personnel dismissed, the well-established 
mechanism of integrating R&D outputs into industry was destroyed. As a result, the scientific 
community in transition economies is largely represented by former employees of the Academy 
of science, who in the past were mainly engaged in fundamental research and therefore have 
no experience of collaborating with industries. Consequently, state funding should be high 
enough to let domestic scientists to broaden their expertise to the level when their research 
outputs become relevant to the needs of industrial players but not high enough to let them 
ignore opportunities offered by collaboration with industries. 
The adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach enabled officials to focus 
on implementing their own interpretations of what should be done in order to build up a 
knowledge-based economy. Collaboration between R&D and industrial players in many ways 
depends on the ability of two leading ministries in the domain of research, development, 
technology and innovation – Ministry of Education and Science and Ministry of Investment 
and Development to combine their efforts in addressing the expectations of stakeholders. 
However, nudging R&D and industrial players into collaboration was not a priority for 
Ministry of Education and Science. In Kazakhstan, the absence of checks and balances in terms 
of public accountability of officials motivates them to pursue only those targets that are closely 
monitored by higher authority. Nudging R&D and industrial players into collaboration is a 
complex endeavour which would require a lot of effort by the Ministry of Education and 
Science and therefore may prevent public sector managers from meeting their most important 
performance indicator – that is, the utilisation of funds. On the other hand, allocation of funds 
on conduct of purely academic research is the easiest way for the Ministry of Education and 
Science to utilise their budget as it can be conducted by scientists on their own. Although 
allocation of funds on pursuit of pure science is not going to turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-
based economy, it allows officials to meet plan targets by using their budget in the most 
convenient way.  
The National Agency for Technological Development is directly subordinate to 
Ministry of Investment and Development. Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board recounts 
attempts of his Agency to coordinate its work with Ministry of Education and Science:  
Last year we visited 300 companies and have identified 75 problems that enterprises 
strive to solve. We said to Ministry of Education and Science: “You provide grant 
funding. Here are 75 problems that you can focus scientists on. Whether there will be 
results or not it is still better than science for sake of science”. But they refused 
because it creates difficulties for them. They want to solve some tasks of their own. 
They regularly provide funding. Some scientists live at the expense of it. They get 
used to do it in Soviet way [separate science from industry]. But I say, even if they 
work in a Soviet way, let’s give them these tasks. They [Ministry of Education and 
Science] could have prioritised these tasks and pass them down the chain [for the 
scientists to solve]. When you receive grant, solve these tasks since you are scientist. 
But it never moved from the dead-point. (Sanzhar Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 
2016)   
The conclusion that can be derived from the Chairman’s recollection is of high importance. It 
shows that the tendency of governmental agencies to pursue their own goals to the detriment 
of the interests of the entire country is one of the key factors hindering any progress in solving 
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the problem of a lack of collaboration between science and industry. The unwillingness of the 
Ministry of Education and Science to join forces stems from the adoption of the ‘economy first, 
then politics’ approach, the primary aim of which was to accelerate the pace of market-oriented 
reforms. The adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach consolidated the power 
around the President, encouraging public sector managers to focus on achieving goals that 
would be most visible to the higher authorities. The lack of checks and balances in terms of 
public accountability by officials caused by the suppression of the civil society and the mass 
media strongly aggravated this tendency.  
4.7. Conclusion   
 Whilst many market-oriented researchers tend to view transition as merely the 
transformation of formal organisational and institutional set-ups, which can be accomplished 
overnight, the reality is that transition represents a paradigm-shifting undertaking that needs to 
be addressed properly in order to avoid serious systemic problems. There is a common 
misconception among market-oriented researchers to consider a centrally-planned economy as 
a non-system, designed to replace market forces with central planning procedures. Centrally-
planned development was a fully-fledged paradigm, which needs to be distinguished from the 
generally accepted norm of market relationships as it was established in order to pursue the 
goals of socialism, such as eradication of inequality, speculation, unemployment, and 
exploitation. The goals of socialist society shaped the system of values of Soviet people and 
defined a model of technological development, adopted by the communist regime. Being 
developed in order to fit well with the goals of socialism, the science-push model had several 
features, that differentiated it from market-pull model of technological development. In 
particular, the science-push model enabled researchers to engage more in ‘big science and 
technology’ in areas such as space exploration, nuclear power and military technology because 
frugal engineering of consumer products enabled the budget of civil R&D to be kept relatively 
low. The practice of separating R&D players from industries and end-users enabled researchers 
to focus on getting the science right by excluding pressures exerted by consumer demand and 
downstream implementation concerns. Since neither central planning agencies nor ministries 
were in position to determine research priorities, scientists were also able to engage in the 
pursuit of risky research projects, the strategic value of which was expected to be high. Over 
the course of decades of Soviet era codes of conduct, norms, and practices of science-push 
model shaped values, expectations and attitudes of researchers, which became extremely 
resistant to change. Transition is a paradigm-shifting undertaking, the core difficulty of which 
lies not in transformation of formal set-ups, but in making them fit well with the informal, tacit 
elements of a system, such as system of values.  
The lack of a tangible plan on how to transform Kazakhstan into an open market 
economy, encouraged the government to adopt the ‘economy first, politics second’ approach 
in order to pursue a national sociotechnical imaginary, formed by the WTO. Kazakhstan had 
to abandon the science-push model of technological development because it was incompatible 
with the implementation of WTO-plus demands to establish an open market economy. The 
WTO had no knowledge about the nature of transition. Nevertheless, being an active promoter 
of the ideas of the Washington Consensus, the WTO formed a national sociotechnical 
imaginary by claiming that neoliberal reforms will turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based 
economy. Being convinced that an increase in flow of inward FDI would lead to technology 
transfer, the authorities decided to demonstrate political stability to foreign investors and ensure 
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the smooth implementation of the demands of the WTO by delaying democratic reforms and 
concentrating power in the hands of the President. While the strategy, adopted by Kazakhstan’s 
government has indeed triggered massive inflow of FDI, it did not facilitate the transfer of new 
technologies. Contrary to the expectations of the government, multinationals neither integrated 
domestic R&D players into their research projects nor relocated their knowledge-intensive 
activities into Kazakhstan. Moreover, the establishment of unilateral control over the course of 
Kazakhstan’s socio-economic development by the government did not bring positive results 
because reforms were conducted in the absence of a clear vision of how the transformation of 
the model of technological development could be accomplished. Being unfamiliar with the way 
the market-pull model actually works, authorities focused on establishing its most evident 
attributes, by following practices adopted by mature market economies.  
The ability of Kazakhstan’s innovation system to produce competitive outputs by 
switching to a conduct of near-market research was hindered by the lack of a tangible plan and 
top-down approach to implementation of paradigm-shifting reforms. A mismatch between 
codes of conduct, norms and practices of scientists, established in the course of decades of the 
Soviet history and formal set-ups that the government planned to adopt was paradigmatic. 
However, the government implemented radical reforms in a top-down manner due to a firm 
belief that by following the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, Kazakhstan will turn 
into a knowledge-based economy. The fact that the national sociotechnical imaginary was 
based solely on neoliberal rhetoric of the WTO and offered no tangible plan was overlooked 
due to a reformist attitude of the authorities. Having no guidelines on how transition should be 
handled, the government did not take into consideration the fact that the mere change of formal 
organisational and institutional set-ups neither automatically makes them fit well with the 
expectations of researchers, nor necessarily changes how things are done. No attempt was made 
to create an environment that would incentivise conduct of near-market research because it was 
assumed that researchers would automatically start performing tasks in the way it was imagined 
by the authorities. Moreover, being influenced by the neoliberal ideas, the authorities 
drastically reduced responsibility for funding R&D as they imagined that the reforms will 
facilitate integration of domestic R&D players into the global research projects. Furthermore, 
since the national sociotechnical imaginary is neither very specific, nor sufficiently goal-
oriented, officials developed a tendency to interpret it in such ways as to pursue outcomes, 
accomplishing of which would make them noticed by the higher authority. As a result of 
adoption of a top-down approach to implementation of reform, aimed at establishment of an 
imaginary system, the government failed to create conditions which would incentivise conduct 
of near-market research, required for production of competitive outputs in an open market 
environment.  
The adoption of commercialisation policies, typically used by mature market 
economies in order to bring technology to the marketplace, facilitated illegal lobbying of 
commercially unviable technologies. Implementation of WTO-plus demands to establish an 
open market economy led to the shutting down of science-production associations –  the last 
link of the production chain in the science-push model of technological development. The 
government attempted to address the shortage of output of commercially-viable technologies 
by ‘borrowing’ commercialisation of technologies policies from the contexts of countries in 
which market-pull model of technological development is well-established. It was imagined 
that allocation of state funds through policy instruments, typically used by mature market 
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economies would allow to spur the development of new technologies. What was not taken into 
account, however, is that in reality the problem of the shortage of output of commercially-
viable technologies was caused not by the lack of mechanisms of diffusing the results of R&D, 
but by unwillingness of scientists to engage in a conduct of near-market research due to a 
mismatch between their expectations and the formal set-ups, implemented in accordance with 
the vision of the authorities in a top-down manner. In the absence of near-market research 
outputs, the allocation of funds through the mechanisms provided by commercialisation of 
technologies policy leads to corruption because the goal  for which funds are allocated cannot 
be achieved. Moreover, being ‘borrowed’ from a different context, commercialisation of 
technologies policy becomes a potential risk for universities as it allows them to finance start-
up companies directly from their budgets. The authorities overlooked the fact that personnel of 
universities possessed neither the resources nor the expertise required for development of 
commercially-viable technologies because under the science-push model of technological 
development they were engaged solely in academic research. Being convinced that Kazakhstan 
is on its way of turning into a knowledge-based economy, the government developed a 
tendency to treat the symptoms while ignoring the causes of systemic problems. 
Attempts to create an environment that would incentivise multinationals to relocate 
their knowledge-intensive activities into Kazakhstan by creating the centres of research 
excellence have failed because the government disregarded the need to meet the expectations 
of scientists. Being convinced by the neoliberal rhetoric of the WTO that the entry of 
multinationals will enable the national economy to catch-up technologically with frontier 
countries, the authorities put a lot of effort into attraction of FDI. Although in general 
multinationals are reluctant to move their knowledge-intensive activities to locations outside 
their home base, the government was confident that implementation of demands of the WTO 
and improvement of investment climate will have a certain signalling value. Moreover, since 
multinationals tend to move their knowledge-intensive activities abroad to locations which 
possess strategic capabilities they can exploit, the government invested heavily in creation of 
technology parks, which were envisioned as centres of research excellence. The government 
overlooked the fact that the ‘borrowed’ practice of conducting near-market research in 
technology parks did not fit well with the values, norms and practices of research scientists. 
Over time, the Soviet-era science-push model of technological development developed an 
‘ivory tower’ attitude amongst researchers, as they were at the top of a hierarchical structure, 
looking down on the design bureaux, the factories and the end-users. Researchers did not bother 
to engage in a conduct of near-market research because under the centrally-planned 
development paradigm getting the science right was more important than bringing technology 
to the marketplace. A mismatch between the mechanisms offered by technology parks and the 
expectations of scientists was caused by the necessity to follow complex procedures of 
obtaining funds, the disrespectful attitude of officials responsible for allocation of funds, and a 
lack of familiarity with the task of conducting near-market research.  
The withdrawal of the government from the role of a mediator of science-industry 
relationships in the process of building up a system, based on national sociotechnical imaginary 
increased the rift between R&D and industrial players. The government was convinced that the 
establishment of an open market economy in accordance with the demands of the WTO will 
nudge R&D and industrial players towards collaboration, creating conditions for forthcoming 
technological breakthrough. However, while the reduction of governmental intervention might 
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be a valid strategy for making scientific research more relevant to the needs of industry in the 
contexts of countries where the market relationships are well-established, it produced the 
opposite effect in the case of Kazakhstan. Firstly, neither universities nor business firms were 
familiar with the task of collaborating on innovation because under the centrally-planned 
development paradigm the government acted as a sole mediator of science-industry 
relationships. The lack of trust on both sides inhibited the establishment of a promising 
partnership. Secondly, the collaboration was hampered by inability of the government to shape 
an environment that would incentivise domestic scientists to switch from a practice of pursuing 
purely academic goals to a conduct of near-market research, required for the development of 
commercially-viable technologies. Finally, scientists are unable to turn their research outputs 
into commercially-viable technologies by forming partnership relationships with domestic 
firms due to their limited absorptive capacity to manage complex technology. The tendency of 
the authorities to form the strategy of technological development by following the 
sociotechnical imaginary shaped by the WTO rather than creating an actual plan for how to 





















5. GOVERNMENT AS REGULATOR  
5.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I examine how requirements of the WTO to transform  Kazakhstan’s 
regulatory environment in accordance with the neoliberal principles of the Washington 
Consensus influenced the country’s attempts to catch-up with frontier economies in terms of 
technological development. Here the attention is drawn to the fact that due to the lack of 
knowledge about the process of transition, the sociotechnical imaginary was formed in order 
to convince the government that Kazakhstan’s regulatory environment could be improved 
practically overnight through transformation of its formal institutions and liberalisation of trade 
and investment regime. This chapter pays specific attention to the way the reformist attitude of 
the authorities and their belief in the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO, influenced 
attempts to establish an efficient regulatory environment, needed for integration of domestic 
firms into supply chains of multinationals and their capability building in open market 
conditions. I show that the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus disregard the fact that 
centrally-planned development was a fully-fledged paradigm, causing a mismatch between the 
formal set-ups and well-established informal institutions, embedded in practices, routines, and 
codes of conduct of domestic actors.  
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2. shows how in the absence of an actual 
plan on turning Kazakhstan into an open market economy the government was encouraged to 
focus primarily on the necessity of transforming the country’s formal institutional and 
organisational arrangements. Section 5.3. examines how the mismatch between formal set-ups 
and informal constraints, entrenched in the mindsets of domestic actors, influenced the ability 
of the authorities to control the establishment of an efficient regulatory environment. Section 
5.4. describes attempts by the authorities to make society more entrepreneurial in order to 
facilitate capability building of domestic firms. In section 5.5. I analyse how the government 
tried to encourage export-led growth by following the footsteps of the Asian Tigers. Section 
5.6. reviews how the regulatory environment influenced government plans to turn Kazakhstan 
into a platform for export operations of multinationals.  
 
5.2. Regulatory environment in closed and open economic systems  
While the regulatory frameworks of the Soviet Union were well-suited for achieving 
the goals of socialism in a closed economic system, its complexity would become an 
impediment for creating a favourable environment for development of competitive domestic 
firms in open market conditions. The regulatory environment plays a central role in the 
production, adoption and diffusion of innovations. It influences the behaviour of national firms, 
shapes their capabilities and defines technological opportunities. The regulatory system of the 
Soviet Union was constructed by extensive use of performance indicators based on central 
plans, checks and permissions which set performance objectives for domestic actors in 
conformity with the planning priorities (Bunich 1980). Complex planning procedures and all-
embracing norms were used in order to replace missing market forces and regulate relationships 
in such a way as to harmonise the endeavours of individual actors with those of others in a 
pursuit of common aims. With the establishment of the self-regulatory market relationship 
paradigm, numerous regulatory constraints, cumbersome institutional arrangements, and 
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excessive governmental intervention inherent to former planned economies would create 
significant obstacles for capability-building of national firms. Therefore, in the Address to the 
nation the Head of the State argued: “Sure enough, the discarded system offered more secure 
minimum social benefits and was a success in a number of fields. However, we must remember 
that this system fell apart because it proved to be non-competitive from the economic point of 
view… Within the Soviet command economy, the state managed to control everything and 
everybody. As a result, it has become an awkward structure with numerous intersecting chains. 
In developed countries more than 80% of similar activities which were under the Soviet control, 
are not included into the list of state functions” (Nazarbayev 1997). Consequently, in order to 
establish an open market economy, Kazakhstan’s government faced the necessity to form a 
regulatory environment that would motivate stakeholders to engage in innovative activity.  
Nurlan Musin, former chief executive officer of Ulba Metallurgical Plant, recounts his 
perspective on the goals of technological development in capitalist and socialist societies: 
In the past I had always asked myself: why were we capable to produce spacecrafts, 
that put the Soviet Union ahead of developed capitalist countries but did not produce 
decent tractors such as John Deere’s? The cause is in the political system. In order to 
keep making profits when the market was saturated, John Deere had to increase the 
price of each tractor by introducing new functions and improving level of comfort. 
Those tractors have satellite broadband, air conditioning. You can speak to your wife 
in any time, watch TV, listen to music. Seats are leather upholstered and have 
massage system. Manufacturers such as John Deere made sales of such tractors 
possible by lobbying state subsidies to farmers. Subsidies that are allegedly intended 
to support farmers in reality are targeted towards manufacturers… And now compare 
it to Soviet era. It is hard to imagine our farmers being provided with such conditions 
because our people had to be modest. Our people were meant to work in normal, 
simple conditions. That is why the excessive technological development of means of 
production was not approved. Not because our people could not do it.  (Nurlan Musin, 
interview, 18th July 2016) 
The Soviet regulatory system was created with the goals of socialism in mind (section 3.2.). Its 
main priority was to develop technologies capable of improving the well-being of the entire 
population rather than to increase profitability, competitiveness, commercial attractiveness, or 
exclusivity of products. Moreover, the regulatory system of the Soviet Union enabled the 
authorities to direct the efforts of scientists and engineers towards the goals they considered 
important.  
Kazakhstan’s authorities imagined that the implementation of radical reforms in 
accordance with the demands of the WTO would automatically lead to the formation of a 
regulatory environment that would incentivise entrepreneurs to innovate, encourage 
multinationals to relocate their knowledge-intensive activities to Kazakhstan and facilitate 
integration of domestic R&D and industrial players into the global value chain. The formation 
of the national sociotechnical imaginary, picturing Kazakhstan’s transformation into a 
knowledge-based economy was inspired by the neoliberal rhetoric of proponents of the ideas 
of the Washington Consensus. Developed countries and intergovernmental organisations 
strongly encouraged Kazakhstan’s government to accelerate the implementation of WTO-plus 
demands to establish an open market economy, emphasising the benefits of the reforms (EBRD 
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1994). Potentially problematic matters such as the ability of uncompetitive domestic firms to 
withstand competition with multinationals in an open economic environment were represented 
as an integral part of the process of building up their competence. For example, the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2012, p. 140) stated: “Over the next five to ten 
years, WTO accession seems likely, which would have a significant impact on the economy. 
The increased competition could act as a further stimulus for Kazakhstan's companies to 
innovate, while Kazakhstan's attractiveness to foreign investors may also increase due to 
improved perceptions, better market access, a more transparent legal framework, and enhanced 
investment procedures. At the same time, WTO membership would set significant limits to 
state support for industries and state regulation of projects with foreign capital participation. 
On the other hand, reduced state protection may also boost incentives for Kazakhstan's firms 
to intensify their innovation efforts”. While different analysts asserted that radical reforms 
would greatly benefit Kazakhstan’s economy, the fact is that no real evidence was provided to 
support such claims. Not only is it difficult to predict the results of paradigm-shifting 
transformations in general, in addition, there was no similar precedent in the world history, 
examination of which could have served as a basis for drawing such conclusions.  
Even though no evidence was provided that the neoliberal reforms would turn 
Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based economy, the authorities enthusiastically embarked on 
their implementation. The ‘best-practice’ reform package, imposed by the WTO was based on 
a set of 10 economic policy prescriptions, known as the Washington Consensus (section 3.5.). 
In accordance with it, Kazakhstan was supposed to reduce governmental intervention in 
economic activity, liberalise trade and investment regime, conduct privatisation and so on. The 
ideas of the Washington Consensus sharply contrasted with the regulatory practices adopted in 
the Soviet Union, which, after disappointing results of perestroika (Desai 1989) became 
associated with stagnation and lack of technological dynamism. Thus, the impression that by 
following the recommendations stipulated in the Washington Consensus and promoted through 
the WTO, Kazakhstan is moving towards creation of knowledge-based economy became a 
foundation for national sociotechnical imaginary. Speaking about accession to the WTO in his 
annual Address to the people, President Nursultan Nazarbayev announced: “We want to see 
Kazakhstan as a country developing along the global economic trends, as a country which is 
embracing all that is new and progressive, as a country which holds a small but its own specific 
niche in the world economy, and as a country which is quickly adaptable to new economic 
conditions… I strongly believe our country’s accession to this international economic 
organization opens vast opportunities for strengthening Kazakhstan’s competitiveness on the 
world markets” (Nazarbayev 2006). Although the reformist attitude of the authorities and their 
enthusiasm regarding the ideas of the Washington Consensus raised the nation’s expectations, 
the ability to turn sociotechnical imaginary into reality first and foremost depended on 
methodical implementation of concrete plans.   
While the WTO insisted upon implementation of radical reforms, prescribed by the 
Washington Consensus, it offered no guidelines on how Kazakhstan’s government should have 
handled the transformation of institutional and organisational set-ups. Being unfamiliar with 
the ways market systems operate, Kazakhstan’s authorities anticipated that the WTO would 
provide instructions on how to resolve the challenges, emerging in the process of 
implementation of the paradigm-shifting reforms. The problem, however, was that the WTO 
possessed neither knowledge about specificities of innovation process in the Soviet Union nor 
expertise on the matters of transition (section 3.5.). Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (1994, p. 3) 
argues: “For economic theorists the problems facing the socialist economies represent a 
challenge… Surely economic theory should provide considerable guidance. Regrettably, 
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economic science – at least until recently – has had very little to say about these fundamental 
matters, and even less to say about the important issue of transition. The typical advice of the 
visiting consultant making a hurried trip to one of the economies embarking on a transition 
path is to emphasize repeatedly the importance of markets…”. The suggestions given by the 
WTO were derived from the viewpoint of an outsider and stressed the need to liberalise trade 
and investment regime and create a fair play environment for multinationals. As a result of the 
absence of a concrete plan to transform the regulatory environment, the government focused 
largely on adoption of institutional and organisational practices inherent to open market 
economies, and attraction of FDI through improvement of the investment climate. Meanwhile, 
many important issues, related to the development of a regulatory environment that would 
improve the capability building of domestic firms remained overlooked, hindering attempts of 
the authorities to turn the national sociotechnical imaginary into a reality.  
The Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov explains which 
measures Kazakhstan’s government considers to be important for attraction of FDI:  
What is the investment climate? The investment climate is practically everything. 
Namely: how you got a visa, how you entered the country, how comfortable was your 
flight, how you entered the airport, whether or not immigration officer smiled to you. 
After that, when you went out, you need to catch high-quality cab, get to a good, 
adequately priced hotel. Next, when you turn on TV, is there a channel in English? 
Afterwards, when you start a business, it is ease of opening an enterprise: whether or 
not you have e-government, if customs work normally, if tax system works 
efficiently. At some point, social security, health care and education system come into 
consideration. That is to say, there is a number of issues and investment climate 
covers them all. That is why our task is to create the best possible business climate 
and solve all these problems. Then you will have desire to enter and invest in our 
country. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
It is vital to note that the reformist attitude of Kazakhstan’s authorities and their firm belief in 
the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO, became one of the main reasons why 
various problematic matters were overlooked during reforms. This attitude was especially 
noticeable during the interview with the Vice Minister, who seemed especially confident in his 
belief that increase in inflow of FDI is the most important factor that would lead Kazakhstan 
towards transformation into a knowledge-based economy.  
Another factor that impeded the attempts of Kazakhstan’s authorities to turn the 
national sociotechnical imaginary into a reality was the necessity to meet paradigm-shifting 
demands of the WTO at entry, without any transitional period. Rodrik (2002) argues that 
gradual and cautious harmonisation of national legislation with the norms of the WTO may 
provide the government of a developing country with an opportunity to build a high-quality 
regulatory environment. However, the first part of the problem with this argument in relation 
to the case of Kazakhstan is that for the countries of the former Soviet Union implementation 
of the ideas of the Washington Consensus, even over a relatively prolonged period of time 
cannot be qualified as a gradual change. The key challenge of transition from centrally planned 
to open market economy lies not in transforming formal institutional and organisational 
arrangements, but in addressing issues, arising as a result of a paradigmatic mismatch between 
the formal set-ups that had to be established and informal constraints embedded in well-
established practices, routines, and codes of conduct of domestic actors. Unlike formal rules 
which can be changed overnight, these informal constrains are extremely resilient to policy 
interventions (North 1990). The second part of the problem is that similarly to other post-Soviet 
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countries, Kazakhstan was required to meet most of the WTO commitments at entry with no 
transition period. United Nations (2001, p. 37) argues that during accession of transition 
economies to the WTO “No time is allowed these countries to establish the required 
institutional and legal infrastructure to meet these commitments which are part and parcel of 
their overall transition to a market economy which is a long and painful process and cannot be 
forced overnight”. The WTO rhetoric stated that implementation of the reforms, based on the 
rules of the Washington Consensus would enable post-Soviet Kazakhstan to create a favourable 
regulatory environment, required for turning the national sociotechnical imaginary into reality. 
However, due to the paradigm-shifting nature of the demands imposed and the necessity to 
meet most of the WTO commitments at entry, Kazakhstan faced a barrier that was too difficult 
to overcome. 
Although the WTO placed a strong emphasis on the importance of transformation of 
Kazakhstan’s formal institutional and organisational set-ups in accordance with the ideas of 
the Washington Consensus, no attention was paid to the role of informal constraints, embedded 
in well-established practices, routines and codes of conduct of domestic actors. The poor 
understanding of the problem of transition stems from the tendency of market-oriented theorists 
to regard the centrally planned regime as a deviation from the generally accepted norm of 
market relationships (section 3.2.). Due to the lack of knowledge about the problems of 
transition, it is generally assumed that the post-Soviet economies can catch-up with 
technologically more advanced nations simply by adopting formal organisational and 
institutional set-ups inherent to ‘benchmark’ open market economies. The short-sightedness of 
such a view is in dismissing the fact that apart from consciously created formal institutions, 
there also exist informal, tacit institutions that evolve spontaneously. Informal institutions such 
as political culture, social norms, routines, established practices, and values constitute implicit 
‘rules of the game’. Together they form an environment which plays a central role in the 
production, adoption and diffusion of innovations. Accordingly, Lundvall et al. (2006, p. 3) 
note: “There is a new tendency in international organizations that work on development issues 
to focus on institutions as perhaps the most important development factor. This tendency is 
interesting and useful but the focus remains narrow and one may wonder if the relatively 
narrow spectrum of institutions, which have been in focus, really can explain so much of the 
development process as it is claimed”. Similar to other international organisations which 
promote the ideas of the Washington Consensus, the WTO neither paid attention to the 
contextual differences between the countries on which ‘best-practice’ reform package was 
imposed, nor to the fact that for the former republics of the Soviet Union the mismatch between 
formal set-ups they had to adopt and well-established informal constraints was critical. 
Since the WTO viewed the process of transition in the very narrow sense of changing 
Kazakhstan’s formal institutional and organisational set-ups in conformity with the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, WTO’s focus was on persuading the government 
to accelerate the pace of the reforms rather than on finding ways to address a mismatch between 
formal and informal elements of the system. Due to the lack of knowledge about the problems 
of transition, the WTO had no actual plan on how to transform national organisational and 
institutional set-ups in such a way that would lead to the establishment of an effective 
regulatory environment. Nevertheless, the WTO insisted upon implementation of the reforms, 
based on the ideas of the Washington Consensus, highlighting their potential to turn 
Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based economy and the importance of accelerating the process 
of transformation of formal organisational and institutional arrangements. As the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1994, p. 45) puts it: “Suppose that a full set of 
market institutions, including a well functioning tax and banking system, bankruptcy and social 
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safety nets, functioning legal institutions (laws, courts and their personnel) had been introduced 
literally overnight along with the liberalisation of trade and prices. While the infeasibility of 
such a step is universally acknowledged, there are those who give the impression that it 
represents an ideal towards which reformers should strive”. The WTO did not provide any 
evidence to support the statements that the fast transformation of Kazakhstan’s organisational 
and institutional set-ups would allow to establish a favourable regulatory environment. Most 
importantly, no attempts were made to consider whether the mindsets of those responsible for 
transformation of Kazakhstan’s formal organisational and institutional arrangements were 
prepared to perform such an important task. 
Kazakhstan’s authorities were convinced that implementing reforms in accordance with 
recommendations of the WTO would automatically change the mindsets of public sector 
managers to a new paradigm. It is often argued that harmonisation of national legislations with 
the internationally accepted norms can improve policymaking in developing countries. For 
instance, Rodrik (2002, p. 7) notes that following the norms, stipulated in the WTO agreements 
may help governments of developing countries to “overcome traditional weaknesses in their 
style of governance” and “impose a certain degree of predictability, transparency, rule-bound 
behavior, and nondiscrimination in areas of policy often subject to discretion and rent-seeking”. 
Pro-liberalisation rhetoric convinced Kazakhstan’s authorities that the process of accession to 
the WTO will automatically change the mentality of the public sector managers, making their 
routines, practices, and codes of conduct more suitable for the task of creating an effective 
regulatory environment. Shortly after Kazakhstan submitted an application to join the WTO in 
1996, the President in his Address to the nation said: “Long-standing habits of petty 
interference with all the affairs, altogether unnecessary and harmful halo of secrecy prompting 
concealment of information from the society and even from each other, bureaucracy and 
localistic tendencies, nepotism and clannishness, collective irresponsibility, dullness and 
inertia, inadequate multi-stage hierarchies, corruption - this is but a far from complete "bunch 
of virtues" of our bureaucracy brought up by the former regime and coming to the fore in the 
last years to acquire overt, undisguised forms” (Nazarbayev 1997). While the strategy of the 
WTO aimed to focus solely on introducing change into Kazakhstan’s formal set-ups, the 
authorities imagined that the mentality of officials, still bearing features inherent to Soviet-era 
regime would automatically start to alter in the process of implementation of the demands of 
the WTO.  
The next section explains how a mismatch between formal and informal set-ups, 
influenced the government’s ability to establish an effective regulatory environment.   
5.3. Top-down system does not respond to commands 
The fact that mindsets of those in charge of transformation of Kazakhstan’s formal set-
ups were not adapted to a market relationships paradigm, resulted in a collision of former and 
new rationales, inhibiting creation of an effective regulatory environment. In the Soviet Union 
the authorities aimed to establish a system that allowed them to maintain total control over 
every aspect of economic activity rather than create an effective self-regulatory environment. 
A conceptually different paradigm of development adopted by the Soviet Union formed a path 
that constrained an alternative course of action for policymakers and became self-reinforcing. 
Campbell (2010, p. 90) notes: “As researchers began to turn their attention to the analysis of 
change, they recognized that institutions typically do not change rapidly—they are sticky, 
resistant to change, and generally only change in ‘path dependent’ ways”. Accordingly, public 
sector managers looked at the task of introducing new organisational and institutional set-ups 
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through the prism of the previous paradigm of socio-economic relationships. Instead of 
attempting to form an effective self-regulatory environment, officials strived to conduct 
reforms in such a way that new regulations would enable them to maintain total control over 
the system. Particularly, this goal was achieved through deliberately complicating legislation, 
which enabled them to interpret laws in the way they saw fit. As early as in his annual Address 
to the nation in 2001 the President expressed his concerns with such a development by noticing 
that the number of legislative acts adopted during the years of independence was approaching 
one thousand, which impeded their correct application (Nazarbayev 2001). Nonetheless, such 
a tendency continued due to the path-dependent nature and stickiness of former rationales. As 
a result, over the last decade, the number of annually adopted norms and regulations has 
increased more than fourfold, with about six thousand legislative acts affecting business 
adopted in 2016 alone (Lee 2017).   
Being able to interpret complicated norms and regulations in the way they saw fit; 
Kazakhstani officials developed a tendency to pursue their own varied vested interests to the 
detriment of the common good. According to the estimation of the Prime-Minister, 
Kazakhstani entrepreneurs are demanded to fulfil about 28 thousand requirements (Kazinform 
2017). Most of these all-embracing regulations were developed during the Soviet time in order 
to replace missing market forces and to control the quality of produced goods and services. 
However, because during the Soviet time all enterprises were state-owned, these regulations 
were used merely as guidelines, rather than the grounds for charging fines. The abrupt 
transition towards market relationships changed the way in which public sector managers 
perform their functions and use the power entrusted to them. For instance, it was noted by the 
authorities that the police use road cameras solely in order to charge fines rather than to prevent 
crimes (Zakon 2019). In essence, many public sector managers started to use their positions in 
order to pursue their own varied vested interests to the detriment of the needs of the entire 
society. This is important, considering that the number of agencies that have control functions 
by far exceeds any reasonable amount. Overall, there are shocking 61 departments with 
controlling functions in Kazakhstan, 45 of which are central and 16 are regional (Lee 2017). 
These local and central agencies rigorously check any initiatives of entrepreneurs that may 
deviate from well-established practices of doing things. Since innovative activity implies new 
ways of doing things, the complexity of legislation and the ability of public sector managers to 
interpret them in the way they see fit places enormous obstacles in the way of innovation. In 
order to prevent inspections from state agencies and avoid associated problems, Kazakhstan’s 
entrepreneurs prefer to stay away from any types of innovative activity.  
In the absence of a plan which would include concrete steps on how to address the 
problems associated with an abrupt shift from socialist to capitalist system of values, 
Kazakhstan became locked-in on a trajectory of development that led to systemic corruption 
and opportunistic behaviour of public sector managers. The concept of path-dependence is 
well-established in the literature. According to Goldstone (1998, p. 834), “Path dependence is 
a property of a system such that the outcome over a period of time is not determined by any 
particular set of initial conditions. Rather, a system that exhibits path dependency is one in 
which outcomes are related stochastically to initial conditions, and the particular outcome that 
obtains in any given ‘‘run’’ of the system depends on the choices or outcomes of intermediate 
events between the initial conditions and the outcome”. The initial condition which is causally 
related to upsurge of corruption in Kazakhstan was a socialist ideology, which deprived Soviet 
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people from an opportunity to enjoy different attributes of consumerist lifestyle, established in 
capitalist countries. Being forced to live in conditions of austerity for many decades and having 
experienced shortage of basic goods during perestroika, people of the former Soviet Union saw 
corruption as the fastest way to achieve wealth after the abrupt shift to the market relationships 
paradigm. However, the intermediate cause that ultimately led to systemic corruption and 
opportunistic behaviour of state officials was neglecting the need to adapt the mindsets of those 
responsible for transformation of Kazakhstan’s formal organisational and institutional set-ups 
to market relationships. 
Senator Mikhail Bortnik, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship explains how fast state transformation have caused 
corruption and opportunistic behaviour among decision-makers:  
In fact, we are the first generation who broke away from that system which was based 
on principles of confining, prohibiting, restraining and forcing to follow the inscribed 
path. Whereas they (the Western society) developed evolutionary, upwards, upwards, 
upwards, towards freedom of action, freedom of decision-making, freedom of 
thoughts, we came from the system that suppressed this freedom. Now we are 
moving, hopefully towards freedom as well. But we are so “hungry” for some 
elementary things, everyday possessions that it leads to corruption as well as 
ambitions among new generation of decision-makers. One has no work experience, 
but he is already appointed as a vice-minister. Naturally, when he is surrounded by 
such money, such opportunities he forgets about the goal and starts to follow other 
goals. (Mikhail Bortnik, interview, 22nd May 2017) 
Forced and speedy transition towards market relationships has indeed become a powerful 
catalyst for systemic corruption and opportunistic behaviour of officials. Discussing the 
reasons for systemic corruption in Kazakhstan, Nezhina (2014, p. 15) argues: “Market ideology 
equates happiness and wealth. To achieve wealth, one needs to be rational and efficient. Moral 
considerations apart, I argue that corruption is a rational and efficient instrument that enhances 
business opportunities, reduces competition, and leads to wealth. I maintain that the promotion 
of predominantly economic motivations elevated money above all other values, distorted 
traditional value system, and led to systemic corruption”. In reality, the problem lies not in the 
market ideology per se, but in the way it was established in transition economies. 
Intergovernmental entities that forced former centrally-planned economies to undergo speedy 
transformation neither considered the austerity of the Soviet lifestyle, nor the fact that the 
mindsets of people need time to adapt to paradigmatically different ways of doing things.  
Due to the rise of systemic corruption and opportunistic behaviour of public sector 
managers, the practice of deliberate entanglement of legislation, enabling officials to interpret 
norms and regulations in the way they saw fit became self-reinforcing, making the system 
unresponsive to the commands of the higher authority. Whereas it is generally assumed that in 
the countries with top-down systems of governance those at the top of the pyramid have 
absolute control over actions of officials who occupy positions lower down the hierarchical 
ladder, the reality is that informal constraints embedded into their routines, practices and codes 
of conduct may conflict with the goals of higher authorities, impeding execution of their 
commands. For instance, Amann (1982, p. 150) notes: “During the course of Soviet history the 
economy had become accustomed to a different pattern of priorities… and despite the repeated 
exhortations of Khrushchev [First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
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of the Soviet Union] many influential political leaders and economic officials found it 
inconvenient to adjust. This, in turn, exacerbated the problems of the system in carrying out its 
allocated tasks; the so-called ‘command economy’ did not respond to commands”. The absence 
of a plan for how to adapt the mindsets of officials to a new paradigm put Kazakhstan’s 
authorities into a similar position. In the process of implementing the demands of the WTO, 
officials looked at the task of transforming the regulatory environment through the prism of the 
previous paradigm and complicated legislation in order to maintain control over the system. 
However, the establishment of predominantly economic motivations within the society, caused 
by the abrupt shift from socialist to capitalist system of values, provoking officials into 
interpreting complicated legislation in such a way that allowed them to pursue their own varied 
vested interests. Attempts by Kazakhstan’s authorities to reduce the regulatory burden in order 
to facilitate innovative activity conflicted with rationales of public sector managers, 
encouraging them to resist direct orders. Accordingly, the President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
observed that although during the first phase of implementation of his directives to reduce 
administrative barriers for business, the number of permits required was supposed to be 
reduced by 30 percent from 1015 to 700, an inventory showed that the number of permits in 
fact increased to 1137 (Zakon 2012).  
The inability of the authorities to overcome the tendency of public sector managers to 
create ambiguous legislative norms can be illustrated by the example of tax regulations. 
According to the Prosecutor General, the reason why national legislation is filled with vague 
and confusing laws is because the same state agencies that are directly responsible for 
enforcement of the laws are not only placed in charge of drafting bills of these laws but also 
are in a position to initiate their subsequent amendment (Newtimes 2017). However, while that 
might be a proximate cause of such a tendency, the higher-level cause is the fact that due to the 
absence of a tangible plan on transition, the need to adapt mindsets of those in charge of 
transformation of formal organisational and institutional set-ups to the market relationships 
was overlooked. Being locked-in on a previous paradigm of socio-economic relationships, the 
main feature of which was the ability of the government to maintain total control over the 
operation of the system, officials strived to create legislation which would enable them to 
preserve the same level of control by interpreting norms and regulations in the way they 
wanted. Kazakhstan’s authorities quickly came to realise that complicated legislation inhibits 
development of new technologies. Accordingly, the President in his annual Address 
announced: “The state, for its part, must clear all legal, administrative and bureaucratic barriers 
from the path of business initiatives and provide direct support to promising new business start-
ups in the private sector” (Nazarbayev 2006). The problem, however, was that the top-down 
system no longer responded to the commands of the higher authority. More than a decade later, 
the President noted that in order to pay a value-added tax an entrepreneur needs to know 82 
articles of Tax Code, directing taxpayer to another 286 articles, 206 of which have further 
references (Capital 2017). Although it was envisioned that Kazakhstan could quickly adjust to 
a new paradigm of economic relationships by altering its formal institutional and organisational 
set-ups, the reality is that informal constraints became an insurmountable barrier to system 
transformation.  
The disappointment of policymakers about their inability to change tendency of public 
sector managers to complicate national legislation on purpose is noticeable in my interview 
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with Mikhail Bortnik, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship:  
It is challenging for a beginning entrepreneur and even more challenging for an 
entrepreneur with big turnovers because sometimes the same value-added tax is 
calculated differently for each type of operation, is returned differently, etc. 
Therefore, the simpler the legislation, the more direct effect articles, rather than 
articles that refer to second, third subordinate article it will be based on, the easier it 
will be to develop [innovations] and collect taxes. Because we know that the same 
value-added tax turned into a fertile field for corruption. Try to understand whom to 
return, whom not to return, try to untangle 82 articles referencing to 286 articles and 
other things. (Mikhail Bortnik, interview, 22nd May 2017) 
The inability to overcome the tendency of officials to introduce ambiguous regulations, caused 
by a mismatch between the formal set-ups that had to be established and informal elements of 
the system, placed enormous obstacles in the way of innovation. Peng (2002, p. 251) notes: 
“Since no firm can be immune from the institutional frameworks in which it is embedded, there 
is hardly any dispute that institutions matter”. Attempts by the authorities to create an effective 
regulatory environment were an exercise in futility because the strategy of implementation of 
radical institutional and organisational reforms, insisted upon by the WTO, was based on the 
national sociotechnical imaginary, rather than an actual plan.  
Although the authorities imagined that in the course of reforms, new rationales would 
replace former rationales, leading to a formation of professional government apparatus, public 
sector managers continue to pursue their own plan targets to the detriment of the country’s 
economic and technological development. From the very early stage of implementation of 
market-oriented reforms, Kazakhstan’s authorities noticed that the collision of former and new 
rationales inhibited the system’s functioning. Accordingly, the President in his annual Address 
noted: “No one in Kazakhstan, including the Prime Minister, the Ministers of the Government, 
the heads of the Houses of the Parliament, or myself is satisfied with the performance of our 
Government. It is not the fault or the failure of one official or one ministry. It is not a failure 
of vision or will. Regardless of our best intentions, our best plans, and even our best people, 
we find that every day the operation of Government is still too slow, too bureaucratic, too 
confused and lacks responsibility” (Nazarbayev 1998). While the authorities imagined that in 
the process of accession to the WTO, attitudes, practices, and codes of conduct of public sector 
managers will become attuned with the tasks required for turning Kazakhstan into a 
knowledge-based economy, the reality showed that being established over the course of 
decades of the communist rule, the mindsets of officials became highly resistant to change. For 
instance, when tax services were unable to meet their plan targets on levying taxes (plan targets 
need to be met by the end of each calendar year), they started to use ambiguity of legislation in 
order to force entrepreneurs to pay taxes in advance. Such practice was heavily criticised by 
the Speaker of the lower chamber of the Parliament, who argued that although levying taxes 
on sales which have not yet occurred, tax services manage to meet their own plan targets, they 
harmed industries by taking away their working financial capital (Sputnik 2018). The tendency 
to prioritise their own plan targets over the interests of the entire society proved to be deeply 
embedded into the mentality of officials, hampering the creation of an environment that would 
incentivise innovative development. 
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My interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs "Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev shows how the business community felt about the 
tendency of public sector managers to twist entrepreneurs’ arms in order to achieve their plan 
targets: 
The second most common problem on what we have always received complaints is 
taxation. This became particularly evident during the last year. We started to 
experience that first in 2015 when the prices on our main export products plummeted 
and the tax authorities in order to replenish the budget somehow, began to twist arms 
of entrepreneurs. Whenever where there a manufacturing process was organised or 
where an entrepreneur found a way to make things work, they try to pull out 
everything through taxes. Although in the central apparatus of the Ministry of 
Finance, Tax Committee there is a full understanding, we face very serious violations 
from the local tax authorities. Sometimes even the following has happened – 
entrepreneur received letters from a Department of State Revenue stating that 
allegedly, back in 2011 or 2010 or 2012 taxes were levied incorrectly. Consequently, 
everything has to be reassessed and has to be repaid for these past years. And when 
it all was reassessed, it could happen that one company could be charged additional 
several billion of tenge. (Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016) 
The situation described by the Deputy Chairman is like another practice that also demonstrates 
the tendency of officials to prioritise pursuit of their own plan targets over the common good. 
It is the practice of fining entrepreneurs based on false accusations. A Member of the 
Parliament, Gulzhan Karagusova has drawn attention of the authorities to that fact that in 2015 
the amount of revenues to the republican budget in the form of fines increased from 2.6 KZT 
billion in 2014 to 4.8 KZT billion (Sputnik 2017). The reason why the member of the 
Parliament decided to criticise the tax services is because such a sharp rise in alleged breaches 
of legislation happened exactly when the oil prices [Kazakhstan’s main revenue earner product] 
plummeted and consequently tax services experienced difficulty in meeting their targets of 
levied taxes. Evidently, the practice of replenishing the budget by fining entrepreneurs for 
imaginary breaches of regulations became a burden for entrepreneurs. 
The firm belief of the authorities that Kazakhstan was on its way to turning into a 
knowledge-based economy impeded the development of checks and balances which would 
have put constraints on the behaviour of public sector managers. During the Soviet era the 
interests of the industrial players were represented by the relevant ministries, including the 
Ministry of the Communications Equipment Industry, the Ministry of the Electronics Industry, 
the Ministry of General Machine Building, the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool-
Building Industry, the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and the Ministry of the Radio 
Industry. Being state-owned entities, Soviet industrial players were safely protected from any 
violations from other state agencies that might cause disruption or interrupt the production 
process. In contrast, the regulatory framework of the modern Kazakhstan does not provide the 
private-owned companies the same level of protection. The Ministry of Investment and 
Development – the state agency directly responsible for Kazakhstan’s technological 
development – does not have the authority to interfere when the interests of industrial players 
are violated by other governmental agencies. Essentially, Kazakhstan’s regulatory system for 
a very long period of time lacked a force that would be able to back the interests of privately-
owned firms. The development of civil society organisations was heavily suppressed because 
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the authorities assumed that their interference into the course of implementation of the radical 
reforms, insisted upon by the WTO, might obstruct the process of turning Kazakhstan into a 
knowledge-based economy. Ibrayeva and Nezhina (2013, p. 64) argue: “Most NGOs still 
largely depend on foreign funding and adjust their missions according to their donors’ agendas. 
In Kazakhstan, independent and oppositional media is controlled and politically harassed… As 
a result, the civil society and the mass media are unable to place significant constraints on or 
conduct independent investigation of the behaviour of public officials or politicians”. What 
was not anticipated by the authorities, however, is that the top-down system will stop 
responding to commands. The tendency of officials to interpret legislation in such ways as to 
pursue their own vested interests went out of control of the higher authority due to the absence 
of check and balances in the system.  
Realising that the top-down system was no longer responding to commands, the 
authorities decided to restore some balance in the system by considering and involving the 
National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken" as a real partner in policy making. Deputy 
Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev 
argues:  
Prime-Minister supported our initiative to create an appellate commission at the level 
of the central office of the Ministry of Finance, which would include representatives 
of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs and representatives of the Ministry of 
Finance, so that it would be possible to respond very quickly to such violations of 
entrepreneurs' rights in taxation and protect their rights. Up to now you have to go to 
court in order to protect your rights. Imagine yourself: your rights are violated, your 
bank accounts are arrested, you can’t do anything, the whole business is halted. You 
can file a lawsuit, but the process usually lasts a year, a year and half in the court until 
you pass all procedures. By that time, your business will certainly die.  To prevent 
this from happening, we proposed to the Government to create an appellate 
commission, which would solve such issues very quickly. (Nurzhan Altaev, 
interview, 29th July 2016) 
The fact that the initiative of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs to introduce an appellate 
commission on tax matters was approved by the Prime Minister, suggests that the authorities 
started to realise that the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach has its drawbacks. In the 
absence of public accountability of officials caused by the lack of checks and balances, false 
accusations in alleged breaches of legislation can be used by corrupt public sector managers to 
systematically extort money from entrepreneurs. In accordance with the survey conducted by 
the World Economic Forum (2018), Kazakhstan is ranked 65th out of 140 countries in the 
efficiency of legal framework in challenging government actions and/or regulations. Therefore, 
it may seem that an entrepreneur has a reasonable chance to defend his/her interests in a court. 
However, as the Deputy Chairman correctly noticed, the court procedures through which 
entrepreneurs can challenge decisions of public sector managers are too lengthy, meaning that 
businesses of those who refuse to pay extortion money would not survive.  
The next section examines how the tendency of public sector managers to use 
complicated regulations in order to pursue their own vested interests influenced capability 
building of domestic firms.  
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5.4. Capability building of domestic firms 
One of the most important factors that hindered capability building of domestic firms 
and defined their tendency to avoid innovative activity from the very beginning of 
Kazakhstan’s abrupt transition toward market relationships was the fact that the mindsets of 
entrepreneurs were locked-in on the old ways of doing things. Private entrepreneurial activity 
was illegal in the Soviet Union. In accordance with the Soviet legislation, commercial 
mediation, and entrepreneurial activity were punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to 
five years with confiscation of property (Matthews 1989). Since mindsets are slow to change, 
most people preferred to seek or wait for public sector employment, rather than attempt to 
organise business of their own. In his Address to the nation, the President noted: “our mentality 
is shaped up by several generations of people who were brought up in the spirit of Communist 
principles. Some people enthusiastically took advantage of recent changes, but quite many 
didn't. People are influenced by subjective and objective factors; they are slow to adapting 
themselves to eventual changes… It would take decades until a new world outlook comes into 
existence with us” (Nazarbayev 1997). Although some people, as it was noted by the President, 
accepted the radical change of economic relationships paradigm by starting to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity, they did not attempt to innovate. For a generation of people who would 
have been prosecuted merely for engaging in private entrepreneurial activity the idea that under 
the new paradigm of economic relationships they were supposed to become active promoters 
of innovative activity was difficult to comprehend. Moreover, entrepreneurs did not see the 
benefits of updating manufacturing methods, establishing feedback relationships with the 
customers or increasing productivity because the ways of doing things were shaped throughout 
the decades of centrally-planned development. While the task of changing attitudes of 
entrepreneurs towards innovation was quintessential, it was never prioritised by the 
government because Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development was based on the 
sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO.   
Sanzhar Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological 
Development notes how the attitude towards innovation gradually changed in Kazakhstani 
society:  
Israel, Singapore, Malaysia – it took them 20-30 years to become technologically 
successful. As for us, it is, in fact, merely our second five-year term of being engaged 
in the development of innovations [refers to the adoption of five-year plans on 
technological development by the government]. The first business establishments to 
be opened were restaurants, saunas and billiard parlours. Each time someone made 
money on something like sales, including that of natural resources, he immediately 
opened for himself or for his wife a restaurant or a beauty salon. Because it is fast 
money. Being descendants of the Soviet era, we all lived under constraints. The 
horizons of financial opportunities were opened to us very suddenly, which defined 
the ways of formation and accumulation of capital. Nevertheless, it is starting to 
change now. This generation, children, students, they think differently. Even 10 years 
ago everyone wanted to work for KazMunayGas [the largest state-owned oil and gas 
company]. But now they want to create their own company in the IT sector or 
something similar. We meet with many of them, organise competitions for 
schoolchildren, students. They are no longer locked-in on finding a job in the 
government, the quasi-public sector, the customs or the traffic police – the 
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occupations that became a byword [for corruption]. They think differently nowadays. 
Graduates come to us, apply for internship. – Why do you need this? – I want to create 
a start-up, but I am not ready, I want to understand how others work, you have a lot 
of projects,  that people work on. This is the way they think now. Previously people 
come to us because “You have stability, fixed salary, the budget feeds you”. This is 
what they used to come for. Now it is a complete turnaround from that. (Sanzhar 
Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
This attitude towards entrepreneurship is one of the key factors that affect the dynamics of 
innovation in any society. Governments of many developing countries seem to have realised 
that this attitude does not change automatically and needs to be addressed through policy 
action. For instance, Intarakumnerd (2006) mentions that there is a push by the Thaksin 
government to steer Thai society into entrepreneurship, motivating people to turn from 
employment by the government and big corporations to becoming entrepreneurs. However, the 
task of changing attitudes in the case of market economies is more realistically achievable 
compared to a country where entrepreneurship was an illegal activity for many decades.  
Due to the lack of knowledge on how to make society more entrepreneurial, the 
authorities put their hopes on a new generation of young people, without taking into 
consideration how their attitude could be affected by the regulatory environment. It was 
assumed that the tendency of Kazakhstani business to abstain from innovation efforts will 
automatically be overcome in a new generation of young entrepreneurs because their mindsets 
were never affected by the old ways of doing things. In his annual Address to the nation the 
President argued: “We must be patient in our transforming mass consciousness. In this we must 
seek support in the younger generation which is more flexible in adapting to the new system 
of values and has a fresh vision of the future” (Nazarbayev 1997). The new generation of young 
entrepreneurs who never lived under the constraints of the Soviet era indeed had a potential to 
develop a different attitude towards innovation. However, their initial enthusiasm vanished 
once they encountered obstacles created by the public sector managers. For example, Tengri 
news (2016) reported a case of a young businessman, who invested significant funds into a, 
new for Kazakhstan, concept of a food-truck by purchasing a bus with a kitchen equipment and 
painting it with airbrush artwork for attracting customers. The police decided that this 
innovative idea was breaching the law because in accordance with the regulations, people are 
not allowed to cover more than 30% of a vehicle’s side surface with airbrushing. The bus was 
towed back to the garage by the police the day before opening and since the airbrush artwork 
constituted the key part of the strategy for attracting customers, the owner decided to freeze the 
project. While in the course of almost three decades since the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
a new generation of entrepreneurs has been raised, Kazakhstan is still ranked 103rd out of 140 
countries for growth of innovative companies (WEF 2018). The absence of a positive dynamics 
in the development of innovative firms, despite new generation of young entrepreneurs, clearly 
shows that the development of innovations depends not only of the attitude of entrepreneurs, 
but also of that of other domestic actors.   
My interview with Nurzhan Altaev, the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National 
Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken" shows that launching even the most basic and well-
established types of business require lengthy and complicated procedures that may completely 
undermine the attitude of entrepreneurs towards innovation:  
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Nowadays, if you for instance want to build some small store or workshop you need 
a bunch of permissions, lots of technical conditions for connection to electricity, 
water and so on. Plus all the architectural procedures. Then, after you built everything, 
a bunch of permissions is required again in order to get the Act of Commissioning of 
the completed project. That is to say, sometimes we see that due to construction 
procedures entrepreneur may spend around one and a half to two years only to obtain 
those permits. The same thing happens again after he finished construction and wants 
to get the Act of Commissioning of the completed project. This is a very serious 
problem. (Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016) 
Initially, the authorities assumed that the only reason for an unwillingness to engage in 
innovative activity was the lack of entrepreneurial spirit among the population. What the 
authorities needed to take into consideration, however, was that the implementation of 
innovative ideas often requires unorthodox approaches. Therefore, the attitude of entrepreneurs 
towards innovation centres on their ability to overcome the reluctance of public sector 
managers to issue permits which allow them to engage in activities that deviate from the well-
established ways of doing things. The tendency of officials to create impediments for business 
was condemned by the President, who stated: “There are private dental clinics with their own 
patients. But why aren’t there other developments in different directions such as traumatology, 
gynaecology? (Because) it is impossible to open a private clinic. Why? It’s in our hands. Who 
is doing this? Where is the ‘fifth column’ [a group of people who undermine a country’s effort 
from within in favour of an enemy] sitting? Inside the government?” (Lee 2017). 
Entrepreneurial spirit is indeed the key factor that defines prospects of technological growth in 
former centrally-planned economies. However, the attitude of public sector managers towards 
entrepreneurship significantly hindered its development.   
Considering the fact that Kazakhstani business emerged from an environment where 
entrepreneurial activity used to be illegal, it was extremely important to focus the efforts of the 
government on finding ways to change the attitude of all domestic actors, including that of 
public sector managers, researchers, businessmen and consumers towards entrepreneurship and 
innovations. In the Soviet time a person who was involved into entrepreneurial activity, as a 
term of abuse was pejoratively called baryga, which originally came from the word barysh, 
meaning profit. Since the mindsets of domestic actors were unable to keep up with the pace of 
the radical transformation of a paradigm of socio-economic relationships, the biggest problem 
faced by Kazakhstani businessmen was that the society continued to view them as barygas. 
Long-established attitude towards entrepreneurship encouraged many public sector managers 
to use the complexity of national legislation in order to extort money from businessmen as if 
they were kickbacks for allowing them to engage in illegal activities. Attempts to extort money 
from businessmen have happened not only when officials issued them permissions or 
conducted inspections, but even when entrepreneurs committed insignificant violations of 
administrative regulations. For instance, the Head of the State informed the nation that in 2016 
and 2017 alone, state revenue officials initiated the investigation of 17,000 cases, classifying 
them as criminal matters (Sputnik 20171). However, 9,000 of these cases have been 
discontinued due to the lack of corpus delicti (the facts and circumstances constituting a crime). 
The President characterised this phenomenon as a concealed racket because the main 
motivation of state revenue officials was to intimidate entrepreneurs in order make them act in 
accordance with the vested interests of public sector managers. It needs to be pointed out that 
while the extortion of money from entrepreneurs is still commonplace, the situation was far 
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worse two-and-a-half decades earlier, when entrepreneurship only started to form in 
Kazakhstan. In recent years, the authorities experienced significant difficulties when trying to 
change society’s attitude towards entrepreneurship and innovation due to the absence of a 
tangible plan on transition that recognised the need to influence mindsets of domestic actors 
alongside the change of formal set-ups. 
Being familiar with the regulations and practices of public sector managers that affect 
business most, the National Chamber helped the authorities to formulate the law ‘On permits 
and notifications’, which significantly decreased the regulatory burden. Deputy Chairman of 
the Board of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev argues: 
The majority of complaints relate to permissions. We certainly made a very serious 
progress in this matter because as you know one year ago the law ‘On permits and 
notifications’ was passed. We managed to reduce very significantly number of 
permissions there. We formulated clearly that only those permits which are specified 
in this law are legitimate in our country. That is to say, no state agency is allowed to 
invent anything to their advantage if it is not specified in this law. It means that they 
cannot demand to obtain any additional approvals or permissions if the law does not 
stipulate it. Besides, the state agencies used to intentionally protract various 
permissions, which are mandatory for starting a business. Now, in the framework of 
this law these permissions have notifying nature. Essentially, you simply have to 
inform state body that you started some activity. That’s it, you don’t have to obtain 
permission. As soon as state agency receives your letter, you can start your activity. 
(Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)  
Initially the authorities decided to implement the national sociotechnical imaginary in a top-
down manner because it was assumed that other domestic actors would act solely in their own 
interests, thereby inhibiting Kazakhstan’s transformation into a knowledge-based economy. 
Eventually, the authorities started to realise that the attitude of officials towards 
entrepreneurship became the biggest impediment for innovative development. Accordingly, 
the Head of the State repeatedly tried to convince public sector managers to change their 
attitude towards business. For instance, in his Address to the nation the President said: 
“Entrepreneurs should know that we are creating for them a conducive environment and 
effective incentives, that business in our country is safe and rewarding” (Nazarbayev 2005). 
However, since the exhortations of the authorities did not work, it was decided to restore the 
balance in the system by including the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken" into 
the decision-making process.  
Being unable to change the attitude of public sector managers towards entrepreneurship 
overnight, the authorities decided to limit their influence by reducing the number of inspections 
that can be made, as well as the number of permissions, required for running a business. The 
President noted: “Various inspections, contemplated by more than 50 laws, have turned into a 
true calamity for businessmen. Certain agencies use various pretexts to "inspect" a business 
several times in violation of the law. This seriously distracts enterprises from their business. 
Furthermore, it runs counter to the policy that I have been pursuing. The number of 
inspections carried out by law-enforcement authorities and other inspectors should be 
significantly reduced, and such inspections should be streamlined” (Nazarbayev 2008). 
Accordingly, in 2011 the government introduced the law ‘On state control and supervision in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan’. The law established common guidelines for implementation of 
the control functions by state agencies. Later, the Head of State signed a ‘Decree on drastic 
measures to improve the conditions for development of entrepreneurship in the Republic of 
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Kazakhstan’. The Decree introduced a moratorium on inspections of small and medium-sized 
businesses from April 2014 until January 2015. In January 2015, the practice of scheduled 
inspections was cancelled and the government elaborated a new unbiased system of 
determining inspections. The measures undertaken by the authorities led to a significant 
reduction of the regulatory burden. In 2008 Kazakhstan was ranked 79th out of 130 countries 
by ‘burden of government regulation’ (WEF 2008). A decade later Kazakhstan was ranked 
48th out of 140 countries in the same category (WEF 2018). The authorities were confident 
that reducing the regulatory burden would spur entrepreneurship and encourage businessmen 
to engage in innovative activities. Instead, a reduction in the number of inspections 
immediately led to significant deterioration in the quality of goods and services. For instance, 
when the government put a moratorium on checks of small and medium-sized enterprises, the 
number of mass poisonings in restaurants significantly increased (Medelbek 2014). Essentially, 
the authorities found themselves in a stalemate situation, which clearly showed that the attitude 
of domestic actors, rather than number of inspections and permissions per se, plays the key role 
in the innovative activity.   
Deterioration in the quality of goods and services, caused by attempts to lift the 
regulatory burden solely through prohibition of inspections, proved that the top-down approach 
might not be a solution to every problem. An alternative course of actions was offered by the 
National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken". Nurzhan Altaev, the Deputy Chairman of the 
Board elaborates:  
Certain measures were undertaken in the framework of the law ‘On permissions and 
notifications’. In compliance with it, timeframe and number of required documents 
were seriously reduced. But this measure is scarcely sufficient. We cannot yet say 
that we have achieved any significant accomplishments. A lot needs to be done and 
one of the suggestions we made is to convey all the permissions associated with the 
architecture and construction to ‘Government for Citizens’ [the state-owned 
corporation, providing services to the population]. Besides, it should be done through 
electronic document management systems in order to shield an entrepreneur from 
contacts with officials. He could receive all that through the internet as well as submit 
documents. (Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)   
The problem of the lack of entrepreneurial spirit among the population will persist as long as 
the attitudes of officials towards entrepreneurship remain the same. Considering the fact that 
the number of small and medium enterprises in Kazakhstan decreased by 7 percent due to 
regulatory burden, it is safe to say that the negative attitude of public sector managers towards 
entrepreneurship remains a serious problem (Lee 2017). While the measure offered by the 
National Chamber of Entrepreneurs – to minimise direct contacts between public sector 
managers and entrepreneurs will not be enough to change the attitudes of officials towards 
entrepreneurship, it will at least reduce likelihood of extortions.  
The next section investigates attempts of the authorities to incentivise export-led 
growth of national economy by emulating the policies of Asian Tigers.  
5.5. Kazakhstan as a Snow Leopard – following the footsteps of Asian Tigers 
The authorities believed that Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development 
should have been based on the use of its beneficial geo-economic position in order to facilitate 
integration of domestic firms into the supply chains of multinationals. In his Address to the 
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nation, the President noted: “Kazakhstan can and must actively participate in multilateral 
economic projects which promote our integration into the global economy and are based, 
among other factors, on our beneficial economic and geographical location and available 
resources (Nazarbayev 2006). In theory, the geographic remoteness of Kazakhstan from the 
headquarters of its major investors should have facilitated the establishment of backward 
linkages between domestic firms and multinationals. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2011) using 
firm-level panel data from Romania demonstrated that greater distance between the home and 
the host countries increases the probability of integration of domestic firms into supply chain 
of multinationals. The authors’ argument rests on the assumption that bilateral remoteness 
between the headquarters and the production facilities in the recipient country encourage 
investors to purchase locally produced intermediate inputs required for manufacturing of the 
final product. Comparisons conducted by them confirmed that foreign investments from the 
United States of America (USA) or Canada were associated with a higher degree of vertical 
spillovers than FDI from the European Union. During its independence period, Kazakhstan 
attracted $330 billion of FDI, more than 50 percent of which came from European Union and 
15 percent from the United States (Kazinform 2019). Therefore, its geographic location can be 
considered favourable for integration of domestic firms into the supply chains of 
multinationals. The question that remained to be answered, however, was whether domestic 
firms were able to capably exploit this potential. 
The task of becoming suppliers of intermediate inputs for affiliates of foreign 
companies is extremely challenging for firms in transition economies. Domestic firms would 
have to catch up with multinationals in terms of scale efficiency, capacity to innovate, quality 
and variety of produced outputs (Rugraff 2013). The government assumed that the 
improvements, required for establishing backward linkages with multinationals could be 
achieved through export orientation of the economy. In accordance with the plans of the 
authorities, the goal of turning Kazakhstan into a major export-oriented economy was supposed 
to be achieved through accession to the WTO. The main reasons for the high expectations of 
Kazakhstan’s authorities about the consequences of accession was the neoliberal rhetoric, 
attributing success of newly industrialised countries to the adoption of a liberal trade and 
investment regime. For instance, Gilpin (2001, p. 320) claims that one of the most important 
factors that defined the success of newly industrialised countries was that they “were able to 
pursue an export-led growth strategy because of the global free-trade environment”. The 
authorities were inspired by the technological and economic success of newly industrialised 
countries and saw them as benchmark models, whose experience should have been used for 
creating Kazakhstan’s own strategy of technological development. Accordingly, sharing his 
vision of the country’s economic development, the Head of State in the Address to the nation 
claimed that by the year 2030 Kazakhstan will become known as a Snow Leopard, whose goal 
of building a technologically advanced economy will be achieved by following the footsteps 
of Asian Tigers (Nazarbayev 1997). The President’s announcement was made one year after 
Kazakhstan’s application for membership in the WTO was submitted and reflected the 
expectations of the authorities about the potential benefits of the accession.  
The authorities had very high expectations for the prospects of an outward orientation 
of the national economy, formed by the neoliberal rhetoric of the WTO. The firm belief of the 
government in the sociotechnical imaginary and their reformist attitudes are evident in my 
interview with Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov, who argues 
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that despite the fact that Kazakhstan as a landlocked country cannot use low-cost sea transport, 
it still has a huge export potential:  
Clearly, our accession to the Eurasian Economic Union opens for us a large market 
of 170 million people. That is to say, access to certain markets has already been 
granted to us. Sharing borders with two big neighbours – Russia and China also opens 
up huge markets. The question is – what markets do you want to target at? Yes, of 
course, exporting to anywhere in Europe using cheap methods of transportation 
would be problematic. But if you are targeting the huge growing market of China, or 
Russia, then it is different case. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
The Vice Minister’s claim proves that neither the expectations nor the priorities of the 
authorities have changed over the time. At the very early stage of accession to the WTO, the 
President also noted that the markets of the neighbourhood countries, including that of Russia, 
China, Central Asia, the Near and Middle East with their population of about 2 billion people 
can absorb as much product as Kazakhstan can produce, which dictates the necessity to develop 
the export potential of domestic firms (Nazarbayev 1997). However, while high absorptive 
potential of neighbourhood markets was a favourable factor for an outward orientation of the 
national economy, the main impediment was the low technological capability of domestic 
firms.  
Whereas neoliberal rhetoric convinced the authorities that Kazakhstan’s accession to 
the WTO was the best way to ensure outward orientation of the national economy, the fact is 
that the rules of the organisation hamper export-led growth by prohibiting the provision of 
subsidies to domestic firms. Due to a lack of knowledge on how to turn Kazakhstan into an 
export-oriented economy, the authorities based their strategy of national technological 
development on the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the proponents of neoliberal ideas of 
the Washington Consensus. The reason why the government enthusiastically pursued the 
imaginary is because neoliberalists used the example of newly industrialised economies as 
poster children of successful outward orientation, achieved allegedly through liberalisation of 
trade regime (Gilpin 1987). In reality, export-led growth of the national industries of newly 
industrialised countries was achieved not through liberalisation of trade, but through export 
subsidisation, which is prohibited under existing WTO rules (Rodrik 2002). In particular, the 
WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures severely restricts incumbent 
members from direct subsidisation of export-oriented enterprises. The agreement defines two 
categories of subsidies: prohibited and actionable. Subsidies are defined as prohibited if the 
government requires recipients to use only domestic goods or achieve certain export targets. 
Subsidies are regarded as actionable if a country can prove that the subsidy has an adverse 
effect on its interests. In this case the countervailing duty can be charged. The prohibition on 
provision of subsidies had serious implications on Kazakhstan’s potential to turn into an export-
oriented economy as it is the state subsidisation of uncompetitive domestic firms that defined 
their ability to upgrade the technological capabilities needed for production of internationally 
competitive products. Lin and Chang (2009, p. 501) argue: “In the real world, firms with 
uncertain prospects need to be created, protected, subsidised, and nurtured, possibly for 
decades, if industrial upgrading is to be achieved”. The necessity to comply with the prohibition 
of export subsidisation, imposed by the WTO increased the dependence of domestic export-
oriented firms on the quality of the regulatory environment. 
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In order to achieve industrial upgrading, the government faced the necessity to find 
ways to incentivise domestic enterprises to export without contradicting the rules of the WTO. 
However, such measures were much less efficient then direct subsidisation. In my interview 
with Aydin Kulseitov, the Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry Development 
Institute, his characterisation of the domestic market as “half-dead” not only shows the state of 
relationships between entrepreneurs and domestic consumers, but also the attitude of the 
authorities about the dynamics of innovation processes on the internal market:  
To be frank with you, in our Actualisation of Industrialisation Programme [Decree 
amending the ‘State Program of Industrial-Innovative Development of Kazakhstan 
for 2015-2019’] we expresses our vision that supporting a manufacturer that targets 
exclusively the domestic market is such an ungrateful undertaking that does not lead 
to any progress. Therefore, we strictly stipulated that support will be provided only 
to those enterprises, that produce for export. If you export, we will provide any 
possible support which is allowed in the frameworks of the WTO rules. But if you 
want to compete over share of domestic market – go to the bank or pay from your 
own pocket. This is not something the state should be concerned about. There is no 
reason to tear each other’s throats over our little, half-dead internal market. So, if you 
want to compete domestically – then by all means, compete. But if you are going to 
export, we will help you. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016) 
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency 
“Kaznex Invest” comments:  
Support will be provided, but according to the rules of the WTO it cannot be granted 
exclusively to exporters. Therefore, we will support everybody, allegedly. Both 
importers and exporters will be recipients. For instance, we may cover their transport 
expenses. But we hope that it will mainly be used by exporters. (Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
Subsidisation of export-oriented firms was especially important in the case of Kazakhstan 
because the mindsets of industrial players were locked-in on the old ways of doing things. In 
Kazakhstan feedback relationships between manufacturers and customers are practically non-
existent because in the conditions of the Soviet Union they were isolated from each other 
(Siemaszko 1982). Due to path-dependency, those manufacturers that target only the domestic 
market continue to ignore their customers and therefore lack the incentive to upgrade.  
The prohibition of subsidies by the WTO limited a number of instruments the 
government could use in order to encourage domestic firms to invest in development of 
internationally competitive products. In the closed conditions of the Soviet planned economy 
the government controlled the quality of commodities through a set of technical standards, 
known as GOST.  Soviet manufacturers had no incentive to increase the quality of their outputs 
any further if they met the GOST standards. Since the mindsets of the first generation of 
Kazakhstani businessmen were locked-in on the previous paradigm of economic relationships, 
they did not see the benefits of updating their production methods and improving the quality 
of products above the required standards. Accordingly, it was assumed that by changing 
standards the government can encourage entrepreneurs to invest in production of 
internationally competitive goods. For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission for 
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Europe (2012, p. 32) in its review of innovative performance of Kazakhstan argues: “A major 
challenge faced by government innovation policies is how to encourage the demand for 
innovation, so that opportunities are created that can be seized by entrepreneurs. Standards can 
play an important role, provided they allow a degree of freedom over technological solutions 
and their implementation, unlike the previous GOST standards prevalent in Soviet times”. In 
reality, however, adoption of different standards would not solve the problem of the 
unwillingness of entrepreneurs to invest in the development of internationally competitive 
products, but would seriously aggravate it. The problem was not in the lack of proper standards 
but in the way the standards were used by public sector managers. While in the Soviet time the 
standards were used merely as guidelines, today they are mostly used by public sector managers 
in order to pursue their own vested interests to the detriment of the common good. For instance, 
investigation of prosecutors revealed that public health inspectors methodically fined domestic 
firms on the grounds of breaching Soviet guideline requirements to store rye and wheat bread 
on different shelves or to install the lowest shelf for bread storage at least 35 centimetres above 
floor level (Zakon 2017). Similarly, Tengri news (2017) reports that the public health 
inspectors systematically fined entrepreneurs using the guideline standard of making omelettes 
with toppings thinner than 3 centimetres. Considering the attitude towards entrepreneurship 
among public sector managers, an attempt to introduce a new system of standards would only 
increase ambiguity and complexity of the regulatory environment, further inhibiting 
development of internationally competitive products.  
The need to change the attitude of domestic actors towards entrepreneurship was 
overlooked by the authorities because the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO 
encouraged them to focus solely on implementation of formal institutional reforms. What was 
not taken into account, however, is that formal institutions do not function properly if they are 
placed in the wrong context. As Putnam et al. (1993, p. 8) put it: “Just as the same individual 
may define and pursue his or her interests differently in different institutional contexts, so the 
same formal institution may operate differently in different contexts”. Due to long-established 
attitudes of public sector managers towards entrepreneurship even the Soviet standards which 
were meant to serve merely as guidelines became used by officials in order to fine 
entrepreneurs. As a result of the absence of incentives to upgrade production methods and 
technological capabilities, entire sectors of Kazakhstani industries are seriously 
underdeveloped. The National Agency on Development of Local Content is a governmental 
agency, directly subordinate to Ministry on Investment and Development. Kairat Bekturgenev, 
Chairman of the Board comments:  
There was an agreement between the governments of Belarus and Kazakhstan on the 
construction of plant for the production of refrigerators in Kazakhstan. We went there, 
studied the entire cycle of production process of ‘Atlant’ [refrigerator brand]. After 
that we returned to Kazakhstan and started to work on localisation. And here I can 
say that unfortunately we were unable to localise production here in Kazakhstan. The 
only appropriate thing that we had was metal from ArcelorMittal. We lacked even 
packaging because cardboard was not produced in sufficient scale in Kazakhstan… 
This is very serious obstacle and it hampers development of many projects. (Kairat 
Bekturgenev, interview, 15th June 2016) 
Even the fact that entire sectors of Kazakhstani industries were in their infant stage would not 
be an obstacle for export-led growth if the attitude of public sector managers towards 
93 
 
entrepreneurships was different. Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National 
Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex Invest” provides the following example of how 
production of refrigerators ‘Atlant’ could have been organised through just-in-time delivery 
processes:  
In principle, the lack of some components would not matter that much if we improved 
trading across borders. For example, if there are no screws, they can be brought from 
Russia. There is no cardboard – it can be brought from Belarus or from somewhere 
else. But our problem, I am telling again, is trading across borders. The big problem 
is that it takes a lot of time to bring components. The world switched to system like 
just-in-time inventory 25-30 years ago. That is to say, they do not have those screws 
in their warehouses. They bring them directly to the plant in order not to keep a large 
amount of inventory on their balance sheet. This just-in-time inventory system will 
not work here by definition because those screws can be stuck at customs for 30 days, 
and that’s it. That is why any production we have will be uncompetitive in comparison 
with China, where its customs clearance is handled within an hour. (Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
The long-established attitude towards entrepreneurship as an illegal undertaking encourages 
public sector managers to use the complexity of regulations in order to extort money from 
businessmen, as if they were kickbacks for allowing them to continue engaging in their 
activities. In other words, the real reason why customs procedures are so lengthy and 
complicated is because such order of things provides opportunities to receive bribes for 
accelerating the process of custom clearance. The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (2015) ranked Kazakhstan 185th out of the 189 economies in ‘trading across 
borders’ category. Not only did the attitudes of public sector managers reflect poorly on the 
ability of domestic enterprises to engage in development of internationally competitive 
products, but also directly influenced the complexity of import/export procedures.  
Although the authorities introduced various initiatives, aimed at spurring the 
development of internationally competitive products, their efforts did not bring results because 
they did not change the attitude of domestic actors towards entrepreneurship. Over many years 
the government attempted to overcome the lock-in of the innovation system. In order to 
encourage the new generation of young entrepreneurs to engage in development of 
internationally-competitive products and reorient the national economy towards export-led 
growth, the government introduced various mechanisms that were supposed to help domestic 
firms to update their production methods and apply new technologies. As early as in 1997, one 
year after Kazakhstan submitted the application for membership in the WTO, the government 
established the Entrepreneurship Development Fund ‘DAMU’, which provides subsidies to 
domestic enterprises on favourable terms through partner banks. In order to achieve 
diversification and improve the competitiveness of the economy the ‘State program for 
accelerated industrial and innovative development of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2010-
2014’ was launched. It was later replaced by the ‘State program of industrial-innovative 
development of Kazakhstan for 2015-2019’. The ‘Law on State Support of Industrial 
Innovative Activity’ was adopted in early 2012. Additionally, the government developed the 
‘Conception of innovative development of Kazakhstan till 2020’. However, while the 
authorities put a growing emphasis on the promotion of innovation, they overlooked the need 
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to change the attitude of domestic actors towards entrepreneurship. As a result, the initiatives 
introduced did not increase the international competitiveness of domestic firms. Commenting 
on the export potential of domestic firms OECD (2016, p. 120) notes: “Kazakhstan is still 
almost exclusively internationally competitive in products based on natural resources. Between 
2010 and 2014, the country had on average a revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in 
exporting goods in 55 (out of approximately 1,000) products. Around 30% were raw material 
or agricultural products and two-thirds corresponded to processed natural resources including 
a few chemical products. Fever than 5% of the RCA products were products not based on 
resources, including, for example, rail locomotives, tugs and vessels”. The key reason why the 
need to change the attitude towards entrepreneurships in the society was overlooked was 
because the strategy of the authorities was based on top-down implementation of the national 
sociotechnical imaginary.  
The authorities implemented reforms in a top-down manner because they believed that 
public pressure may impede the process of turning Kazakhstan into a major export-based 
economy. In order to achieve outward orientation of economy and turn Kazakhstan into a Snow 
Leopard, the government started to follow the footsteps of Asian Tigers by limiting 
participation of domestic actors in the process of decision-making. Gilpin (2001, p. 319) 
argues: “The theory of the developmental state maintains that the East Asian state was able to 
play a guiding role in economic development because of a number of unique domestic and 
international factors. In all these societies, the state has been relatively autonomous and 
therefore able to pursue policies free from public pressure. Yet, this state autonomy was deeply 
embedded in a society where the state worked very closely with business interests to promote 
rapid industrialization”. However, the problem with emulating the policies of newly 
industrialised countries was the difference in historical contexts. The negative attitude of 
officials towards entrepreneurship was shaped by decades of the Soviet history. The problem 
of the wrong attitude was aggravated due to adoption of the ‘economy first, then politics’ 
approach whereby public sector managers received unilateral control over the process of 
decision-making. Evidently, by giving carte blanche to public sector managers, the authorities 
created a system that lacked checks and balances. The complete dependence of entrepreneurs 
on the decisions of officials became the main factor that defined the nature of their 
relationships. The authorities believed that since Kazakhstan has a top-down governmental 
hierarchy, they would be able to control the behaviour of public sector managers. However, 
the reality is that due to lock-in of mindsets of officials the top-down system no longer 
responded to commands.  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” provides the following example of how burdensome rules hamper the 
export-led growth of Kazakhstan’s economy:  
One of our enterprises assembles Wi-Fi routers and wanted to export them. It turned 
out that according to old Soviet norms Wi-Fi routers are qualified as dual-use 
products and their export is subject to authorisation by the National Security 
Committee. In order to obtain permission on Wi-Fi routers you have to wait for 30 
days. That is to say, that this small enterprise which with great difficulty found a 
buyer on its products have to wait for 30 days for permission from the National 
Security Committee. Naturally, the buyer will not bother to wait our routers for 30 
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days. He will buy them somewhere in Thailand, China, Turkey, where there are no 
such rules. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
The example provided by the Chairman illustrates the fact that the system no longer responded 
to commands. Earlier, the President in his Address to the nation gave a direct order to officials 
to reduce regulatory burden by stating the following: “A well-developed entrepreneurial sector 
is the basis of any economy. In this regard, I am instructing the Government, in the 
administrative reform's context, to radically reduce the administrative burden on 
businesses, and to further simplify the approval system, mostly in terms of licensing, 
certification, and accreditation. Let me offer an example. According to the latest World Bank 
report "Doing Business", it takes 89 days to perform all export-related procedures in 
Kazakhstan, whereas it only takes five days to do the same in Estonia” (Nazarbayev 2008). 
However, even many years later the situation did not change. Evidently, neither the 
exhortations nor the direct orders of the authorities changed the attitudes of public sector 
managers towards entrepreneurship. 
The next section describes how regulatory environment influenced decisions of 
multinationals to use Kazakhstan as a platform for their export operations. 
5.6. Creation of an export base for multinationals     
 The authorities planned to achieve outward orientation of the national economy not 
only by encouraging domestic firms to export, but also by turning Kazakhstan into a platform 
for export operations of multinationals. The authorities believed that the inflow of FDI will 
become a major source of the capital needed for capability building of domestic export-oriented 
firms. Omarova (1999, p. 350) argues: “Building an internationally competitive, export-
oriented industrial sector is a long-term project requiring massive injections of capital. In the 
absence of domestic sources of capital, the Kazakhstani leadership’s developmental ambitions 
critically depended on its ability to attract massive foreign investment”. Moreover, it was 
assumed that if multinationals start using Kazakhstan as a base for their export operations, it 
may also increase export capacity of indigenous firms. In theory, close geographic proximity 
to multinationals can reduce the costs associated with the process of breaking into foreign 
markets for domestic firms by familiarising them with the tastes of customers in foreign 
markets. Affiliates have foreign parent firms which implies that they are a better source of 
information about foreign markets than domestic exporters. This hypothesis was tested by 
Aitken et al. (1997), who examined statistical data of 2113 Mexican manufacturing plants over 
the period 1986-1990 in order to estimate spillover effects associated with costs of foreign 
market access for domestic firms located near exporting multinationals. The authors concluded 
that multinationals act as catalysts for local firms and significantly enhance their export 
prospects. In the case of Kazakhstan, it was especially important to familiarise domestic firms 
with the tastes of foreign customers because the Soviet Union was a closed economic system. 
Despite the fact that theoretical research suggests the possibility of spillover effects from the 
presence of multinationals, Kazakhstan’s strategy of achieving outward orientation of the 
national economy through attraction of FDI was based on an imaginary, rather than a tangible 
plan because they had no knowledge about the nature of export-led  growth.  
The Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov explains how the 
government imagined the role of multinationals in Kazakhstan’s strategy of building export-
based economy:  
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Our goal is to make you choose Kazakhstan as a place for investments. We strive to 
crate the best investment climate. So that you could safely produce your commodities 
here and sell them abroad.  (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
Apparently, the government imagined that the country’s favourable geographic position would 
encourage multinationals to produce goods in Kazakhstan and export final products to China 
and countries of the Eurasian Economic Union. 
Pursuing the national sociotechnical imaginary, the government has undertaken a series 
of major reforms which were meant to encourage multinationals to turn Kazakhstan into a base 
for their export operations. Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO was the first step in the 
government’s plan, aimed at achieving export-led growth. It was expected that accession to the 
WTO would increase the flow of inward FDI because the rules of the organisation heavily 
protect the interests of foreign investors. Buthe and Milner (2008) argue that nowadays extreme 
government actions that may directly harm the interests of investors, such as the expropriation 
of foreign assets, rarely take place. Instead, governments of developing countries are likely to 
use a more subtle approach in order to obtain a larger share of the benefits from investments. 
The authors note that commitments by host governments to international standards in 
frameworks of the WTO are more credible due to the ability of home governments and 
multinationals to respond with costly economic pressure through dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Therefore, the government anticipated that accession will convince 
multinationals that Kazakhstan is a safe place for their investments. Besides, the authorities 
made some extra steps in order to encourage the flow of inward FDI. For instance, investors 
working in special economic zones and those who signed investment contracts with the state, 
were provided with full exemption from import duty payments. The dependence of 
multinationals on the quality of local suppliers was minimised through reduction of the average 
level of import tariff from 9.5 percent in 1996 to 2.6 percent in 2004 (OECD 2017). Moreover, 
in order to encourage multinationals to choose Kazakhstan as a base for their export operations, 
the government adopted policies aimed at reducing the regulatory burden, created by the 
complexity of administrative procedures required for obtaining visas, quotas, permissions, 
undergoing checks, customs procedures, etc. For instance, the Prime-Minister demanded 
central and local authorities to monitor the quality of services provided to investors including 
ease of enrolling children into kindergartens and quality of service in restaurants (Gani 2018). 
Although the authorities did not know whether upon entry multinationals would decide to use 
Kazakhstan as a basis for their export operations, they made many concessions in order to 
attract them. 
An interview with Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export 
and Investment Agency “Kaznex Invest” shows that the main priority of the government was 
attraction of FDI: 
In 2014 we attracted the largest amount of FDI among the landlocked transition 
economies. Among all transitions economies, regardless whether they have access to 
sea or not, we are second after Russia. Therefore, we play very well in our league. 
But the question is how we will enter the next league and how we will look there, 
against such countries as the Baltic States, Eastern Europe, China. (Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
Similarly, the Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov argues: 
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We constantly monitor existing investors, meet, talk, find out what are their problems. 
We have an investment ombudsman institution – it is Minister for Investment and 
Development, on the basis of which the current problems of a particular investor are 
being addressed. If the problems are of a systemic nature, then we have a Council for 
improving the investment climate under the Prime-minister. Issues related to 
improvement of tax and custom legislation are being considered there. For strategic 
purposes we have a Council of foreign investors under the President. (Yerlan 
Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016) 
The measures the government undertook with the purpose of improving Kazakhstan’s 
investment climate and regulatory environment led to a significant increase in the flow of 
inward FDI. As it was anticipated by Kazakhstan’s government, the adoption of a non-
discriminating investment regime and attempts to improve the regulatory environment resulted 
in an upsurge of inflow of FDI not only in oil and gas industries but also in non-extracting 
sectors of the economy. The flow of inward FDI in the processing sector increased more than 
tenfold, from $ 346 million in 2005 to $ 3, 748 million in 2014 (figure 5.1.). A similar trend 
was experienced by the construction sector with a rise from $ 134 million to $ 799 million in 
less than decade. The inflow of FDI in wholesale and retail trade along with vehicles and 
motorcycles repair went up from $ 387 million in 2005 to $ 2,731 million in 2014. While 
attracting extracting multinationals became a major source of capital, it is the work of non-
extracting multinationals that was supposed to teach domestic firms the tastes of foreign 
customers and demonstrate to them the benefits of export orientation. Due to positive dynamics 
in attracting non-extracting multinationals the government imagined that the entry of 
multinationals will inevitably lead to export-led growth. Therefore, the authorities focused their 
efforts mainly on attracting FDI rather than on the need to the adapt mindsets of domestic 
actors, including that of public sector managers to a new paradigm of economic relationships.   
 
Figure 5.1. FDI inflow in non-extracting sectors, $ millions.  
Source. National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan.   
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Although the authorities made a lot of concessions in order to encourage multinationals 
to choose Kazakhstan as a base for their export operation, they failed to create a favourable 
environment for export-led growth. The vision of the authorities, defining the Kazakhstan’s 
strategy of technological development was largely shaped by recommendations of the WTO. 
The WTO itself had little awareness about what needs to be done in order to facilitate export-
led growth in the economy in transition and therefore focused attention of the authorities 
exclusively on the necessity to transform Kazakhstan’s formal institutions in accordance with 
the main principles of the organisation. Another reason why the WTO insisted solely upon 
change of formal institutions without weighing the consequences of their potential mismatch 
with the well-established informal institutions is because in reality the organisation is 
"concerned with setting the rules of the trade policy game, not with the results of the game" 
(Hoekman 2002, p. 42). Thus, the need to change the attitudes of the officials, shaped by the 
austerity of the Soviet regime and the, perestroika period, as well as vast opportunities, offered 
by market relationships was overlooked. Objectively, Kazakhstan has a lot of characteristics 
that should have convinced multinationals to turn it into a base for their export-based operation, 
including a safe investment climate, cheap labour force, favourable geographic location and 
low tariff barriers. However, due to predatory attitudes of public sector managers, the costs 
associated with even the most basic activities, such as launching production processes, 
arranging transportation, and undergoing customs procedures became too high. 
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of the National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” assumes that the legacy of the Soviet era is the main factor that 
inhibits the plans of multinational companies to use Kazakhstan as a platform for export 
operations:  
We still work by Soviet building codes. One of investor complained to us – investor 
works, he wants to produce transformers. Power transformers for transport. He began 
to build factory, but then he was told that it is imperative to build a bomb shelter as 
well. That is to say, that according to our building codes which are still valid in 
Kazakhstan if you build a factory you have to build bomb shelter. This is the legacy 
of the Soviet era. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
While the Chairman blames the regulations inherited from the Soviet era, the reality is that it 
is the attitude of public sector managers that hampers export-led growth of national economy. 
The obvious reason why the officials referred to the norm of the Soviet GOST, with the 
requirement to build a bomb shelter, and demanded its implementation from the investor was 
to extort a bribe from the multinational company so that this requirement would be overlooked. 
The fact that public sector managers were not obliged to demand implementation of the 
outdated norms of the Soviet GOST is confirmed by Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the 
Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative Development and Entrepreneurship, who was 
sceptical about the very possibility that such situation could take place:      
I doubt that anyone would nitpick specifically to building bomb shelters nowadays 
because it is costly and it is a waste of money. Old norms contain such requirement, 
but they are not taken into account and of course no one builds those. (Askhat 
Kuzekov, interview, 1st August 2016)  
In reality, similar situations to this regularly arise. Being unable to change the attitudes of 
public sector managers, the authorities had to intervene in such situation on the highest level. 
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Being asked to comment on the situation about the bomb shelter requirements, the Vice 
Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov responds:  
As you probably have heard, there are specific instructions, articulated in the Address 
of the Head of the State to introduce international [standards] and it is gradually 
implemented… Such questions are being raised, including by the investors 
themselves. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
Following the instructions of the WTO, the authorities have focused solely on the 
transformation of formal institutions. Accordingly, the attitudes of public sector managers 
towards entrepreneurship were defined solely by the path of Kazakhstan’s socio-economic 
development and did not fit well with the ‘rules of the game’ of a new paradigm. The major 
problem was that a paradigmatic shift from a socialist to a market ideology was implemented 
in a short period of time, leading to opportunistic behaviour by public sector managers, and 
systemic corruption. 
The reformist attitude of the authorities and their ambition to turn Kazakhstan into a 
Snow Leopard were used by the WTO in order to encourage acceleration of the pace of the 
reforms, which led to the creation of a system that lacks checks and balances. The country’s 
strategy on achieving outward orientation of the national economy was based on the 
sociotechnical imaginary that Kazakhstan can repeat the success of Asian Tigers simply by 
following their footsteps. Being an outsider, Kazakhstan’s government had no knowledge 
about the processes that led to industrialisation and export-led growth of Asian Tigers. While 
the actual reason behind the success of newly-industrialised countries was subsidisation of 
domestic firms (Rodrik 2002), the neoliberal rhetoric posits that it was achieved through 
liberalisation of trade regime and attraction of FDI (Gilpin 1987, Gilpin 2001). Reality is being 
distorted because the rules of the WTO prohibit subsidisation of domestic firms. Being inspired 
by the success of Asian Tigers, the government was eager to implement reforms in accordance 
with recommendations of the WTO. However, since the WTO was concerned solely with 
establishing the ‘rules of the game’ and not with its results, it convinced the government that 
fast implementations of the reforms will be beneficial. In fact, such a step had no upsides for 
Kazakhstan’s development. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1994, 
p. 45) argues: “While the distorted economies inherited from decades of central planning may 
have appeared to offer ample scope for reforms making virtually every one of their inhabitants 
better off, nothing in economic theory suggests that… a one-step movement to a market 
economy would have that effect”. In order to accelerate the pace of radical reforms in 
accordance with the advice of the WTO, the authorities emulated the strategy used by the Asian 
Tigers by providing carte blanche to public sector managers. However, the problem with 
adopting such an approach was that the attitude towards entrepreneurship in Kazakhstan was 
completely different to that in the newly industrialised countries due to historical differences 
among the countries. The possession of power aggravated the attitude of officials towards 
entrepreneurship and enabled them to pursue their varied vested interests to the detriment of 
the common good.  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” recounts:   
The allocation of land with infrastructure is a big problem. That is to say, the system 
of allocating land plots is complex and incomprehensible. There is no land registry. 
Nowhere. We only try to make one, but we meet very strong resistance. Since there 
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is no land registry database, no one seem to know where there are land plots. When 
you come to akimat [office of the governor], they either don’t show anything or show 
something incomprehensible. Otherwise, they show land plots that are unsuitable. 
There is huge lack of transparency. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
The Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov responds: 
This situation is being solved now in cooperation with akimats. The Head of the State 
tasked the Ministry of Agriculture to put this information into the open domain. The 
question is, what kind of investment projects you are referring to. That is to say, now 
there is a competition between regions for attracting any investor and there is no such 
thing as not to give him land. On the contrary, as I have told you we now have special 
deputy akim [on investments] in every region, they call us every day and ask to direct 
investors to them. When they receive information that someone came in centre, they 
offer the best lands, the best conditions because everyone is interested. Perhaps what 
you described has been happening when oil was higher than 100 dollars, but now 
there is a big demand. Every region is aimed not only to give land, but to help investor 
to implement his project. Everyone understands that it means tax revenues, jobs. We 
don’t face such problems now. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic Policy, Innovative 
Development and Entrepreneurship explains:     
Why akimat does not provide land? Because land is a commodity. It is one of few 
commodities that still remains in the hands of officials. They practically have nothing 
else left. Land is still in their hands and therefore they use it in their own venal 
interests. To be frank, there is, of course, a corruption component. (Askhat Kuzekov, 
interview, 1st August 2016)  
The Department of Land Affairs is considered one of the most corrupt among the local 
authorities in accordance with rankings of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken" 
(Tengri news 2018). Centrally located land plots, especially those with infrastructure are 
extremely valuable commodities. Since the allocation of land plots by the local authorities is 
not monitored by civil society, it creates a high risk of corruption. Kazakhstan lacks civil 
society organisations that could intervene and introduce transparency in areas where the 
personal interests of officials might be involved. 
 The concessions made in order to convince multinationals to use Kazakhstan as a 
platform for export-based operations had no noticeable effect because due to the lack of checks 
and balances the authorities were unable to put constraints on behaviour of public sector 
managers. Initially, due to the fact that Kazakhstan has a top-down governmental hierarchy, 
the authorities were confident that they will be able to keep a firm grip on the process of the 
country’s radical transformation. In his Address to the nation the President noted: “Strong 
executive power has become a basis of stability in the society and one of key factors of success 
of economic reforms where Kazakhstan is the leader among CIS countries. International 
experts also acknowledge it” (Nazarbayev 2001). The reason why international experts 
acknowledged that the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach benefited the country’s 
development was because the consolidation of power accelerated the pace of liberalisation of 
Kazakhstan’s trade and investment regime, something which was in the interests of the 
developed countries and multinationals. In reality, the top-down system did not respond to the 
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commands of the authorities such as a demand to ease the regulatory burden. For instance, the 
Head of the State noted that it takes about 10 days for a car carrier trailer to travel 1,000 
kilometres between the cities of Ust-Kamenogorsk and Almaty (Kazinform 2011). The 
President clarified that the reason for this is not the quality of roads, but the fact that on its way 
a car carrier trailer will be subjected to numerous inspections where officials will nit-pick to 
every detail, such as insignificant difference between declared and actual weight of the cargo. 
The President pointed out that no foreign investor would be willing to undergo such sort of 
treatment.  
The opportunistic behaviour of public sector managers and disrespectful attitude 
towards entrepreneurship became one the main reasons why multinationals do not choose 
Kazakhstan as a platform for their export operations. Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the 
Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex Invest” comments: 
The custom clearance process takes weeks in Kazakhstan, whereas in normal 
countries it takes hours. That is to say, in Singapore the custom clearance procedure 
takes 40 minutes. In our country it can take month. For instance, customs can close 
for holidays. In the world’s rankings estimating effectiveness of customs procedures 
we occupy one of the worst places. Firstly, it is due to the fact that we have very low-
skilled personnel working at customs. Secondly, customs is extremely poorly 
equipped, we have low level of computer technologies penetration, electronic 
declaration was introduced only recently and so on. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, 
interview, 26th July 2016)  
The Chairman assumes that one of the key reasons why it takes weeks to undergo customs 
procedures is the custom’s poor equipment. However, the truth is that the process of custom 
clearance was deliberately made lengthy and complicated. The logic dictates that even in the 
case of complete absence of computer technologies the process should not take weeks. Custom 
clearance could take a matter of hours if the extortion fee was paid as expected.  
The situations where obstacles are created by officials on purpose are ubiquitous. For 
instance, one of the reasons why multinationals do not choose Kazakhstan as a platform for 
their export-based operations is the lack of highly-qualified workforce. President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev on 26th Plenary Session of Foreign Investors Council said: “Many of the investors 
present here have already faced the problems associated with the lack of required specialists. 
We need to cover the needs in engineering and technical specialists possessing appropriate 
competencies of international level” (Nazarbayev 2013). Even though the authorities try to 
solve the problem of the lack of a highly-qualified specialist by simplifying visa requirements, 
officials find different ways to complicate the process. Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the 
Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex Invest” comments:  
We don’t have a system of obtaining a visa at the airport for the majority of countries. 
Only for some of OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] 
countries. But as I said, employees of multinationals are not necessarily citizens of 
OECD countries. There are a lot of Hindus, Romanians, Poles, Vietnamese and 
others. Besides, there is an issue with migration registration. Majority of people don’t 
know that they need to register. When they try to leave the country, they might be 
either get arrested or fined. This is a very big problem. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, 
interview, 26th July 2016) 
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It is obvious that the complexity of the registration procedures is used by officials in order to 
pursue their varied vested interests. More than 100,000 foreigners are fined annually on the 
grounds of breaking migration legislation simply because they do not know about the 
requirement to register upon arrival (Sputnik 2019).  
5.7. Conclusion 
Since market-oriented researchers viewed the centrally-planned regime as nothing 
more than a non-system, it was assumed that Kazakhstan’s regulatory environment could be 
improved almost overnight through the transformation of its formal institutions. As an active 
promoter of the ideas of the Washington Consensus, the WTO ensured that Kazakhstan’s 
regulatory environment was transformed in accordance with its principles by forming a 
national sociotechnical imaginary. The WTO provided no evidence that radical neoliberal 
reforms will be beneficial for Kazakhstan’s technological development but demanded that the 
country meet these at entry, without any transitional period. In reality, there was no tangible 
plan on how to transform Kazakhstan into an open market economy because being an outsider, 
the WTO had no knowledge on potential problems of transition. Nevertheless, the neoliberal 
rhetoric was successful in convincing Kazakhstan’s government that the implementation of 
paradigm-shifting reforms, aimed at the establishment of a regulatory framework inherent to 
open market economies and attraction of FDI, would automatically lead to formation of a 
favourable environment that would incentivise domestic actors to engage in innovative activity 
and facilitate international technology transfer. In the course of the transformation of 
Kazakhstan’s regulatory environment many important issues such as the necessity to take into 
consideration the mindsets of domestic actors were overlooked because the strategy of 
technological development was based on an imaginary rather than a tangible plan.  
The mismatch between the formal set-ups that had to be established in accordance with 
the requirements of the WTO and well-established informal institutions created a top-down 
system that did not respond to the commands of the authorities. The neoliberal prescriptions, 
stipulated in the Washington Consensus and imposed through WTO requirements, disregard 
the contextual differences between developing countries. However, while centrally-planned 
development was viewed by market-oriented researchers as a non-system, the reality is that it 
was a fully-fledged system with a well-established set of informal institutions that fitted well 
with the goals of a socialist society. Because the WTO had no knowledge about the pitfalls of 
transition and because its main concerns lie in setting up the ‘rules of the game’, rather than its 
results, the need to adapt the mindsets of domestic actors, including that of public sector 
managers, was overlooked. Unlike market relationships, centrally-planned development was 
aimed at maintaining total control over every aspect of socio-economic relationships. Since the 
mindsets of public sector managers were locked-in on the previous paradigm of development, 
through reforms they strived to recreate the regulatory environment that would allow them to 
preserve control over the system through deliberate complication of national legislation. The 
ability to interpret complicated regulations in the way they saw fit, and radical changes in the 
system of values caused by abrupt transition from socialist to market relationships triggered 
systemic corruption and the opportunistic behaviour of public sector managers, inhibited the 
development of innovations. Attempts of Kazakhstan’s authorities to reduce the regulatory 
burden did not bring any results because the tendency to complicate legislation on purpose and 
use it to the detriment of common good became self-reinforcing.  
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The attempts of the government to incentivise capability building of indigenous firms 
failed due to the absence of a tangible plan on how to change a highly negative attitude of 
domestic actors towards entrepreneurship. The necessity to change the attitude of the society 
towards entrepreneurship was never prioritised by the government because Kazakhstan’s 
strategy of technological development was based on the sociotechnical imaginary shaped by 
the WTO. The authorities realised that the attitude of the first generation of businessmen 
towards entrepreneurship would be difficult to change because it was influenced by the 
previous paradigm of socio-economic relationships. The authorities imagined that the lock-in 
on the old ways of doing things would be automatically overcome by the next generation of 
young entrepreneurs. Therefore, the government focused all its efforts solely on 
implementation of formal institutional reforms, insisted upon by the WTO. What was 
overlooked, however, was the necessity to change the attitude of public sector managers, who 
viewed entrepreneurs as barygas, obliged to pay kickbacks in order to be permitted to continue 
their activities. A burdensome regulatory environment, enforcing businessmen to pay bribes in 
order to overcome the barriers preventing engagement in even the most basic types of 
entrepreneurial activity, disincentivised the new generation of young businessmen from 
attempts to develop innovations. Neither exhortations nor direct commands of the authorities 
to reduce regulatory burden worked. In order to improve the capabilities of domestic firms the 
government attempted to limit the number of inspections in a top-down manner. However, the 
reduction in the number of inspections immediately resulted in a significant deterioration of 
the quality of products, both goods and services, demonstrating that the need to change 
attitudes, rather than intervene in a top-down manner was important.   
The authorities imagined that Kazakhstan’s favourable geographic location, adoption 
of a regime to protect investments and the autonomy of government decision-making would 
turn the country into a Snow Leopard – a major export-oriented economy. Kazakhstan’s 
authorities were inspired by the example of newly industrialised economies – the poster 
children of successful export-led growth. They planned to follow in the footsteps of the Asian 
Tigers not only by encouraging domestic firms to export, but also by turning Kazakhstan into 
a platform for export operations by multinationals. The neoliberal rhetoric convinced the 
government that accession to the WTO is the best way to ensure outward orientation of the 
national economy. It was assumed that increase in the flow of inward FDI, triggered by 
accession to the WTO would facilitate integration of domestic firms into the supply chain of 
multinationals, providing that they are able to catch-up with affiliates of foreign companies in 
terms of scale efficiency and capacity to innovate. Furthermore, the government anticipated 
that the absorptive potential of the markets of the neighbourhood countries would encourage 
multinationals to choose Kazakhstan as a platform for their export-based operations. In reality, 
however, the prohibition of export subsidies, imposed by the WTO, limited the instruments 
available to the government in order to encourage domestic firms to engage in development of 
internationally competitive products, and increased their dependency on the quality of 
regulatory environment. Besides, the reformist attitude of the authorities and their firm belief 
that the implementation of the requirements of the WTO will turn Kazakhstan into a Snow 
Leopard, encouraged the authorities to adopt the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach as a 
means of providing autonomy to government decision-making and to accelerate the pace of 
reforms. However, attempts to base Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development on 
emulation of policies of newly industrialising economies in terms of giving carte blanche to 
public sector managers backfired because the need to change their attitude towards 
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entrepreneurships was overlooked. As a result of the inability of the authorities to overcome 
the negative attitude of officials towards entrepreneurship, the regulatory environment became 
too costly, thereby creating an insurmountable barrier to export-led growth.  
























6. GOVERNMENT AS COORDINATOR  
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter analyses attempts by the government to spur the process of Kazakhstan’s 
transformation into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy by replacing weak and 
sluggish market forces with targeted state intervention. I show that the reformist attitude of the 
authorities and their ambition to turn Kazakhstan into a Snow Leopard by following the 
footsteps of Asian Tiger economies encouraged them to base the country’s strategy of 
technological development on a sociotechnical imaginary, rather than a tangible plan. Attention 
here is drawn to the fact that the task of replacing a centrally-planned coordination regime with 
one inherent to open market relationships was a paradigm-shifting undertaking, as domestic 
actors were locked-in on the old ways of doing things. I analyse how over-reliance of domestic 
firms on state intervention, stemming from attempts of the authorities to replicate 
interventionist style of governance of Asian Tigers influenced their motivation to invest in 
long-term capability building, development of entrepreneurial spirit and the attitude towards 
emerging categories of end-users. This chapter explores how the authorities aimed to turn the 
country into a new benchmark of successful economic development – the Snow Leopard –  
despite making no real attempts to study the experience of newly industrialised countries and 
examine contextual differences between Kazakhstan and Asian Tigers.  
The arguments in this chapter are organised as follows: section 6.2. analyses whether 
interventionist style of governance facilitated the adaptation of the mindsets of domestic actors 
to the new paradigm of socio-economic relationships. Section 6.3. reviews how the 
establishment of backward linkages between multinationals and domestic suppliers in the oil 
and gas sector through the imposition of local content requirements influenced their decision 
to develop technological capabilities. In section 6.4. I describe attempts by the authorities to 
overcome the dependence of Kazakhstan’s technological development on foreign capital by 
incentivising local firms to take part in industrialisation programmes. Section 6.5. examines 
the consequences of the decision of the authorities to replace domestic rivalry with extensive 
state procurement. Finally, section 6.6. shows how the tendency of the authorities to focus on 
satisfying the needs of national champions influenced the occurrence of spillover effects in 
other sectors of the economy through backward linkages. 
6.2. From central planning to interventionist state   
While the necessity to shift from the coordination approach intrinsic to centrally-
planned economies, to the one inherent in market relationships, has been viewed by market-
oriented researchers as merely an organisational undertaking, the reality is that such an 
endeavour had a paradigm-shifting nature as it involved the task of changing the mindsets of 
domestic players. Coordination processes under a centrally-planned regime had many 
specificities that did not make much sense from the point of view of market-oriented 
researchers. For instance, Soviet industrial players did not attempt to increase labour 
productivity because, due to the principles of socialist ideology, their primary task was to 
employ as many people as possible (Morton 1984). Accordingly, different market-oriented 
researchers assumed that the command regime was simply a failed experiment of the Soviet 
authorities, aimed at replacing market forces with planning procedures. Market-oriented 
researchers based their arguments about the alleged inferiority of the Soviet system of 
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coordination on its economic drawbacks, such as the complexity of input-output relationships, 
lack of flexibility, delays in allocation and distribution, high transportation costs, 
miscalculations in planning and so on. Since centrally-planned development was viewed by 
market-oriented researchers as a non-system, no real attempts were made to understand the 
problems of transition (section 3.2.). In reality, the centrally-planned regime was designed not 
to be the most economically efficient, but to serve socialist ideology, satisfy the military 
ambitions of Soviet leaders and solve strategic problems caused by the country’s vast size, 
underdevelopment of peripheral territories and scarceness of resources. Most importantly, the 
decades of central planning not only defined the nature of relationships between domestic 
actors, but also became embedded in their mindsets. Therefore, the main difficulty of transition 
lies not in changing organisational and institutional arrangements but in adjusting mindsets of 
people to the new order of things because informal constraints are extremely resistant to 
change.    
Kazakhstan’s authorities neither had knowledge about how domestic actors in a market 
system were supposed to be coordinated, nor had a plan on how to transform the national 
economy. Accordingly, the need to adapt mindsets of domestic actors to a new paradigm of 
socio-economic relationships by changing the ways of doing things was overlooked. Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex 
Invest” explains:  
At today’s exchange rate our minimal wage is approximately 30-40 dollars per month. 
Meanwhile, in countries of Western Europe, in the United States minimal wage is 3-
4 dollars per hour. Consequently, many corporations there innovate, strive to get rid 
of extra staff, adopt different types of automatization, different types of robots and so 
forth. For us it is easier to hire 300 people, get huge gratitude from the ministry [of 
Healthcare and Social Development], get many appreciations from akimat 
[governor’s office] and keep hundreds of people on not quite resource-efficient 
production. That is to say, until this situation will not be changed dramatically by the 
government, we will not have demand for innovations. Well, take banal situation, 
when you drive around the city in spring time you can see people whitewashing trees. 
How many people is such city as Astana are whitewashing trees? Probably several 
hundred of them. Am I right? That is to say that they walk around and like 300 – 400 
years ago whitewashing trees. At the same time, if there were certain requirements in 
terms of minimal wage for that people, then public utility companies would have 
probably placed order to some innovators who could make some machine which 
makes it automatically. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
The Chairman provided an incredibly good illustration of how the need to adapt the mindsets 
of domestic players to new socio-economic order is overlooked by the authorities. Low labour 
productivity was inherent to centrally-planned development because a policy of full 
employment was a cornerstone of socialist ideology. In market relationships, however, the 
motivation to improve labour productivity is one of the most important factors pushing forward 
technological progress. Since the authorities had no knowledge of the nature of market 
relationships, no attempts were made to change attitudes of domestic actors towards labour 
productivity. As a result, in Kazakhstan, the average labour productivity is at least three times 
lower than in developed market economies (OECD 2016). Moreover, it is evident from the 
interview that the actions of public sector managers hamper the attempts of entrepreneurs to 
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increase labour productivity, which points to the fact that Kazakhstan’s government lacked a 
tangible plan on how to handle the transition.  
Being unfamiliar with the way the national innovation system should have been 
coordinated in the open market conditions, the authorities relied mostly on the expertise of the 
WTO when formulating the strategy of technological development. In his Address to the 
nation, the Head of the State expressed his concerns with the fact that the government has been 
demonstrating an excessive administrative zeal in the matters in which it should have not 
interfered, and acting in a very passive and inert manner where it should have been active 
(Nazarbayev 1997). The reason for such behaviour of public sector managers was obviously 
the fact that they had no knowledge of how to coordinate the work of the innovation system 
under the new paradigm of socio-economic relationships. Nevertheless, the authorities were 
convinced that Kazakhstan could resolve many problems associated with transition, including 
those caused by withdrawal of the government from the role of a sole mediator of relationships 
among domestic actors by following the sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the WTO. For 
instance, it was imagined that liberalisation of the investment regime and protection of FDI in 
accordance with the recommendation of the WTO will automatically facilitate integration of 
domestic firms into supply chains of multinationals, thereby, solving the problem of lack of 
downstream capabilities. The problem, however, was that the main concern of the WTO was 
not to help the country to adapt to an open market relationships paradigm, but to establish 
formal ‘rules of the game’ that provide access to multinationals to Kazakhstan’s domestic 
market.  
Since the main concern of the WTO was to establish a regime that favours FDI, no 
actual efforts were made to make the process of accession easier for transition economies. The 
United Nations (2001, p. 204) notes: “Apparently, WTO Member Countries are only prepared 
to accept accession of Kazakhstan to WTO on their terms and have little regard to the real 
problems and difficulties of the country. For instance, despite the fact that, according to 
economic indicators, Kazakhstan should be classified as a developing country, the demands for 
commitments would classify it as a developed country”. It needs to be noted that similarly to 
other former centrally-planned economies, Kazakhstan experienced significant difficulties in 
adjusting to market relationships. Kairat Urazbayev, Director of East Kazakhstan’s Department 
on Natural Monopolies Regulation and Competition Protection argues:  
Collapse of the Soviet Union broke multiple production networks. For instance, while 
we had first part of production cycle, its second part was typically located somewhere 
in Russia, Ukraine or Caucasus. Accordingly, the parade of sovereignties halted bulk 
of manufacturing processes, because we lost channels of distribution of products. 
Nowadays, we have the problem of finding markets. This problem is especially acute 
in Kazakhstan because of vast territory and small size of population. We can produce 
various commodities but huge distances, transport and other expenses affect cost of 
product. Given that we have a powerful neighbour China which can produce anything 
much cheaper, it is very difficult to stay competitive. (Kairat Urazbayev, interview, 
15th July 2016) 
What the authorities should have realised is that the WTO seeks to follow its own agenda and 
has little awareness of the real problems of economies in transition. Meanwhile, adapting to 
open market conditions proved to be an extremely difficult task for participants of economic 
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processes in former centrally-planned economies. Firstly, economic actors had to start 
performing functions, which were formerly carried out exclusively by the government. For 
instance, since distribution was previously handled by the state, industrial players needed to 
develop downstream capabilities such as marketing, finance and operations management 
(Radosevic 1997). Secondly, under a centrally-planned regime many industrial enterprises 
relied on a single supplier of inputs. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
shift towards market relationships such a specificity of input-output relationships led to 
decentralised bargaining between suppliers and buyers, causing a decline in the output of goods 
with complex production processes (Blanchard and Kremer 1997).  
Being based on the sociotechnical imaginary shaped by the WTO, rather than a tangible 
plan, Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development aimed to replicate the path of Asian 
Tigers by adopting an interventionist style of governance. Although the regime brought by the 
WTO in no way contributed to the success of newly industrialised countries, the neoliberal 
rhetoric often uses the example of Asian Tigers in order to make a showcase of the benefits of 
globalisation. Kazakhstan’s authorities were inspired by the way the governments of Asian 
Tigers overcame economic stagnation and achieved industrialisation. However, due to the lack 
of knowledge about the processes that led to industrialisation and the outward orientation of 
economies of Asian Tigers, the authorities assumed that accession to the WTO and adoption 
of interventionist style of governance were the most important factors, related to success of 
newly industrialised countries. Since the authorities based their plans on the sociotechnical 
imaginary, rather than careful examination of experience of newly industrialised countries, 
neither the real causes that enabled their governments to achieve such results, nor contextual 
differences between the former centrally-planned economy and Asian Tigers were taken into 
consideration. Accordingly, in his Address to the nation the Head of the State argued: “Forty 
years ago when Singapore gained its independence, it was one of the poorest countries in the 
world with an annual per capita income less than $200. Today the per capita income of 
Singaporeans exceeds $20,000. Malaysia, a country similar to ours with respect to the 
population, ethnic composition and many other parameters, gained a 10-fold rise in living 
standards of its citizens within less than twenty years. Such staggering achievements made 
these countries world famous assigning them the name of Asian Tigers. Are there any obstacles 
which might prevent Kazakhstan availing of fine opportunities from scoring the same success? 
None whatsoever” (Nazarbayev 1997). The reformist attitude of Kazakhstan’s government and 
their lack of knowledge about the processes that led to industrialisation of Asian Tigers were 
used by developed countries and intergovernmental organisations in order to convince them to 
follow the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus.  
While the authorities aimed to replicate the interventionist style of Asian Tigers, they 
made no real attempts to study the experience of newly industrialised countries. Dolowitz and 
Marsh (2000, p. 5) define policy transfer as the “process by which knowledge about policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in 
another political system”. Despite obvious differences in the contexts of Kazakhstan and Asian 
Tigers, policy transfer in terms of lesson-drawing would not only be possible, but also practical. 
After liberalising the investment regime in the frameworks of accession to the WTO, 
Kazakhstani firms faced numerous problems caused by the lack of a qualified workforce. Upon 
entry, multinationals started to bid away skilled workers from domestic firms because they 
were able to offer significantly higher wages. Hay Group, a global management consulting 
firm, have analysed Kazakhstan’s employment market and estimated that companies with 
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foreign capital payed wages on average 41% higher than local companies (Trubacheva 2013). 
Due to the rules of the WTO, the government could not regulate the salaries paid by 
multinationals. In this situation, lesson-drawing would be extremely helpful. It is well-known 
fact that Asian Tigers also faced the problem of lack of qualified workforce after shifting to 
high value-added manufacturing. However, unlike Kazakhstan, newly industrialised countries 
did not create barriers for hiring highly-skilled foreign personnel as it would have hindered the 
development of technological capabilities of domestic firms. For instance, Seah (1981) reports 
that as a result of the government’s emphasis on new technology the percentage of expatriates 
recruited in Singapore rose from 15 per cent in 1980 to between 35 and 50 per cent in 1981. 
Actual examination of policies of Asian Tigers and lesson-drawing would enable the 
authorities to avoid some obvious mistakes, caused by the lack of knowledge about how open 
market relationships work.   
Absolute confidence in the course of action, pursued by the government is evident in 
my interview with the Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov: 
First of all, we made visa-free entry for citizens of 19 countries, as you know. I think 
that if you will speak with foreigners, they will tell you straight: “Well done guys, 
this is first thing that you have done. Excellent. That was exactly what was needed 
right now. From next year, taking into account Expo, the OECD countries will 
become visa-free. Great. That means that you open your country to entire world. This 
is a huge message”. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
The inability to hire foreign highly-skilled personnel most of all affected small domestic firms, 
whose competitive advantage was innovation. Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board 
of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex Invest” comments:   
There are a lot of barriers that do not allow us to develop technologies and high-tech 
industries. Again, if you want to register and develop some innovative enterprise, it 
will be very difficult to hire for instance chief technical officer. If let us say he is a 
citizen of the United States or the United Kingdom, then he may enter for 15 days. 
But to get permission to employ foreign labour force is extremely difficult because 
there are quotas. Quotas are usually given to major projects, distributed by akimats 
[municipal authorities] and nobody knows how transparent it is. There certainly is 
corruption component in these issues. In other words, for some entrepreneur who 
promotes certain idea, who counts every dollar, it will be extremely difficult to hire a 
foreign experts. In such type of business this is key factor because in any case, no 
country in the world can boast that its citizens are strong in all sectors and in every 
capacity. That is to say, even if we take a look at countless foreign investors that come 
in here, even in the biggest American or Korean companies key personnel, executives 
are neither citizens of USA, nor Korea. They are citizens of India, Romania and many 
other countries. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
Strangely enough, an option to use foreign workforce was open to investors that implemented 
large-scale projects, giving them a competitive advantage over domestic firms. Vice Minister 
of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov argues: 
If you implement a priority investment project in one of six priority sectors, then you 
can bring out-of-quota for the construction period plus one year. (Yerlan Khairov, 
interview, 1st August 2016)    
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The adoption of an interventionist style of governance requires a deep understanding of 
ongoing socio-economic processes. The government put considerable efforts in attracting 
foreign investment in Kazakhstan. Even small details, such as visa-free entry for potential 
investors were put in place. However, the need to protect domestic firms from the tendency of 
multinationals to bid qualified workforce away by facilitating skilled migration was 
overlooked. 
Although the authorities adopted an interventionist style of governance, enabling public 
sector managers to maintain total control over the system’s functioning, they did not develop a 
tangible plan which would recognise the need to adapt the mindsets of domestic actors to the 
new paradigm of socio-economic relationships. Initially, the attitude of society towards 
entrepreneurship in Kazakhstan was extremely hostile because in the Soviet Union it was an 
illegal activity. Since the mindsets of domestic actors were locked-in on the paradigm of socio-
economic relationships, shaped by the decades of Soviet history, market relationships did not 
start working automatically after they were legalised in Kazakhstan. The authorities imagined 
that attraction of FDI and adoption of interventionist style of governance would spur economic 
growth like the one experienced by newly industrialised countries. Accordingly, the Head of 
the State in his Address to the nations announced: “Our strategy of healthy economic growth 
rests on a strong market economy, an active part played by the state and 
attraction of significant foreign investments… However the fact that the state will play a 
limited role on developed markets [implies sectors of economy where market relationships 
function well]  in no way implies that it will be deprived of will and power, thus turning into a 
passive observer. Quite the contrary: it must be very strong for the laws to be honoured, it must 
be competent and knowledgeable... It must minutely plan its activities so as not to be lax and 
disorganised, it must identify interests of various groups of the population and development 
priorities, it must closely co-operate with the private sector thus consolidating and 
cementing the society” (Nazarbayev 1997). Since the strategy of technological development 
was based on an imaginary, rather than a tangible plan, the need to change the attitude of society 
towards entrepreneurship was neglected. Instead of creating an environment that would make 
society more entrepreneurial, the authorities kept coordinating economic processes through 
interventions and direct control. Eventually, such a tendency became self-reinforcing as it 
provided public sector managers with the power they wanted.  
My interview with Igor Shatskiy, Director of East-Kazakhstan’s Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs “Atameken” illustrates how adoption of interventionist style of governance 
influenced the development of business initiatives:  
Our state allegedly issues permissive documents quickly and free of charge. But in 
order to obtain it you have to go to some private organisation and pay a bunch of 
money in order to get a free of charge document. Everyone is compelled to go to that 
organisation and bring easy money to lucky nephew [reference to nepotism] who sits 
there. We have this everywhere. In the ecology, technical regulation, fire safety, 
sanitary control, it is all the same. In any sphere, everywhere sits lucky nephew. (Igor 
Shatskiy interview, 20th July 2016) 
The main reason why emulation of interventionist style of governance of Asian Tigers did not 
work well in the case of Kazakhstan was because the system of values of public sector 
managers was shaped by a radical shift from socialism to capitalism. The tendency of officials 
to coordinate economic processes became self-reinforcing as it enabled them to use their 
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positions in pursuit of their own varied vested interests. Eventually, public sector managers 
started to seek ways to spread their control even further by creating affiliated organisations.  
The fact that the need to change mindsets within society should have been taken into 
consideration decades ago became evident when the authorities attempted to delegate some of 
state functions to quasi-public and private sectors. For many years the government emulated 
the interventionist policies of Asian Tigers by trying to spur technological development 
through direct state coordination of economic activity. The main drawback of such a strategy 
was that it neglected the contextual differences between Kazakhstan and newly industrialised 
economies, including the lack of entrepreneurial spirit and high level of corruption. When the 
authorities realised that interventionist style of governance and unilateral domination of public 
sector in the process of decision-making did not make society more entrepreneurial, they 
decided to create incentives for innovation activity by engaging in dialogue with other domestic 
actors. In theory, dialogue between state and society should have provided a valuable input for 
making well-informed decisions and should have helped to build trust among all stakeholders 
(Burri 2015).  The problem, however, was that over the years domestic actors got used to the 
routines, practices and codes of conduct that formed in Kazakhstan due to adoption of an 
interventionist style of governance and unilateral domination of public sector, including the 
need to pay bribes and extortion fees to public sector managers. The well-established ways of 
doing things shaped the behaviour of domestic firms, making them reluctant to invest in their 
own capability building, passive in terms of business initiatives and reliant on administrative 
connections and the decisions of the authorities. While attempting to delegate power to 
domestic actors, the authorities found themselves in a stalemate situation because the path that 
emerged over the years of active state intervention and top-down coordination of economic 
activity shaped the mindsets of domestic actors in such a way that makes productive partnership 
extremely difficult.  
The ways of doing things became so well-established in Kazakhstani society that when 
the authorities delegated some of the state functions to private sector, these firms themselves 
adopted a practice of extorting money from entrepreneurs. This phenomenon is best illustrated 
by attempts by Kazakhstan’s authorities to entrust the provision of expertise in origin of goods 
and the function of issuing registration certificates to private expert organisations. Aydin 
Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry Development Institute, comments 
on this matter:  
I will tell frankly: when authority to issue certificates CT-KZ was delegated to private 
sector, situation became worse. Previously, Committee on technical regulations 
executed this function, a civil service. There was a lot of criticism, business 
complained about extortions, et cetera. When authority was delegated to private 
sector i.e. accredited companies, size of minimal unofficial payment increased 
twofold. Besides, the country now is flooded with companies that allegedly produce 
locally and sell domestic goods. Whereas in reality they only have stamp and 
accountant. Sometimes they don’t even have an accountant. They import goods, put 
stamp “Made in Kazakhstan” and sell. On the basis of certificate CT-KZ they 
participate in tenders, get discounts and so on. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th 
March 2016) 
Domestic firms strive to receive certificate CT-KZ, confirming that the product has enough 
share of local content to receive preferential treatment from the state. After the authority was 
delegated to private expert organisations, certificates CT-KZ were issued to any firm which 
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was willing to pay a bribe without the need to undergo confirmation procedures. As a result, 
the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs had to initiate recall of such certificates after 
confirming 30 cases of issuing certificates CT-KZ with violation of established procedures in 
just eight months (Zakon 2014).  
The next section shows how well-established ways of doing things influenced 
development of oil and gas sector in Kazakhstan.  
6.3. Development of oil and gas sector  
In the past, Kazakhstan was largely dependent on other republics of the Soviet Union 
in terms of processing industries. During the command era important scientific facilities and 
final assembly plants were strategically dispersed across the entire territory of the Soviet 
Union. Even production units that supplied major subsystems, such as engines, were allocated 
in separate locations, regardless of transportation costs (Creacey 1993). Accordingly, due to 
strategic and military considerations, a number of high-technology facilities were located in 
Kazakh SSR, such as the world’s first breeder nuclear reactor which provided energy for a 
desalination facility, the Baykonur space centre, an extensive network of research laboratories 
in fields of microbiology and so on (National Research Council 2007). Moreover, due to the 
abundance of natural resources, an advanced system of mining complexes and metallurgical 
plants was built in several regions of Kazakh SSR. However, downstream industries that 
processed raw and semi-finished materials and supplied commodities to end users were 
primarily located in Russia. Therefore, Kazakhstan’s infrastructure, including roads, railways 
and pipelines were developed in such a way as to deliver extracted materials for processing to 
the other republics of the Soviet Union. Omarova (1999, pp. 83-84) argues: “The structure of 
Kazakhstan’s industrial sector inherited from the Soviet era rendered it particularly vulnerable 
to the break-up of inter-republican trade after the collapse of the USSR. Kazakhstan’s large 
and inefficient oil and gas enterprises, mining operations, and metallurgical combines lost their 
traditional customers and desperately needed to find new markets”. In order to overcome the 
economy’s dependence on neighbouring countries the government planned to integrate 
domestic industries into the global value chains by attracting FDI.  
Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry Development Institute 
recounts:  
Before 1991 [year of gaining independence] we allegedly were industrial country. In 
fact, we were an agrarian-industrial country. 30 percent of economy was represented 
by services and 30 percent by agriculture. The overall industrial output was about 16 
billion dollars [per year], including oil and gas. Notably, 20 percent was generated by 
oil production and 80 percent by light industry. Nowadays it is completely different. 
Agriculture is approximately 4 percent; industry is about 20 percent. But that is not 
the question here. We did not have the industry as such. We were in the glavk system 
[Central Board of Industrial Management of the Soviet Union], where semi-finished 
goods were extracted here and sent to other republics. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 
17th March 2016)   
After dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s authorities faced the need to upgrade the 
national economy towards the higher end of the value chain, because domestic industries 
mainly consisted of upstream entities, engaged solely in extraction of natural resources. 
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Since post-Soviet Kazakhstan lacked the capacity to build the entire value chain from 
extraction of raw materials to production and retailing on its own, the authorities planned to 
attract capital, needed for development of domestic industries through exploitation of natural 
resources. During the first years of independence Kazakhstan’s economy desperately needed 
to find a source of capital in order to rescue the economy from stagnation. Omarova (1999, p. 
338) argues: “As other former Soviet republics, the Kazakhstani state was facing a wide array 
of social and economic problems of the transitional period: most of the country’s industrial 
enterprises operated at a loss, the agricultural sector was on the verge of total bankruptcy, 
wages and pensions were not paid for months, the system of health care and education 
desperately needed subsidies to provide for the most basic needs of Kazakhstani citizens. Under 
these circumstances, future oil windfalls were seen as the only source of revenues needed to 
resolve Kazakhstan’s problems”. The problem was, however, that Kazakhstan’s oil and gas 
deposits were scarcely explored during the Soviet period because the bulk of the country’s 
petroleum operations took place in Western Siberia and Volga-Urals region. Accordingly, 
during the Soviet period small production associations, operating in Kazakhstan’s oil and gas 
industry were supplied with a fraction of the trained petroleum engineers and managerial 
personnel required. As a result, post-Soviet Kazakhstan lacked human resources, technological 
capabilities, finances, and infrastructure, all of which were needed for the establishment of 
viable private oil companies. Being unable to fully exploit the potential of the abundant natural 
resources, Kazakhstan’s government had no other choice, but to attract multinationals into the 
country’s extraction industries. From 1993 to 1999 Kazakhstan’s government managed to 
attract $9.29 billion of FDI, more than half of which went to the oil and gas industry (Olcott 
2010). The inflow of FDI into extraction industries became the main source of capital, needed 
for the country’s industrialisation, with oil and gas sector alone contributing half of real GDP 
growth between 2000 and 2005 (OECD 2016).  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” argues:  
Our country is ninth biggest in the world, but it lacks access to sea. Therefore, many 
types of production cannot be developed here by definition. It mainly refers to 
technologically advanced, multi-tonnage industries such as oil refinery, 
petrochemistry and chemistry. All types of manufacturing that comprise of importing 
large amount of raw materials, cheaply, in tankers and subsequent shipment of final 
product in tankers as well, has no perspective of development here. That is why 
various experts are sceptical about prospects of development of industries like oil 
refinery or petrochemistry in Kazakhstan on a large scale, that is, for export. (Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
Initially, the decision-making by the authorities was confined to limited options because the 
prospects of becoming a major oil exporter without the help of foreign capital were hindered 
by the fact that landlocked Kazakhstan could neither ship oil by tankers, nor had pipeline access 
to international oil markets. The number of available options was further reduced by the fact 
that the authorities considered that it was unprofitable for Kazakhstan to develop multi-tonnage 
industries.  
Whilst during the early years of independence Kazakhstan was incapable of developing 
a petroleum industry on its own due to the lack of human resources, technological capabilities, 
finances and infrastructure, the massive inflow of foreign capital into its oil and gas sector and 
imposition of local content requirements facilitated the establishment of backward linkages 
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between domestic firms and multinationals. This should have led to technological upgrade of 
local suppliers and subcontractors. Despite being considered a mature industry, the oil and gas 
sector has enormous innovative potential. For instance, Maleki (2013) shows that even the 
upstream (exploration and production) petroleum industry, traditionally considered exhausted 
of technological opportunities, in fact has experienced technological upsurge after the mid-
1990s, triggered by demand for innovation in complex projects in harsh and less accessible 
environments. The problem, however, was that the mindsets of Kazakhstani businessmen were 
shaped by decades of unilateral domination of the public sector, making them reluctant to invest 
in long-term capability building, passive towards business opportunities, and over-reliant on 
governmental intervention. Therefore, domestic firms relied solely on local content 
requirements, which forced multinationals to use a certain amount of domestically produced 
inputs in producing their final outputs. Local suppliers did not use linkages with multinationals 
in order to shorten the learning process, improve quality of products or upgrade their production 
methods. For instance, Ospanova (2010) reports that in Kazakhstan investors referred to 
numerous difficulties in adhering with local content requirements, including: lack of qualified 
human resources; insufficient interaction between domestic producers, investors and the 
government, shortage of indigenous suppliers of specialised products, the insufficient 
technological capacity of local suppliers, etc. What domestic firms failed to take into 
consideration is that the imposition of local content requirements on foreign investors violates 
the Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures as well as Kazakhstan’s specific commitments (WTO 2015). In 
the oil and gas sector specifically, local content requirements will be eliminated by 1 January 
2021 (WTO 20151). Considering the fact that domestic firms rely solely on the imposition of 
local content requirements and do not use linkages with multinationals in order to improve, it 
is safe to say that their strategy is short-sighted and doomed to eventual failure. 
 
The inflow of FDI into oil and gas sector provided Kazakhstan with an opportunity to 
establish an internationally competitive downstream petroleum industry and avoid negative 
consequences, caused by the dominance of extracting over processing industries. Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex 
Invest” comments:  
Our refineries do not process all the oil we produce because we produce about 75 
million tons of oil and process only 15 million tons. We have three refineries, each is 
capable to process about 5 million tons. Bulk of oil is exported raw. It goes to 
refineries located abroad. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
The downstream petroleum industry reaches consumers through products such as gasoline, 
kerosene, fuel oils, lubricants, waxes, asphalt, and various petrochemicals. The development 
of a downstream petroleum industry would diversify the national economy and prevent 
disproportion in the development of the extracting and processing sectors. Porter (1990, p. 73) 
argues: “The basic unit of analysis for understanding national advantage is the industry. 
Nations succeed not in isolated industries, however, but in clusters of industries connected 
through vertical and horizontal relationships. A nation’s economy contains a mix of clusters, 
whose makeup and sources of competitive advantage (or disadvantage) reflect the state of 
economy’s development”. However, unilateral domination by the public sector placed 
enormous obstacles in the way of innovation by making domestic firms blind to the potential 
offered by the development of the petroleum industry. 
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Disproportion in the development of the extracting and processing sectors have led to 
so-called ‘Dutch disease’ of Kazakhstan’s economy. The term Dutch disease originates from a 
crisis of the Netherland’s economy in the 1960s, following the discovery of North Sea natural 
gas deposits. The higher real income, generated by the resource boom, led to an upsurge in 
spending in the non-tradable sectors (sectors whose output is not traded internationally, such 
as construction, services, etc.). Higher demand on outputs of non-tradable sectors increased 
prices and wages in those sectors, squeezing profits from the tradable lagging sectors 
(manufacturing, agriculture, etc.), where prices are fixed at international levels. With increased 
inflation in non-tradable prices, there is appreciation of the real exchange rate, resulting in a 
fall in the output share of tradable goods in lagging sectors relative to non-tradable goods. The 
symptoms of Dutch disease were especially acute in Kazakhstan due to the significant 
disproportion in the development of the extracting and processing sectors. OECD (2011, p. 18) 
notes: “Diversification efforts can be challenging for an economy like Kazakhstan’s for several 
reasons, among them the so-called “Dutch disease”. Abundant natural resources may indeed 
lead to appreciation of the country’s real exchange rate, thereby making manufactured goods 
less competitive than those of other nations, and so increasing imports and decreasing exports 
(a process of de-industrialization would then ensue)”. In Kazakhstan, dominance of extracting 
over processing industries became too evident with about two-thirds of exports and almost a 
third of budget revenues generated by the oil and gas sector (OECD 2016). Accordingly, the 
government had to devalue the domestic currency in order to boost competitiveness of the 
lagging tradable sectors. Whereas devaluation of the national currency protects the interests of 
some firms operating in lagging sectors, it also damages domestic producers that use imported 
goods as inputs. Moreover, devaluation of the national currency decreases the purchasing 
power of consumers with fixed incomes, thereby hampering development of domestic 
producers, profits of which depend on the domestic market.  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” explains:  
Before devaluation it was very difficult for us to produce any processed goods, 
because our goods were more expensive than Russian goods, Belarusian goods, 
Chinese goods. Therefore, the government and the National Bank should maintain a 
very low exchange rate of tenge, because there is a massive inflow of petrodollars. 
Large influxes of dollars increase demand on local currency, causing its 
overvaluation… Before the devaluation the impact was especially significant. We had 
a very high average salary, even higher than in China. The standard of living was 
higher than in China, per capita GDP was higher than in China. Before the 
devaluation. Therefore, from the point of view of labour cost it was unprofitable to 
locate production here in comparison with China. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 
26th July 2016) 
Rapidly rising wages in the extracting sector led Kazakhstan’s economy into a middle income 
trap, the situation where a country can neither compete with lower income economies that 
produce cheaper outputs due to lower wages, nor with developed countries that produce more 
technologically advanced outputs.  
The next section examines how over-reliance of domestic firms on governmental 
intervention influenced their ability to assume the leading role in industrialisation of national 
economy.   
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6.4. Racing to the bottom: the industrialisation programme  
The authorities realised that the ability to achieve the ambitious goal of turning 
Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy first and foremost hinged on 
their ability to industrialise the country. During the Soviet era, Kazakhstan served merely as a 
source of raw materials due to the abundance of its fossil fuel and mineral deposits. Under the 
central planning regime strategic and military consideration prevailed over economic ones. 
Therefore, plants that processed resources extracted in Kazakhstan were located mostly in 
Russia despite the high transportation costs. The Head of the State noted: “During the Soviet 
time we were being developed as a raw-material appendage, so that we could only supply raw 
materials. Neither machine-engineering nor processing industries were developed here” 
(Nazarbayev 2013). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, domestic industrial players, 
specialising mostly in extraction and lower-end manufacturing lost their customers and 
struggled to find new markets. Besides, they had to develop new capabilities, which they did 
not need under the central planning, such as networking and negotiation skills (Radosevic 
1997). Apart from that, industrial players faced the necessity to perform their own R&D, 
something that had previously been conducted by sectoral institutions and science production 
associations, which were abolished in the course of market-oriented reforms (Graham 1993). 
Due to the multiplicity of problems faced by domestic industries in the process of Kazakhstan’s 
transition towards open market relationships, it was hardly expected that they would soon 
become the locomotives of technological development. Yet, for achieving ambitious goals of 
the authorities, the national economy needed to shift from the extraction of resources and 
lower-end processing towards value-added stages of production.  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” comments:  
Obviously, it is problematic to send certain goods by railways such as ferrous and 
non-ferrous metallurgy. That is to say, in isolated conditions of Soviet Union, 
development of those industries was expedient because of internal consumption. 
Quality and price did not matter because everything that was produced was consumed 
domestically. Now, when we play on the open market, joined the WTO, joined the 
Eurasian Economic Union we compete with exactly the same industries that are 
located, for example, on the coasts of some countries. For example, South Korea is 
one of the largest producers in metallurgical industry, particularly in ferrous 
metallurgy. Raw materials for their metallurgy, particularly coal they may transport 
from Indonesia or Australia. Their metal will be cheaper than the one produced inside 
the continent. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016)  
Kazakhstan’s industrial players were hardly competitive on the international scale. Omarova 
(1999, p. 346) argues: “Most of the republic’s industrial enterprises were monstrous, inefficient 
Soviet-style metallurgical combines and mines, located in heavily Russian-populated regions 
and providing support for the cities surrounding them. After the collapse of the USSR, the 
Kazakhstani state had to continue subsidising these enterprises, which had lost the traditional 
market for their outdated and uncompetitive products”. Obviously, the specificities of central 
planning, such as a policy of full employment, fragmentation of innovation process, etc. had a 
strong impact on the competitiveness of domestic industries in open market conditions. 
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The ambition to industrialise Kazakhstan through attraction of FDI into processing 
sectors encouraged Kazakhstan’s government to accelerate accession to the WTO. According 
to recommendations produced for Kazakhstan by international organisations, accession to the 
WTO was imperative for attracting investments into processing industries and diversification 
of the economy. For instance, OECD (2012, p. 17) claimed: “As an open economy seeking to 
attract investment outside of the primary sectors [oil and gas], Kazakhstan needs a predictable 
and transparent trade policy and efficient and reliable cross-border trade procedures. 
Kazakhstan’s long awaited and still pending accession to the WTO will be an important step 
in this direction ...”. Apart from harmonising national legislation with the requirements of the 
WTO, the government signed several dozen bilateral agreements ‘On the Encouragement and 
Mutual Protection of Investments’, which create a favourable legal environment for the 
promotion and protection of foreign investments on the territory of Kazakhstan. The 
liberalisation of trade and investment regime has boosted overall inflow of FDI, but mainly 
into extraction industries and related activities, such as geological prospecting and exploration 
(Figure 6.1.). Apart from extraction of fossil fuel and minerals some multinationals organised 
lower-end processing, which was barely enough to satisfy the ambition of Kazakhstan’s 
authorities of upgrading the economy towards value-added stages of production. The reformist 
attitude of the government and their ambition to turn Kazakhstan into the Snow Leopard were 
used by the WTO in order to create an imaginary that encouraged authorities to accelerate the 
pace of reforms.  
My interview with Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry 
Development Institute, demonstrates the reformist attitude of Kazakhstan’s government and 
their ambition to industrialise the economy:  
Some people say: “We now have a powerful industry, we have Mittal Steel 
[multinational corporation], et cetera”. In fact, we still lack basic products that we 
require. In chemical industry Kazphosphate, Kazazot produce yellow phosphorus 
which is the bottom level of processing in chemistry. We need to produce fertilisers. 
Currently we produce approximately 40 tons of fertilisers. It's nothing. Only now we 
started to build plants that will produce about million tons of phosphorus fertilisers, 
calcium fertilisers and perhaps we will produce complex fertilisers. We operate at the 
very bottom of the chain but lack production in the highest segments of chemical 
sector. We still cannot launch petrochemistry, although we sit on gas. We need to 
start production of structural and stainless steel. Perhaps even steel sheets for an 
automotive sector although scales don’t let us yet. We currently are on the bottom 
level. Mittal Steel somehow survives there but does not see point to develop further. 
We started to produce metallic aluminium only 5 years ago.  Previously we had only 
bauxites [an aluminium ore]. And so, our standpoint is: if we want industrial 
innovative development, we need to finalise formation of basic industries first. 
(Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016) 
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency 
“Kaznex Invest” explains how aluminium production is being developed in Kazakhstan:  
In Soviet times, aluminium was not produced here at all. Only bauxites [an aluminium 
ore] were produced. And only in the 2000s [2007] Eurasian Resources Group 
[multinational corporation] attracted money and built the first electrolysis plant. Out 
of one and a half million tons of alumina [aluminium oxide] they began to process 
300-400 thousand tons here. The rest they send to Russia as they used to do. But now 
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the company is planning to expand. The second stage of the electrolysis plant is 
thoroughly discussed. Therefore, if all this happens, we will start to produce primary 
aluminium. Different companies such as Turkish investor Galaxy can use primary 
aluminium to make aluminium profile for the construction and various other things. 
This requires very large investments. For instance, this project costs about 2 billion 
dollars, the construction of the second stage of an electrolysis plant. Why such a large 
amount, because in addition to this plant, it is needed to build a power plant in order 
to have cheap electricity. We have a total power installed capacity for Kazakhstan of 
18 gigawatts. In order to process another million of tons of alumina, we need to put 
2 more gigawatts into operation. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
The government clearly envisaged industrialisation as the only way of upgrading the economy 
towards the higher end of the value chain and the means of mitigating the symptoms of Dutch 
disease. Moreover, the government expected that industrialisation would spur economic 
activity by reducing the dependency of domestic firms on the necessity to use imported inputs 
in their production cycle, thereby cutting down transport expenses, eliminating currency risks 
and saving time. Therefore, attracting multinationals into the processing sectors of economy 
through accession to the WTO was seen by the authorities as the only viable option.  
 
Figure 6.1. Gross inflow of FDI, $ millions 
Source. National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2018  
While accession to the WTO increased the overall flow of inward FDI, the plans of the 
authorities to industrialise the country were hindered by the reluctance of extracting 
multinationals to process natural resources locally. The government could not use 
administrative pressure to enforce multinationals to shift their operation towards value-added 
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attracting FDI provided Kazakhstan’s government with financial resources needed for 
launching an industrialisation campaign. In the Innovation Performance Review of 
Kazakhstan, UNECE (2012, p. 81) notes: “the revenues extracted from resources make possible 
the undertaking of ambitious policy measures. The main challenge remains the precise 
targeting of such measures and the efficient channelling of the resources used”. Accordingly, 
the government launched the ‘State Program of Forced Industrial and Innovative Development 
2010-2014’, followed by ‘State Program of Industrial and Innovative Development 2015-
2019’. Incentive packages, provided by these Programmes included exemption from paying 
taxes, removal of restrictions on using foreign workforce, provision of land plots, and 
compensation of capital expenses. Shortly after the first state industrialisation programme was 
launched, FDI inflow into processing industries increased two and a half times from $2 244 
million to $5 658 million, illustrating that the decision of multinationals to invest into 
processing industries was triggered by the opportunities provided by the industrialisation 
programme (Figure 6.2.). The empirical evidence suggest that increase in flow of inward FDI 
into processing industries is causally linked to the launch of an industrialisation program, rather 
than to accession to the WTO.  
The extraction of natural resources by multinationals enabled Kazakhstan to overcome 
the major economic difficulties during the first years of independence. Omarova (1999, p. 338) 
argues: “Throughout the post-independence period, exports of petroleum, raw minerals, and 
semi-processed metals remained the main source of the country’s hard currency revenues”. 
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency 
“Kaznex Invest” recounts:  
Investments in our processing sector grow quite rapidly due to the industrialisation 
program. Nowadays Kazakhstan attracts on average 10 billion dollars of FDI. Around 
half goes into oil and gas. In 2014 about 10 percent was invested into processing 
industries. It is twice as much as in 2013. That is to say, in 2013 we only attracted 
about half billion dollars in processing sector overall. In 2014 we attracted billion 
dollars. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
The problem was that no attempt was made to focus on specific industries resulting in a broad-
range of industrial sectors being supported, as exemplified by this quote from Sanzhar 
Izteleuov, Chairman of the Board of National Agency for Technological Development: 
We cannot even establish a consensus of priorities. The State Program of Industrial-
Innovative Development supports various industries. But do we need them all at this 
stage? No, we don’t. We could have focused on three and develop at least them. They 
could act as centres of gravity, creating small companies around them. (Sanzhar 
Izteleuov, interview, 26th July 2016)        
Apparently, the reformist attitude of the authorities encouraged them to imagine that 
Kazakhstan will succeed in different sectors of the economy. OECD (2014, p. 257) notes: 
“Kazakhstan’s system of planning does indeed have an all-encompassing nature which can 
dilute the notion of priorities, discourage managers from making choices and arbitrating 
between conflicting objectives, and lead to a mechanical application of the planned tasks. For 
example, the “State programme of forced industrial and innovative development” has 
generated no less than thirteen sub-sectoral programmes covering all major industries and, in 
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addition, policy objectives such as attracting foreign investments, supporting innovation and 
promoting local content”. Since Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development was 
based on the sociotechnical imaginary, rather than a real plan, the industrialisation programme 
had no well-defined priorities. 
 
Figure 6.2. FDI in processing sectors (millions of dollars)  
Source. National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2018 
The country’s fast economic growth and the launch of the industrialisation programme 
were the catalysts that facilitated relocation of production processes into Kazakhstan, but 
mainly for those multinationals that sought for an opportunity to reduce transportation costs. It 
is frequently assumed that the protection of the rights of investors by the WTO is the main 
factor that encourages multinationals to establish production facilities in the host country, but 
the reality is that the decisions of multinationals are based mostly on the prospects of profit 
maximisation. Chang (1998, p. 109) argues: “those who criticize ‘restrictive’ policies toward 
TNCs [transnational corporations] assume that FDI decisions are mainly affected by the 
amount of business freedom granted to them... However, FDI decisions are much more strongly 
affected by the overall performance of the economy, especially the prospect for growth”. 
Mostly due to an increase in the flow of inward FDI, Kazakhstan’s economic growth 
accelerated sharply after 2000, reaching an average of 9.4% during 2000-08 (OECD 2018). 
Moreover, the industrialisation programme provided various benefits to investors, thereby 
incentivising them to establish production facilities in Kazakhstan. Although in general the 
country’s rapid economic growth and launch of the industrialisation programme were 
important, the main factor that influenced the decision of multinationals to relocate were high 
transportation costs. Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country in the world, encompassing 
an area equivalent in size to Western Europe. Since the country is landlocked, the cost of 
shipping intermediate inputs into Kazakhstan is higher in comparison with countries that have 
access to sea. Besides this, Kazakhstan has a poorly developed transport infrastructure as well 
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of production facilities into Kazakhstan enabled multinationals to reduce high transportation 
costs. The prospects of establishing production facilities in Kazakhstan mostly motivated a 
limited circle of multinationals, specificities of outputs of which required them to produce 
locally.  
Borisbiy Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment 
Agency “Kaznex Invest” comments:  
Since we are landlocked, we need to make an extra effort in order to attract 
multinationals here. First and foremost, we attract multinationals that produce goods 
which cannot travel very far. There are a number of commodities that can be 
transported within a distance of maximum 500 km. This includes different kinds of 
insulating materials, glass, cement, etc. When they are shipped for longer distances, 
there are big transportation costs involved. Glass breaks. Cement solidifies. 
Transporting insulating wool is expensive simply because it is a very lightweight 
material. That is to say, that some manufacturing can be localised here. And in 
principle, this is exactly how it happens [refers to multinationals that participate in 
state industrialisation programme]. Pipes, for example, are also very unprofitable to 
transport. You can load a maximum of five large diameter pipes in a railway carriage. 
Since pipes are hollow, you are essentially transporting air. Therefore, in principle, 
there are certain types of production, that are getting launched in our country 
anyways. This year Tenaris was launched in our country, it is a factory for threading 
large-diameter pipes for the oil and gas industry. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 
26th July 2016) 
The increase in flow of inward FDI into Kazakhstani processing industries should have made 
the government aware that domestic firms lag far behind foreign competitors and needed to be 
supported. Porter (1990, p. 671) argues: “… widespread foreign investment may carry an 
important message. Except when it is largely passive, widespread foreign investment usually 
indicates that the process of competitive upgrading in an economy is not entirely healthy 
because domestic firms in many industries lack the capabilities to defend their market positions 
against foreign firms”. Nevertheless, for a very long period of time the authorities neglected 
such a worrisome tendency and continued to rely solely on attraction of FDI. 
Due to the top-down nature of decision-making, attempts by the government to reduce 
the dependence of Kazakhstan’s technological development from multinationals by 
encouraging domestic firms to participate in the industrialisation programme led to a race to 
the bottom. In general, the tendency of policymakers to focus solely on attracting 
multinationals might be a short-sighted strategy. Porter (1990, p. 679) argues: “A development 
strategy based solely on foreign multinationals may doom a nation to remaining a factor-driven 
economy. If reliance on foreign multinationals is too complete, the nation will not be the home 
base for any industry. At the same time, multinationals can relocate when factor costs shift or 
if wages get too high”. In the case of Kazakhstan, the major drawback of a development 
strategy based on multinationals was that the production facilities were relocated mostly by 
those whose outputs needed to be produced and sold locally. Accordingly, these multinationals 
would neither export their outputs nor likely increase the volume of production. Eventually, 
the government came to the realisation that Kazakhstan’s technological development had 
become overly dependent on multinationals and that domestic firms, rather than multinationals 
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should be the backbone of technological development. Consequently, the government 
demanded that local authorities focused on incentivising domestic firms to participate in the 
industrialisation programme. The problem was that unilateral domination of public sector in 
the process of decision-making encouraged policy-makers to develop a tendency to pursue less 
valuable but more visible outputs. In order to demonstrate the results of their work to the 
President and the central government, the local authorities tried to include into a map of 
industrialisation as many local firms as possible without taking into consideration the absence 
of technological competences, the lack of downstream capabilities and inability to find 
potential markets for their products. 
The way implementation of the industrialisation programmed turned into a race to the 
bottom is described by the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs "Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev: 
You touched upon a very big problem, which we constantly talk about. Why do we 
need a business development map? Why do we need niche projects? First five-year 
plan of the state Program on Industrial-Innovative Development was expected to 
examine each region in order to find niches and form industries that would pull small 
and medium business. In other words, analyse what raw materials, how much of it 
and establish its processing so that producers would be able to organise supply. Every 
region should have determined such niches and niche projects. But that did not 
happen. What do first five-year plan and map of industrialisation really represent? 
Akimat [office of the governor] was responsible for regional map. If I came to them 
and asked to include me in the map because I wanted to build cement plant, the main 
question they would always ask was if I had money for this. If bank agrees to make a 
loan and financial question is resolved, then cement plant will be built. There is no 
analysis, whether or not cement factory is required there, no marketing. It is 
considered that entrepreneurs know everything and those projects got included in the 
map. The akimats are motivated to include as many projects as possible into the map 
of industrialisation without any analysis. They even have some sort of competition 
among themselves. That is why we constantly have such projects as ‘Solar’ [failed 
solar panel manufacturing plant]. We have problems because we built pile of cement 
plants in all regions and now they can’t sell their products. We have built a lot of ill-
considered projects that were built but now they all experience troubles with retail. 
Specifically, if you will analyse projects of first five-year plan, I can safely say that 
70-80 percent of them have problems with sales because they were thoughtless from 
the beginning. I believe that the map of industrialisation should be based on marketing 
of each region. We must understand what is lacking there, calculate sales 
opportunities for that product and build plants only after that. (Nurzhan Altaev, 
interview, 29th July 2016) 
Over the years, the behaviour of domestic firms was shaped by the unilateral domination of the 
public sector, making them overly reliant on the initiatives and directives of the state. The 
problem was that the local authorities were more motivated by an opportunity to demonstrate 
their enthusiasm to the President rather than the need to achieve actual results. As a result, 
attempts by the government to shift the country’s production processes towards the higher end 
of the value chain by including domestic firms in the industrialisation programme have clearly 
failed. According to the World Economic Forum (2016), Kazakhstan is ranked 114th in value 
chain breadth. Furthermore, the economy of Kazakhstan depends on extraction of natural 
resources more than ever. OECD (2016, p. 124) notes: “Kazakhstan is exporting considerably 
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fewer non raw-material goods than an average country of similar economic weight would; and 
even fewer than a decade ago”. The reformist attitude of the authorities, and their zeal to 
implement top-down commands, stemming from the firm belief in the sociotechnical 
imaginary made them deny the obvious failures of the industrialisation programme. This 
attitude is evident in my interview with the Vice Minister of Investments and Development, 
Yerlan Khairov, who makes the following statement concerning the course of implementation 
of the industrialisation programme:  
At this point it is important to ask about what can be done in order to develop the 
processing here, inside the country. The answer is the Program of Industrialisation. 
As you know, implementation of the second five-year plan is already underway. It 
has distinct mechanisms, well-articulated priorities and clear-cut levels of interaction 
and project implementation. That is to say, and the Head of the State always 
emphasises this, industrialisation goes on, it progresses, no matter who says what. 
By this time over 900 projects have already been implemented. That is relatively large 
ones, which were included in the map of industrialisation. (Yerlan Khairov, 
interview, 1st August 2016)    
Whereas the Vice Minister argues that overall 900 projects were implemented, in the East 
Kazakhstan region alone more than 100 solemnly opened industrial objects, which were 
included in the map of industrialisation do not function (Zhakupova 2017). Considering that 
East Kazakhstan is just one out of Kazakhstan’s 14 regions, the share of non-functioning 
objects is extremely high. Askhat Kuzekov, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic 
Policy, Innovative Development and Entrepreneurship recounts:     
You probably remember, about 6-7 years ago during a big meeting the President made 
very clearly statement to all akims [governors] and ministers. He said: “What is going 
on? I open ceremonies, cut the ribbons. Everything is solemn, collective is standing, 
we are making speeches. After a while we see that that enterprises are being closed”. 
And he made a strict warning. First of all, he said that he is not going to open new 
enterprises any longer. Second of all, even if he agrees to attend, he would recheck 
very thoroughly, supervise the work of this enterprise and hold governors of regions 
and ministers responsible for it. Nowadays, number of such enterprises reduced 
sharply. I remember how each region had dozens of such enterprises opened per year. 
There should have been production, but it was not there.  (Askhat Kuzekov, interview, 
1st August 2016)    
It is important to note that the role of the state is undertheorized in technology studies literature. 
Accordingly, the literature is usually based on the assumption that actions of government are 
geared towards maximising the public benefit (Dunning 1993). However, in reality, 
governmental agencies devote no resources to the production of outputs that are invisible to 
the public authorities (Lindsay 1976). This section demonstrates that in Kazakhstan the 
industrialisation programme was used in order to show the results of work of officials during 
lifetime of their careers. As Porter (1990, pp. 622-623) puts it: “Competitive advantage in a 
nation’s industries is created over a decade or more, not over three- or  four-year business 
cycles. … Yet a decade is an eternity in politics”. This draws attention to the fact that strategy 




The next section reviews in what way extensive use of state procurement influenced 
the attitudes of domestic actors towards entrepreneurship and examines whether it spurred 
Kazakhstan’s technological development.  
6.5. State procurement versus domestic rivalry  
Since Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development was based on the 
sociotechnical imaginary, shaped by the proponents of the Washington Consensus, the 
necessity to develop local initiatives and facilitate capability building of domestic firms was 
overshadowed by the intention of the authorities to attract multinationals. Developed countries 
and international organisations made different claims about why FDI plays the central role in 
the process of catching-up and how attracting this would benefit the transition. For instance, 
adopting the typical line of reasoning used by the other proponents of neoliberal ideas, EBRD 
(1994, p. 99) notes: “Liberal trade and FDI are carriers of economic benefits that are supportive 
of growth and may be of particular relevance for the dynamics of transition. They contribute 
to both macroeconomic demand and supply. As microeconomic phenomena, they can 
constitute “packages” that transfer goods and knowledge and cause, potentially, a host of 
behavioural and institutional adjustments”. Due to the lack of knowledge on how to establish 
an open market economy, Kazakhstan’s authorities followed the advice of developed countries 
and international organisations by focusing on liberalisation of trade barriers and attraction of 
FDI. In theory, the entry of multinationals may indeed generate positive externalities to 
domestic firms. However, the capability of indigenous firms to learn from multinationals, 
integrate into their supply chain and react positively on rivalry depends on their 
competitiveness (Chen et al. 2011). While focusing mainly on finding ways to attract 
multinationals, the government overlooked the need to create an environment that would 
incentivise domestic firms to update their production methods.  
Vice Minister of Investments and Development, Yerlan Khairov mentions:  
Law provides investment privileges, including following two packages. First package 
includes 283 types of activity apart from trade, production of excise goods and subsoil 
use. Accordingly, it allows you to receive land plot from state as grant-in-kind after 
implementation of your project. However, it refers first and foremost to industrial 
projects. We do not provide land for agricultural purposes, only industrial projects. 
Second package allows you to get exemption from paying custom duties on imported 
equipment. According to state programme of industrialisation second package 
embraces six priority sectors if you invest equivalent of 200 million minimum 
calculation indexes. Considering fluctuation of exchange rate today it constitutes 
about $12-14 million dollars. If you invest in these six priority sectors which 
incorporate 98 types of activity you get the opportunity not to pay taxes. That is 
corporate tax – 10 years, property tax – 8 years, land tax – 10 years. Apart from that, 
the state will allow you to bring foreign workforce regardless of the quota for the 
period of construction works, plus one year after completion of construction. 
Moreover, if you are going to manufacture product that will be unique for 
Kazakhstan, you may get compensation of expenses from state up to 30 percent of 
the volume of your investments. (Yerlan Khairov, interview, 1st August 2016)    
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One of the reasons why Kazakhstan’s authorities believed in the sociotechnical imaginary that 
attraction of FDI would lead to establishment of knowledge-based, export-oriented economy 
is because they had no knowledge about the nature of international technology transfer. Hanson 
(1982, p. 429) remarks: “The Soviet system excludes direct foreign investment in the USSR 
and restricts contacts between Soviet citizens and foreign nations. It thus shuts out the 
technology transfer associated with flow of risk capital and labour, notably the operations of 
multinational companies and the extensive movement of managers and technologists that 
characterize intra-Western relations”. Various privileges provided by the authorities to foreign 
investors illustrate how strongly they believed in imaginary, shaped by the WTO that attraction 
of multinationals would spur Kazakhstan’s technological development. 
An unwillingness to upgrade their production methods and invest in the development 
of technological capabilities, stemming from a lack of entrepreneurial spirit became the key 
reasons behind the failure of domestic firms to integrate into the supply chains of 
multinationals. Multinationals are not necessarily dependent on local suppliers as their arrival 
may be accompanied by increase in imports of intermediates (Hoekman and Javorcik 2006) or 
by the entry of international follow-source suppliers – the limited circle of suppliers following 
the multinational to new locations (Ivarsson and Alvstam 2005). Nevertheless, after 
establishing their production facilities in Kazakhstan, multinationals started to seek 
opportunities to purchase intermediate inputs locally, as it would allow them to reduce 
transportation costs, avoid currency risks and eliminate uncertainty about timely delivery. 
Usually, local firms must meet certain quality standards in order to become a part of a supply 
chain of a multinational (Javorcik 2006). However, in the case of Kazakhstan the problem was 
that domestic firms neither wanted to update their production methods nor strived to improve 
the quality of products. Reviewing innovation performance of Kazakhstan, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (2012, p. 32) notes: “Entrepreneurial spirit is still in an 
embryonic state, with economic development largely dependent on state-owned conglomerates 
and foreign investors as sources of wealth, employment opportunities and technology 
generation and demand. This results in scarce opportunities for new business creation and 
spillovers”. The attitudes of entrepreneurs towards innovation and potential business 
opportunities inhibited attempts by multinationals to find reliable suppliers of intermediate 
inputs among local firms.  
The attitudes of domestic firms, inhibiting the establishment of backward linkages with 
multinationals became a source of major disappointment for policymakers. Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex 
Invest” remarks:  
Danone built a large factory here to make yoghurts. They add jam to their yoghurts. 
They buy it in Moscow region, although we have potential to make the same jam. We 
have fruits and berries and in principle we can make this jam. But no one produces it 
here. Why no one produces? Because it needs to be high-quality product. It certainly 
would be more profitable for them to buy jam here, from us. Firstly, it will be in tenge, 
so no currency risks. Secondly, it would be safer from a supply point of view. It is 
four thousand kilometres between Moscow region and Almaty. They buy a large 
amount of this product there, but here we do not have such suppliers. That is to say, 
we need to improve ease of doing business to facilitate creation of such intermediate 
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producers. They want to cooperate but we, in Kazakhstan cannot provide them with 
the appropriate quality and low price. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 
2016) 
Despite the lack of a tangible plan on how to transform Kazakhstan into an open market 
economy, the model of coordination was based on the adoption of an interventionist style of 
governance and unilateral domination of public sector in the process of decision-making. The 
reformist attitude of the authorities is evident in my interview with the Chairman of the Board 
of Kazakhstan Industry Development Institute, Aydin Kulseitov who comments on the 
prospects of technology transfer through backward linkages between multinationals and 
domestic firms: 
Transnational corporations, they do not transfer technologies. When they come here 
as business entities, they do not transfer. But if you have real companies here, 
indigenous Kazakhstani companies and they have grown to a level where 
multinationals are ready to cooperate with them, only then technologies will come 
into such business. As long as you don’t have such a serious business, tech-savvy, 
with advanced engineering competencies, not a single multinational will be interested 
in you and no one will speak with you seriously. That is why we say: for the next 10 
years we need to work in this direction so that such industrialised small and medium 
enterprises can emerge. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016)  
The necessity to make society more entrepreneurial by adapting the mindsets of domestic actors 
to a new paradigm of socio-economic relationships was overlooked because the authorities 
based the strategy of technological development on the sociotechnical imaginary which posited 
that the attraction of multinationals and adoption of an interventionist style of governance were 
the key components for turning Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy. 
As a result, the World Economic Forum (2014) ranked Kazakhstan 108th out of 144 countries 
in the ‘local supplier quality’ category. 
The interventionist style of governance, adopted in an attempt to emulate the policies 
of Asian Tigers, suppressed the domestic rivalry needed for the development of an 
entrepreneurial spirit. The tendency of domestic firms to invest in the development of 
technological, human, and organisational competences required for establishing backward 
linkages with multinationals, does not depend solely on the strategic choices of entrepreneurs. 
Bergek et al. (2010, p. 115) argue: “The systems approach stems from a key insight of 
innovation studies, which is that innovation by firms cannot be understood purely in terms of 
independent decision-making at the level of the firm. Firms’ strategies are central to innovation, 
but strategic options are shaped and constrained by environmental factors such as collaborative 
patterns, regulatory systems and customary practices which persist in systemic ways and which 
influence how innovation may occur”. In the case of Kazakhstan, the problem was that despite 
the lack of knowledge about the way market relationships work, the authorities established 
unilateral control over socio-economic processes. It was assumed that governmental 
intervention would be the most efficient way to introduce changes because domestic actors 
were locked-in on the old ways of doing things, shaped by decades of the central planning 
regime. In reality, however, the government had no tangible plan for how to create a 
competitive environment that would make society more entrepreneurial. For instance, instead 
of incentivising domestic rivalry by creating a fair play environment, competition policy in 
Kazakhstan was subordinated to other policy aims, such as ensuring crisis recovery, fighting 
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consumer price increases caused by inflation and satisfying popular demands (OECD 20161). 
Accordingly, the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 ranked Kazakhstan 114th out of 
144 economies surveyed for intensity of local competition (World Economic Forum 2017). 
Overregulation and the absence of domestic rivalry made entrepreneurs passive towards 
business opportunities, reluctant to invest in capability building and overly reliant on the 
leading role of the government. 
The mindsets of participants of innovation processes are locked-in on the old ways of 
doing things because informal constraints are sticky and path-dependent. Nevertheless, the 
government would eventually be able to adapt the mindsets of industrial players to the new 
paradigm of socio-economic relationships by encouraging domestic rivalry. Borisbiy 
Zhangurazov, Chairman of the Board of National Export and Investment Agency “Kaznex 
Invest” comments: 
In order to integrate our entrepreneurs into the value chain of multinationals, there 
needs to be a competition. We need several companies that would give good 
proposals in price and quality. In fact, multinationals are interested in buying from 
local producers. But as a rule, local companies can’t provide a low price and high 
quality. (Borisbiy Zhangurazov, interview, 26th July 2016) 
Although changing the attitudes of participants of innovation processes towards 
entrepreneurship by creating an environment that facilitates domestic rivalry would be a very 
lengthy endeavour, in the long-run it would also deliver the best result. Porter (1990, p. 119) 
mentions: “Domestic rivalry not only creates pressures to innovate but to innovate in ways that 
upgrade the competitive advantages of a nation’s firms”. However, the problem was that the 
outcomes of policies promoting the long-term measures would not be immediately visible to 
the higher authority and would not allow public sector managers to demonstrate their zeal. 
Therefore, public sector managers found this option inadmissible.  
Extensive use of state procurement as a main instrument of public intervention inhibited 
the country’s shift toward the new paradigm of socio-economic relationships by suppressing 
domestic rivalry and causing systemic corruption. Since public intervention plays a key role in 
the process of technological development, it should be based on an adequate understanding of 
the implications for domestic actors. Chaminade and Edquist (2010, p. 102) note: “Innovation 
policy – or other kinds of public intervention – should be a complement to the market, not 
replace or duplicate it. If there is no ‘additionality’, the public actions are a substitute for the 
actions of firms, and other private organizations. The two are overlapping or competing. It is 
of great importance that there actually is ‘additionality’ associated with the public 
intervention”. In the case of Kazakhstan, targeted state intervention was extremely important 
because due to the elimination of trade and investment barriers in the process of accession to 
the WTO, domestic firms needed to catch-up with their external competitors. The obvious 
problem was that in post-Soviet Kazakhstan market forces were extremely weak and sluggish 
as the ways of doing things were shaped by decades of the central planning regime. Therefore, 
the need to create a domestic environment that would stimulate domestic firms to upgrade their 
production methods, increase networking, and improve downstream capabilities was 
quintessential. The authorities neither had a tangible plan for how to stimulate entrepreneurial 
activity nor knowledge about the measures that needed to be undertaken in order to intensify 
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market forces. Nevertheless, imagining themselves in the role of ideological successors of the 
governments of newly industrialised countries, Kazakhstan’s authorities assumed that they 
could successfully intensify activity in the domestic market by using state procurement. 
Eventually, state procurement became a key instrument of public intervention as well as a main 
means of state budget utilisation. However, since state procurement constituted the bulk of 
public expenditure, domestic firms became concerned more about establishing and maintaining 
connections with the authorities, rather than the need to develop technological and downstream 
capabilities.  
The way state procurement shapes the attitudes of the society towards entrepreneurship 
is exemplified by the following comments from Nurlan Musin, the former chief executive 
officer of Ulba Metallurgical Plant: 
We don’t have economic activity of the population. The most active its part is 
occupied with the distribution of the ‘budget cake’. That is to say, no one wants to 
engage in creative work. Rules of our society create environment in which no one 
wants to create, to develop new projects. No one needs this. Level of corruption is 
very high. It is not profitable, not interesting for people to do this, while it is possible 
to arrange everything quickly and discreetly. Most importantly, the whole society is 
afflicted. One asks, another gives. Both are sick. Do you see? Because both do not 
see anything wrong with this. Both believe that this is normal. (Nurlan Musin, 
interview, 18th July 2016)  
The Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs "Atameken", 
Nurzhan Altaev comments:  
The third issue, on which our entrepreneurs complain most of all is procurement of 
public sector, of the quasi-public sector and procurement of subsoil users [subsoil 
users need to purchase a certain amount of domestically produced inputs due to local 
content requirements]. Violations of both the legislation and the rights of 
entrepreneurs happen all the time during procurement. Technical conditions are 
frequently specified in such a way as to target a specific product from a specific 
supplier, often from the one who simply imports goods from abroad. (Nurzhan 
Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)  
OECD (2016, p. 35) notes that in Kazakhstan “public procurement commands 43% of 
government expenditure and is viewed as particularly corrupt”. Since the government 
substituted market forces with state procurement, it became the key reason for systemic 
corruption in Kazakhstan.  
The key problem with the idea of the extensive use of state procurement for spurring 
market forces was that it did not change the attitudes of domestic firms towards emerging 
categories of end-users, inhibiting their adaptation to competitive environment. In open market 
conditions various actors, including multinationals, industrial, and individual consumers rather 
than the government should become the main end-users of outputs produced by domestic firms. 
State procurement, on the contrary, implies that the government specifies product 
characteristics. Therefore, domestic firms did not put any efforts into developing distribution 
networks and the downstream capabilities required for bringing technology to the marketplace. 
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Besides, extensive state procurement means that domestic firms no longer need to improve 
their production methods in order to meet the international standards required for establishing 
backward linkages with multinationals. As a result of the replacement of market forces with 
state procurement, the quality of outputs of domestic firms deteriorated significantly. The 
extremely poor quality of even the most basic commodities, such as school desks purchased 
through state procurement made them impossible to use (Tengri news 2019). Not only did state 
procurement suppress domestic rivalry, disincentivise domestic firms to upgrade their 
production methods and develop downstream capabilities but it also impeded the adaptation of 
the mindsets of domestic actors to a new paradigm of socio-economic relationships.  
My interview with the Deputy Chairman of the Board of the National Chamber of 
Entrepreneurs "Atameken", Nurzhan Altaev shows how attitudes towards the need to develop 
downstream capabilities, implement international standards, and understand the tastes of 
customers is influenced by extensive state procurement:   
I think our ubiquitous problem is that a very large number of entrepreneurs are 
focused on state procurement and procurement of the quasi-public sector, but not on 
the common market. Obviously, they know that year after year there will be state 
orders, procurement. There is no need to work on innovativeness, no need to improve 
your product. Clearly, one way or another it will be all purchased and used. For 
instance, many enterprises in light industry are not market-oriented. If you examine 
range of goods that they produce you will find that it is only what is used by rescue 
services, defence or law enforcement. I often go to exhibitions and see products of 
our light industry. It turns out that it is either a school uniform or uniform that is used 
by state bodies or organisations of the quasi-public sector, but those are not goods 
that are used in the market such as ordinary civilian shoes, suits etc. Although recently 
it began to appear, for a long time before that focus was exclusively on state 
procurement. Of course, it depraves entrepreneurs. That is to say, he doesn’t need to 
improve this product, its competitiveness. He knows that it will be purchased anyway. 
(Nurzhan Altaev, interview, 29th July 2016)   
It is important to emphasise that state procurement as an instrument of intensifying domestic 
rivalry lost all its meaning. In 2018, non-competitive (sole source) procurement constituted 75 
percent of overall volume of state procurement, or 3.3 KZT trillion (≈ $ 8.5 USD billion) out 
of 4.4 KZT trillion (≈ $ 11 USD billion) (Sputnik 20191).  
 The next section analyses how an interventionist style of governance influenced the 
role of national champions in Kazakhstan’s technological development and whether it led to 
integration of local firms into their supply chains.  
6.6. Automotive industry: promoting national champions  
The reformist attitude of the authorities and their ambition to turn Kazakhstan into the 
Snow Leopard encouraged them to invest heavily in the development of the automotive 
industry. The automotive sector is traditionally considered to be one of the most prestigious 
industries. In addition to its own size, the automotive industry can generate far-reaching 
spillover effects in other sectors of the economy through backward linkages. Therefore, 
governments of both emerging economies and technologically advanced, industrialised 
countries placed attracting FDI into automotive industries high on their agenda. For instance, 
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Head (1998) reports that in order to convince Mercedes Benz to locate a plant in Alabama, the 
United States government effectively invested approximately $150,000 per job created. Being 
driven by the ambition to turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy, 
the authorities imagined that they would be able to develop high value-added manufacturing in 
other sectors of economy by attracting multinationals into the automotive sector. It was 
anticipated that entry of multinationals, facilitated by the removal of investment barriers in the 
frameworks of accession to the WTO, would enable domestic firms to integrate into the supply 
chains of multinationals. As a result of favourable state policies, the automotive industry 
quickly became a flagship of Kazakhstan’s industrialisation. During a 5-year period the 
combined volume of production of all goods and services in Kazakhstan grew only twofold: 
from 9,121 KZT billion in 2009 to 18,531 KZT billion in 2014. Meanwhile, the volume of 
production in the automotive sector increased 29.6 times, from 6.3 KZT billion to 187.9 KZT 
billion for the same time period (Agency of statistics 2016). However, since Kazakhstan’s 
strategy of technological development was based on an extremely ambitious sociotechnical 
imaginary, rather than a tangible plan, the authorities did not consider whether domestic 
industrial players are prepared to be suppliers of intermediate inputs for multinationals in such 
an advanced industry.  
My interview with Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry 
Development Institute demonstrates the government’s enthusiasm for developing the 
automotive industries in Kazakhstan:    
When we went to China to learn about the programme ‘China Manufacturing 2025’ 
we met with the ideologists, the people who initiated their further industrialisation, 
Chinese Academy of Engineering. We asked their opinion about our programme. 
They examined it and wrote recommendation: “We see special potential in your 
automotive sector”.   (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016) 
Erzhan Mandiyev, President of Azia Avto comments: 
We’ve managed to achieve good results in Kazakhstan because our model of 
development allows us to control significant market share. Our own network, our 
model of development has shown its efficiency. In this sense AvtoVAZ is very 
interested in preserving this market share. This is the first cause why AvtoVAZ is 
interested. Another reason: we are located here in Kazakhstan and we understand that 
prospects of our development largely depend on ability to build long-term 
relationships with our partners. And this production is one of the ways to ensure such 
longevity. But there is, of course issue of economic expediency of these projects. And 
in this sense we are in trend here because of an industrial-innovative development 
policy, state support, et cetera. All these reasons combined together allow us to launch 
such a manufacturing project here, in Kazakhstan. For AvtoVAZ, why they do it? 
This is in order to ensure control of this production and guarantee preservation of 
their market share in long-term perspective. Because close distance between 
manufacture and markets improves manageability of these markets, increases 
stability of brand, and allows to preserve significant market positions in the area. 
(Erzhan Mandiyev, interview, 19th April 2016) 
Through years of generous support for the automotive industry, the government raised a 
national champion – Azia Avto, producing 87% of all passenger cars in Kazakhstan through a 
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semi knocked-down assembly (box 6.3.). Together with the subsidiary of Renault-Nissan 
alliance, Russian automotive manufacturer AvtoVAZ, they organised a joint venture project 





• Established in 1992 
• Main activities: car manufacturing and repairing  
• Located in Ust-Kamenogorsk, East Kazakhstan 
• Manufactured 87% of all passenger cars produced in Kazakhstan 
• During 2012-2015 sold 265 791 cars (51% of total market share) 
• 32 sales offices in 26 cities of Kazakhstan (population 17,45 million people) 
• 24 sales offices in Ural and Siberian Federal Districts of Russian Federation 
(population 31,6 million people) 
• Offices will be opened in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Mongolia (overall population 53,4 million people) 
• 5 751 employees (as of 01.01.2016)  
• Logistics: 87 car transporters, 320 auto racks 
• Payments in Kazakhstan’s budget: approximately $500,000 USD every working 
day or 14% of budget of East Kazakhstan  
 
Box 6.3. Azia Avto  
Source: Azia Avto  
The authorities were adamant that top-down hierarchy and unilateral domination by the 
public sector in the process of decision-making were essential for the successful transformation 
of post-Soviet Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, export-oriented economy. Despite the 
absence of a tangible plan on how to overcome the problems of transition, the authorities 
imagined that by replicating an interventionist style of governance of Asian Tigers, they would 
be able to turn Kazakhstan into a new benchmark of successful economic development – the 
Snow Leopard. The Head of the State asserted: “It is my belief that all this progress, 
underpinned by a strong presidential power, has made it possible to overcome the legacy of the 
by-gone era and to grow at a higher pace than most members of the Commonwealth” 
(Nazarbayev 2005). The problem was, however, that in the absence of public accountability of 
public sector managers they focused on the less valuable but most visible targets while ignoring 
the necessity to pursue goals which were ‘below the radar’ of the higher authority. The main 
indicator of success that the government used was the share of local content in the outputs of 
the joint venture as it was supposed to indicate whether enough amounts of intermediate inputs 
were produced locally. In reality, the demands of the authorities to increase localisation share 
were meaningless because it did not show the level of integration of the joint venture with the 
local firms. For example, a 50% localisation share did not mean that half of all intermediate 
inputs were produced in Kazakhstan. In fact, it might have implied that the outputs were 
assembled exclusively from imported parts. The calculation of the share of localisation is based 
on subtracting the price of imported components from the retail price of the final product. 
Therefore, it includes wages, taxes, logistics costs, assembly operations, testing, advertising, 
132 
 
and many other things. Nevertheless, since the dynamics of the development of the joint 
venture project were constantly monitored by the authorities, public sector managers aimed to 
show positive results at all costs, by making massive concessions. Meanwhile, the necessity to 
build the capabilities of local firms by intensifying domestic rivalry, reducing regulatory 
burden, and facilitating networking was overlooked.  
In order to demonstrate the results of their work to the higher authority, public sector 
managers even tried to convince the national champion to switch to the production of 
components, which would significantly increase the share of local content in the outputs of the 
joint venture. Erzhan Mandiyev, President of Azia Avto Kazakhstan explains why the pursuit 
of the imaginary goals of officials through production of random components was impossible: 
Market’s potential and our ability to use this potential are crucial for development of 
domestic production. The main thesis which leads any entrepreneur is: if domestic 
production is more profitable than imports, the production will be organised. 
Otherwise no mottos will facilitate its development. This thesis is main here and it 
should be followed in any circumstances: if domestic production is more profitable, 
then there will be investment and money will inflow. From time to time we hear: 
“Why do we produce cars? Let’s begin with production of engines first or launch 
production of some metal component for cars”. Well, those people have some sort of 
perverse idea about the evolution of development. They assume that it is possible to 
start like that and then move forward. I mean that this metal component have to be 
sold somewhere. Who is going to need this metal part? Our company started to 
develop through sales. We have been selling and servicing cars. This was our key 
function and it still is. Our network is the largest in Kazakhstan. We are now 
developing in Russia. We have 15 service centres there. Currently we build 
relationships with Central Asia, start first supplies, open sales centres. This is our key 
function. Accordingly, after we learned how to sell product we came to a point where 
this product can be produced. Now, after we have established mass production we 
can speculate on issue of localisation. As soon as you have amassed volumes of 
production of local components, you can advance manufacturing process by making 
next step which implies performing R&D in order to increase efficiency. If market 
potential allows, of course. (Erzhan Mandiyev, interview, 19th April 2016)     
My interview with Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of Kazakhstan Industry 
Development Institute shows what the key priority of public sector managers was during 
negotiations:   
We told them: “If you want help, you need to localise.” They replied: “Ok. How 
much?” We told: “well 50%.” They replied: “Guys, in order to achieve 50% 
localisation we need to produce at least 120 thousand cars per year. The whole 
Kazakhstan in the best year produced 40 thousand. In order to produce 120 thousand 
we need market.” We told: “Well then, decide for yourself.” And they together with 
Renault-Nissan reached an agreement that parent firm gives them market from Ural 
to Far East [territory of Russian Federation] plus Central Asia on their AvtoVAZ 
models. In average this is exactly 120 thousand. (Aydin Kulseitov, interview, 17th 
March 2016) 
While negotiating, public sector managers insisted upon the need to increase localisation share 
as it would demonstrate to the higher authorities that their vision of turning Kazakhstan into a 
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Snow Leopard is being implemented. As a result of concessions made by the Kazakhstani 
government, AvtoVAZ allowed Azia Avto to open 24 sales offices in Ural and Siberian Federal 
Districts of the Russian Federation with a population 31.6 million people. Moreover, due to 
agreement reached with AvtoVAZ, Azia Avto was planning to open sales offices in 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia with an overall population of 
53.4 million people.  
Since the automotive industry is characterised by use of a vast variety of intermediate 
inputs in the production processes, the government imagined that local firms would be 
automatically integrated into the supply chain of the joint venture. Two main factors supported 
such an assumption. Firstly, the subsidiary of Renault-Nissan alliance, Russian automotive 
manufacturer AvtoVAZ owns 30 percent of the joint venture project, while 70 percent belongs 
to Kazakhstani national champion Azia Avto. Generally, joint ventures with the majority 
ownership share by domestic companies increase the likelihood of establishing backward 
linkages with local firms (Hoekman and Javorcik 2006). Secondly, being convinced by the 
rhetoric of the WTO that international technology transfer was the key to Kazakhstan’s 
transformation into the Snow Leopard, the authorities provided the joint venture with an 
enormous level of state support. For example, in April 2015, Kazakhstan’s government 
initiated the programme of concessional lending to finance the purchase of cars of domestic 
assembly. From April 2015 until May 2019, the state allocated 50 KZT billion (≈ $ 128 USD 
million) to car loans and leasing, enabling Kazakhstani citizens to purchase 6,000 cars (Strategy 
2050 2019). Considering the fact that 87 percent of all passenger cars were produced by the 
national champion, it can be argued that Azia Avto became the major recipient of state support. 
Since the prospects of developing the joint venture hinged largely on support of the state, the 
government anticipated that there would be no impediments to establishing backward linkages 
with local firms. However, while the national champion had no objection against the idea of 
integrating domestic firms into its supply chain, the problem was that local industries were 
incapable of supplying intermediate inputs of satisfactory quality. The attitude of domestic 
firms towards the need to develop technological capabilities was shaped by interventionist 
policies of the government, which suppressed domestic rivalry and the development of an 
entrepreneurial spirit. As a result, local firms relied mostly on state procurement and had no 
incentives to invest in upgrading their technological capabilities. 
Erzhan Mandiyev, President of Azia Avto argues that they were interested in buying 
intermediate inputs locally:  
We are located quite far from the main supply centres, it is Southeast Asia or central 
part of Europe. Therefore, ability to purchase intermediate inputs locally would 
enable us to avoid additional logistics costs associated not only with the 
transportation, but also with certain number of defects because of the damages that 
occur during the transportation. (Erzhan Mandiyev, interview, 19th April 2016) 
In general, the likelihood of establishing backward linkages depends positively on transport 
costs (Rodrıґguez-Clare 1996). The nearest place from which inputs could be exported is the 
Russian city Tolyatti, which is located 3500 kilometres away from the plant. Certain car 
components such as bumpers or wind shields are bulky, fragile and require expensive 
packaging. Therefore, transportation of such parts can be very costly, creating a strong 
incentive to purchase them locally. 
The consequences of the tendency of domestic firms to rely solely on state intervention 
can be illustrated by the attempts of the government to negotiate the supply of car batteries 
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between Azia Avto and Kainar AKB. In general, local content policies are a viable instrument 
for nudging multinationals towards establishing backward linkages with potential domestic 
suppliers. However, the usefulness of local content policies can be completely undermined if 
their implementation is not based on a tangible plan. For example, the inability to utilise the 
potential of local content policies led to the failure of an initially highly successful car 
manufacturing programme in Philippines (Ofreneo 2008). The Philippines’ government 
intended to upgrade their car industry from the assembly of completely-knocked-down or semi-
knocked-down parts, to creating locally-made cars. Essentially, a programme was based on 
progressive rises in the local content of assembled cars. However, due to inconsistent 
implementation of the programme, the complete localisation of car manufacturing processes 
were never achieved. Later, local content requirements were fully withdrawn in compliance 
with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures under the WTO. In the case of 
Kazakhstan, however, the key problem was that the need to adapt the mindsets of domestic 
actors to a new paradigm of socio-economic relationships was overlooked. The authorities tried 
to accelerate the pace of reforms by adopting interventionist style of governance and replacing 
domestic rivalry with state procurement. Due to adoption of such an approach, domestic firms 
lacked entrepreneurial spirit and relied heavily on state intervention. In an attempt to establish 
backward linkage between the national champion and local firms, the government negotiated 
the possibility of supplying car batteries made by Kainar AKB – another national champion, 
which produces 1.3 million car batteries per year (box 6.4.).  
During negotiations, representatives of Kainar AKB refused to undergo the necessary 
certification procedures for integration into the supply chains of multinationals. Moreover, 
representatives of Kainar AKB repeatedly appealed to obligations of Azia Avto to increase the 
share of local content. My interview with Aydin Kulseitov, Chairman of the Board of 
Kazakhstan Industry Development Institute demonstrates the tendency of domestic firms to 
rely solely on administrative measures: 
Local manufacturers could not even organise supply of car batteries. Well, our 
manufacturer [Kainar AKB] says: “We produce a million car batteries, why not to 
put some in this 30,000 cars? Azia Avto responds: “You have to go through a certain 
procedure. For instance, we assemble Kia [among other car brands]. You must 
approach Kia, prove that your car batteries are compatible with Kia, that they won’t 
damage anything, won’t affect quality, warranty, et cetera”. In fact this is certification 
of particular type of product. They say: “Do it for us”. Azia Avto replies: “Why 
should we do it? This is your product. You must be interested”. They say: “No, 
Kazakhstani content, Kazakhstani content”. I spoke with Erzhan Mandiyev [President 
of Azia Avto]. He says: “Strange people. They say that they want to sell their product 
but they don’t want to certify and promote it. Well, we don’t need that either”. (Aydin 
Kulseitov, interview, 17th March 2016)     
According to Erzhan Mandiyev, President of Azia Avto Kazakhstan, the key condition for 
cooperation was appropriate quality of intermediate inputs from local suppliers: 
There are so many nuances associated with the organisation of mass production of 
goods, trademarks of which do not belong to you. Lada trademark belongs to Renault-
Nissan alliance. Therefore, it is manufactured in compliance with standards and 
requirements of Renault-Nissan alliance. Accordingly, we have to follow these 
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standards. I mean that our aspirations to optimise our expenses should not have a 
negative effect on the final product. This condition should be taken into account. It 
means that we must follow the standards and must carry them out. Issues such as 
safety, certification, et cetera have to be considered. This is very complex procedure 
but it should be followed. (Erzhan Mandiyev, interview, 19th April 2016)  
Nurlan Musin, former chief executive officer of Ulba Metallurgical Plant comments:   
Perhaps if we lived in the times of Henry Ford, it would be possible to integrate into 
supply chain without certification. Now it’s just not possible. (Nurlan Musin, 
interview, 18th July 2016) 
KAINAR AKB 
 
• Established in 1975 
• Main activities: battery manufacturing for cars, trucks, agricultural and military 
vehicles  
• Headquarters located in Taldykorgan, Kazakhstan  
• Form of ownership: a private limited-liability company 
• Uses equipment of leading world manufacturers: Sovema (Italy), MAC (USA), 
Digatron and Kustan (Germany), BM (Austria) 
• Full cycle of production, including lead–acid batteries recycling  
• Manufactures 1.3 million car batteries per year  
• Company’s sales cover 40% of total domestic market share 
• Exports constitute 55% of company’s profits  
• Main destinations of exports: Russia, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, 
Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia, Ukraine, Afghanistan and China  
• 700 employees  
 
Box 6.4. Kainar AKB 
Source: Vlast (2019).  
Some public sector managers argue that after forming the joint venture with AvtoVAZ, the 
behaviour of the national champion Azia Avto started to closely resemble that of 
multinationals. For instance, Kairat Bekturgenev, Chairman of the Board of National Agency 
on Development of Local Content comments:  
Here is my personal frank opinion. Azia Avto should not stay aside. It is clear that 
our Kainar does not have contacts and cannot approach a parent company. Azia Avto 
can easily organise this. If they will help, the company will be certified. If they will 
just sit like that and argue “go, do it yourself”, how they are supposed to approach 
them? Clearly there are hundreds of global producers of car batteries and when Kainar 
from Kazakhstan will come to parent company and say “let me be your supplier” will 
it suffice? I think they should act as partners. Azia Avto and Kainar should prove that 
here in Kazakhstan we produce, that we have required scope, we will develop further, 
we need localisation, on issue of localisation there is such product. In this case, a 
dialogue can take place. Azia Avto receives a lot of support from the state. So, there 
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should be something in return from them. However, they see their contribution only 
in jobs creation. (Kairat Bekturgenev, interview, 15th June 2016)  
Despite all attempts of the authorities to facilitate the establishment of backward linkages, 
negotiations between Kainar AKB and Azia Avto Kazakhstan brought rather frustrating results. 
Porter (1990, p. 625) argues: “… firms (and unions) will not change if they believe that 
government “assistance” will allow them to avoid the need to do so. Direct government 
“assistance” in one firm or industry also has a strong tendency to create forces that cause it to 
spread and multiply”. Mikhail Bortnik, Senator, Member of the Committee on Economic 
Policy, Innovative Development and Entrepreneurship argues:  
I think that this is not normal for market relations. Perhaps it is a remnant of the past 
or maybe related to their dominant market share. Those are successful companies, 
having great achievements. But, I say that it is important to understand that we have 
to support those companies whether we want it or not. At some point they also begin 
to lose directions and use administrative measures instead of market mechanisms. 
Sometimes they say: “Provide us guarantees that you will buy cars that we produce 
for ambulance service, for the police”. The car assembly plant, they already consider 
themselves in a position where they can demand. And we support. The same story 
with the battery factory. They know that there are state programmes that prioritise 
support of local manufacturers. So, why don’t you buy my car batteries? Tomorrow 
you will report to akim [governor] and he will force you to buy. (Mikhail Bortnik, 
interview, 22nd May 2017) 
Low technological capabilities of domestic firms, stemming from the absence of 
entrepreneurial spirit and their tendency to rely on state interventions, became the main 
obstacles for establishing backward linkages with the joint venture. Initially, the authorities 
expected that Azia Avto would potentially establish backward linkages with 15 firms located 
in the same region, such as a local producer of windshields U-Ka triplex, or Semey KozhMeh, 
specialising in leather products. However, negotiations between Kainar AKB and Azia Avto 
clearly demonstrated that attitudes of domestic firms, shaped by the interventionist policies of 
Kazakhstan’s government, became the biggest impediment for establishing backward linkages. 
6.7. Conclusion 
The task of shifting from the coordination approach intrinsic to centrally-planned 
regime to the one inherent to the open market relationships was an extremely challenging 
undertaking because the mindsets of domestic actors were a product of the previous paradigm 
of socio-economic relationships. The authorities were truly inspired by the way the 
governments of newly industrialised economies overcame stagnation, achieved outward 
orientation of their economies and coordinated the industrialisation processes. Neoliberal 
rhetoric convinced the government that attracting FDI and implementing the reforms, insisted 
upon by the WTO would turn Kazakhstan into a new benchmark of successful economic 
development – the Snow Leopard. Therefore, the authorities attempted to accelerate the pace 
of radical reforms by replicating the interventionist style of governance of Asian Tigers. 
Although the authorities imagined themselves in the role of ideological successors to the 
governments of newly industrialised countries, no real attempts were made to examine 
contextual differences between post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Asian Tigers. Accordingly, the 
strategy of Kazakhstan’s technological development was based on a sociotechnical imaginary, 
rather than a tangible plan that would recognise the necessity to adapt the mindsets of domestic 
actors to the new paradigm of socio-economic relationships. The interventionist style of 
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governance and dominance of the public sector aggravated the negative attitudes of domestic 
actors towards entrepreneurship, shaped by decades of central planning, making them reluctant 
to invest in capability building, blind to business opportunities and over-reliant on 
governmental intervention.  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s authorities faced the necessity to 
upgrade the national economy from the extraction of natural resources and lower-end 
processing towards the higher end of the value chain. During the command era an advanced 
system of mining complexes and metallurgical plants was built on the territory of Kazakhstan 
in order to utilise its rich fossil fuel and mineral deposits. However, downstream industries that 
processed raw and semi-finished materials were located in other republics of the Soviet Union. 
Post-Soviet Kazakhstan lacked the human resources, technological capabilities, and financial 
means, needed for building an entire value chain from the extraction of raw materials to 
production and retailing. Accordingly, attracting FDI into the processing industries through 
accession to the WTO seemed to be the only way of industrialising the national economy. 
Initially, the reforms have boosted the flow in inward FDI, but mainly into extracting industries. 
However, after the government launched an industrialisation programme, those multinationals 
that sought for an opportunity to reduce transportation costs started to relocate their production 
processes into Kazakhstan. The government realised that reliance on multinationals was a 
short-sighted strategy and aimed to reduce dependence of Kazakhstan’s technological 
development on foreign capital by encouraging domestic firms to participate in the 
industrialisation programme. The problem was, however, that the authorities imagined 
themselves in the role of ideological successors of the governments of Asian Tigers and 
established unilateral control over the decision-making process. In the absence of checks and 
balances that would put constraints on the behaviour of public sector managers, they developed 
a tendency to focus solely on producing outputs that were monitored by the higher authority. 
The lack of entrepreneurial vision amongst domestic firms and their over-reliance on 
governmental intervention led to a race to the bottom because in an attempt to demonstrate the 
results of their work to the higher authority, the local authorities tried to include into a map of 
the industrialisation as many domestic firms as possible, without taking into consideration the 
absence of necessary infrastructure, lack of access to potential target markets, and weak 
downstream capabilities.  
Since the ways of doing things were shaped by decades of a central planning regime, 
the authorities attempted to spur the process of transition by replacing weak and sluggish 
market forces with state procurement. After relocating their production facilities into 
Kazakhstan, multinationals started to seek opportunities to integrate domestic firms into their 
supply chains as it would enable them to avoid currency risks, lower transportation costs and 
eliminate uncertainty about timely delivery. While multinationals were interested in purchasing 
intermediate inputs locally, they found that domestic firms neither wished to update their 
production methods nor strived to improve quality of produced outputs. The main reason for 
that was that the government based the country’s strategy of technological development on a 
sociotechnical imaginary, rather than on a tangible plan. Instead of intensifying domestic 
rivalry by creating a fair play environment, the government tried to incentivise domestic firms 
to invest in the development of technological, human, and organisational competences through 
state procurement. However, since non-competitive (sole source) procurement constituted the 
bulk of state procurement, domestic firms became more concerned about establishing 
connections with public sector managers, rather than with the need to upgrade technologically. 
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As a result, governmental intervention suppressed domestic rivalry and caused systemic 
corruption. Moreover, since extensive state procurement replaced market mechanisms, 
domestic firms no longer needed to adapt themselves to the needs of emerging categories of 
end-users, improve their production methods, develop the distribution networks and 





























7.1. Introduction    
The principle goals of this research project were laid out in detail in introduction 
chapter. Thus, they require only brief recapitulation here. My first goal was to gain an 
understanding about why transition economies experience difficulties whilst trying to catch-up 
with mature market economies in terms of technological development. I embarked on this 
research journey after witnessing over many years the futile attempts of Kazakhstan’s 
government to turn this former centrally-planned economy into a knowledge-based, outward-
oriented market economy. The turning point was the realisation that despite the eagerness of 
policymakers to learn from their own mistakes, the situation could not be dramatically 
improved. This was because some inevitable miscalculations in governmental policies were 
only a proximate cause of the systemic problems experienced by economies in transition. 
Therefore, this research aimed to identify the higher-level causes of the inability of transition 
economies to catch-up in terms of technological development. Since there was no theory or 
guidelines on transition, such a research project seemed highly worthwhile. My second 
research goal stemmed from the need to identify an appropriate course of action for 
Kazakhstan’s government as I was bothered by the tendency of policy-makers to act on visions 
of desirable futures rather than tangible plans. The fact was serious in view of the magnitude 
of change, the reformist attitudes of the authorities, and the lack of theoretical guidelines upon 
which policymakers could base their decisions. My third goal was to examine whether 
accession to the WTO really was a free ride towards technological catching-up as had been 
imagined by the governments of transition economies. I aimed to examine if the ability to 
increase the flow of inward FDI outweighed negative effects caused by the imposition of the 
principles of the Washington Consensus on former closed centrally-planned economies. 
Considering the fact that there is no verified, well-articulated analytical framework linking 
changes in the inflow of FDI to differences in technological performance, my intention to 
contribute to international technology transfer literature by showing the importance of 
engaging in a contextual examination of the factors that inhibit the occurrence of spillover 
effects seemed as a step in the right direction.  
In this chapter I outline the practical and theoretical implications of this thesis, and 
discuss issues which arouse during its progress. Section 7.2. summarises the main findings by 
answering the research questions and presenting the theoretical and empirical contributions 
developed in the process of conducting this research. Section 7.3. explains how the findings of 
this thesis should be interpreted by policymakers and in what ways they can be applied in the 
‘real world of policymaking’. Section 7.4. discusses the limitations of this research project and 
provides suggestions for future studies.  
7.2. Empirical results  
Whilst my main objective was to learn things I did not know rather than to prove 
something I already did, this thesis enabled me to demonstrate that the largely neglected field 
of innovation policy is arguably the most important dimension in the innovation systems 
approach. There were various things I learnt in the process of conducting this research project. 
For instance, I discovered that Kazakhstan’s accession to the WTO was significantly more than 
simply a case of a country that failed to catch-up with mature market economies due to the 
poor decision-making of the national government. Rather, it represents a metaphor of the 
realities of global policymaking by demonstrating how alleged ‘fair-play’ rules imposed by 
developed countries through intergovernmental organisations affect powerless countries. I also 
found that the most dangerous instrument in the arsenal of intergovernmental entities is not the 
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blunt force of economic and political pressure, but soft power of creating imaginaries that play 
on the ambitions of those who lag behind. This realisation was important, as promises of 
desirable futures can may set a country on a wrong path of technological, social, and economic 
development, and can be far more devastating than political and economic restraints. Overall, 
everything I learnt in the process of conducting this research project confirmed what I believed 
all along – that innovation policy answers the most important questions as it deals with the 
complex interplay of knowledge, its application, and power. As Russel (2004, p. 4) puts it: 
“The fundamental concept in the social sciences is Power, in the same sense in which Energy 
is the fundamental concept in physics”. Accordingly, while presenting my findings I aim to 
draw attention to the fact that innovation policy is far from being a trivial field of study because 
the prospects of technological development hinge as much on the knowledge of those at the 
top of the pyramid, as they do on those who work in labs, clinics, technology parks and other 
professionally bounded spaces.  
In this section, I restate the research questions and sum up the main findings.  
1. In what ways does the interplay between the formal arrangements the governments 
of transition economies had to set up in the process of reforms, and the long-established 
informal elements, embedded in the mindsets of domestic actors affect the transformation of 
former centrally-planned economies into open market economies?     
This thesis demonstrates that the tendency to depict transition merely as a process of 
harmonising the formal institutional and organisational set-ups of former centrally-planned 
economies with the generally accepted norms of open market relationships is deeply 
misleading. In recent times, policymakers were able to express their concerns about the fairness 
of WTO policies because different studies convincingly demonstrated that some demands of 
the organisation negatively affected economic and technological development of catching-up 
economies. For instance, Cimoli and Dosi (2017, p. 49) argue: “There is another big novelty in 
the current organization of international economic relations, namely, the regulatory regime 
stemming from the World Trade Organization… This historically unprecedented regime 
indeed implies a significant reduction in the degrees of freedom developing countries can enjoy 
in their trade policies, while notably all catch-up countries in the preceding waves of 
industrialization could exploit a large menu of quotas, tariffs, and other forms of nontariff 
barriers”. Nevertheless, due to a commonly held misconception that a centrally-planned regime 
was a non-system, the WTO was in position to demand that the governments of former Soviet 
republics establish open market relationships before gaining an upgrade to full membership 
status by arguing that such demands would unequivocally benefit transition economies. In 
reality, however, centrally-planned regime was a fully-fledged paradigm, the aim of which was 
not simply to replace market forces with planning procedures, but to eradicate inequality, 
speculation, unemployment and exploitation. The ideology of socialism shaped the values of 
domestic actors, defining their norms, routines, and codes of conduct. Over the course of 
decades of socialist rule these informal elements entrenched deeply in the mindsets of people. 
Radical reforms could not be implemented overnight because these informal elements are 
sticky, path-dependent, and highly resistance to change. Accordingly, the empirical findings of 
this thesis suggest that WTO-plus demands hindered the development of former centrally-
planned economies because the main challenge of transition was not in changing formal 
structures but in making them fit with well-established informal constraints.  
This research project demonstrates that the attention of policymakers should be shifted 
away from the rules stipulated in formal WTO agreements and towards the effects produced 
by WTO-plus demands. A mismatch between the formal structures that the government set up 
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in the process of implementation of WTO-plus demands and well-established informal 
elements manifested itself in various ways. The first thing to mention is a lack of near-market 
research required for producing competitive outputs in open market conditions. The tendency 
of researchers to overlook the commercial viability of research outputs has proved extremely 
difficult to overcome, because the mindsets of researchers became locked-in on certain ways 
of doing things shaped by the structure of incentives and the organisational framework of the 
science-push model of technological development. The second issue relates to the lack of 
entrepreneurial spirit in society and the tendency of businessmen to rely heavily on 
governmental intervention, something which is incompatible with the open market 
relationships. Entrepreneurs simply did not see the benefits of adapting themselves to the needs 
of emerging categories of end-users, updating their manufacturing methods, or developing the 
distribution networks and downstream capabilities required for bringing technology to the 
marketplace because throughout the decades of communist rule several generations of people 
lived in a completely different paradigm of socio-economic relationships. The third way in 
which mismatch manifested itself relates to the negative attitude of public sector managers 
towards entrepreneurship, stemming from the fact that during the Soviet time entrepreneurial 
activity was an illegal activity. This long-established attitude towards entrepreneurship 
encouraged public sector managers to create obstacles to engaging in business activities and 
became the primary reason for systemic corruption, with officials exploiting the complexity of 
national legislation in order to extort kickbacks from businessmen. The findings of this thesis 
suggest that the mismatch between formal arrangements that the government set up and long-
established informal constraints had a significant impact on the economic and technological 
development of transition economies. Nevertheless, research literature neglects these issue, 
focusing exclusively on examining the effects of the rules stipulated in formal WTO 
agreements, and does not take into consideration the impact of WTO-plus demands on 
establishing open market relationships.   
2. How did the governments of transition economies envision technological 
development and was their strategy efficient in terms of turning former centrally-planned 
economies into open market economies? 
This research draws attention to the fact that in the absence of knowledge on how to 
transform a former closed, centrally-planned economy into an open market economy, policy-
makers based Kazakhstan’s strategy of technological development on a sociotechnical 
imaginary shaped by the neoliberal rhetoric of the WTO, rather than on tangible plans. At the 
outset of the transition no attempts were made to develop a theory on how to implement this 
transformation. In the absence of a clear vision of what needed to be done in order to catch-up 
with mature market economies, policymakers had to act in accordance with their personal 
instincts, abstract theories, and anecdotal evidence. However, the course of action was shaped 
by the process of accession to the WTO. Being an active promoter of the ideas of the 
Washington Consensus, the WTO required the governments of transition economies to 
deregulate FDI and establish open market relationships. In order to accelerate the pace of 
reforms, the WTO formed a sociotechnical imaginary by convincing the government that these 
requirements were necessary to turn Kazakhstan into a knowledge-based, outward-oriented 
economy. The WTO had no knowledge of what course of action should be taken in order to 
transform transition economies into fully-fledged competitive economic systems. The reforms 
that the WTO insisted upon were simply a part of broader WTO agenda to establish the 
neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus on a global level. Moreover, the rules of 
the Washington Consensus were designed with market economic systems rather than centrally-
planned economies in mind and contained some obvious misconceptions, pointed out in 
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innovation policy literature, such as a tendency to borrow ‘best-practice’ policies and a strong 
bias towards market fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the authorities enthusiastically embarked 
on their implementation due to the firm belief that reforms would unequivocally benefit 
Kazakhstan’s development, and adopted the ‘economy first, then politics’ approach in order to 
prevent any delays. Therefore, this thesis points out that reforms were designed with a lack of 
understanding of what needed to be done and were guided by the contextually-irrelevant 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, and implemented in a top-down manner.  
The empirical findings of this thesis suggest that the decision to base the strategy of 
technological development on visions of a desirable future, shaped by the WTO did not make 
good social, political, and economic sense. First, envisioning themselves in the role of 
ideological successors to the governments of Asian Tigers, the authorities developed reformist 
attitudes and adopted an interventionist style of governance. The adoption of the ‘economy 
first, then politics’ approach hampered the development of checks and balances which would 
have put constraints on the behaviour of officials, something which caused systemic corruption 
and facilitated the establishment of a practice of pursuing only those targets, the 
accomplishment of which would have brough public sector managers to the attention of their 
higher authority. Second, the belief that Kazakhstan was about to turn into a new benchmark 
of successful economic development – the Snow Leopard – inspired the government to spur 
weak and sluggish market forces with governmental intervention whilst overlooking the need 
to adapt the mindsets of domestic actors to the new paradigm of socio-economic relationships. 
However, since the attitudes towards entrepreneurship in Kazakhstani society were shaped by 
decades of central planning, excessive governmental intervention made entrepreneurs 
unresponsive to emerging business opportunities, reluctant to invest in capability building, and 
over-reliant on state support. Third, imaginary of what implementing the reforms would entail 
encouraged the government to pursue goals that were set in accordance with neoliberal 
ideology, such as opening up, finding ways to attract FDI and creating a ‘fair play’ environment 
for multinationals. Meanwhile, the need to encourage entrepreneurs to update their production 
methods, improve the competitiveness of their commodities, develop distribution networks and 
downstream capabilities was overlooked. This research project demonstrates how dangerously 
misleading sociotechnical imaginaries can be and explains why national policies should be 
based upon well-grounded theory and supported by empirical investigation. It also draws the 
attention of innovation policy researchers to the fact that the tendency to engage in purely 
theoretical elaborations about the factors that may lead to system failure have limited practical 
value as a checklist of potential systemic problems, does not provide guidelines on what needs 
to be done, and may be completely irrelevant to context of a country.  
3. To what extent did joining the WTO enable transition economies to benefit from FDI 
spillover effects and what are the system-level factors that may inhibit integration of domestic 
research and development and industrial players into global value chains?  
This research represents an attempt to move forward from aggregate-level evaluations 
of factors determining the occurrence of spillover effects, to an empirical examination of the 
systemic problems that obscure technology transfer. Although the occurrence of FDI spillovers 
is a relatively unexplored subject, organisations engaged in developmental efforts insist that 
accession to the WTO and the creation of a fair-play environment for multinationals will have 
strong positive effects on economies in transition. Accordingly, despite the binding nature of 
WTO commitments, transition economies strived to gain membership of the organisation in 
order to catch-up with industrialised economies in terms of technological capabilities. Yet, 
claims about the positive externalities generated by the presence of multinationals are based on 
different interpretations of aggregate data or cross-sectional surveys without the supporting 
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evidence for causation. Various extravagant claims about the occurrence of horizontal 
spillovers have been refuted by more recent studies. For instance, Javorcik (2006, p. 208) 
argues: “It is possible, though, that researchers have been looking for FDI spillovers in the 
wrong place. Since multinationals have an incentive to prevent information leakage that would 
enhance the performance of their local competitors but at the same time may benefit from 
transferring knowledge to their local suppliers, spillovers from FDI are more likely to be 
vertical than horizontal in nature”. However, the empirical findings of this thesis suggest that 
the expectations of the authorities that multinationals would integrate domestic firms into their 
supply chains (vertical spillover) were also not met. Domestic firms were incapable of 
supplying high-quality intermediate inputs to multinationals as they lag behind in terms of scale 
efficiency, the capacity to innovate, and the quality and variety of produced outputs. The key 
reason for this was the tendency of the authorities to focus on attracting multinationals whilst 
overlooking the need to develop local capabilities. Entrepreneurs on their own did not see the 
benefits of investing in capability building because their mindsets were locked-in on the 
previous paradigm of socio-economic relationships. Moreover, this thesis shows that since 
multinationals are interested in exploiting local capabilities rather than expanding their own 
competences abroad, in Kazakhstan their activity is mostly limited to last-stage assembly and 
extracting natural resources. Attempts by the authorities to incentivise the relocation of 
knowledge-intensive stages of production through the creation of centres of research excellence 
have failed because researchers have been reluctant to engage in near-market research. Overall, 
this thesis found no evidence that accession to the WTO and a consequent increase in the flow 
of inward FDI benefited Kazakhstan’s R&D and industrial players. 
 
7.3. Implications for policy 
This research draws the attention of governments of transition economies to the realities 
of global policymaking by showing that the decision of the WTO to overlook the specificities 
of the contexts of former centrally-planned economies and to force them to follow the ideas of 
the Washington Consensus was fundamentally wrong. In the absence of bargaining power, 
transition economies had no other option but to follow WTO-plus demands to implement the 
prescription of the Washington Consensus to deregulate FDI and establish open market 
relationships with minimal governmental intervention. The United Nations (2001, p. 37) notes: 
“… because of their relative insignificance to the world trading system as a whole, countries 
with economies in transition have encountered tougher demands from WTO members than 
they would be able to implement without causing injury to their national economy”. The WTO 
disregarded the fact that the rules of the Washington Consensus were designed with market 
economic systems in mind and did not take into consideration the difficulties experienced by 
transition economies. Due to a widely held view that a centrally-planned regime was a non-
system; the WTO was in position to argue that the imposition of the rules of the Washington 
Consensus would unequivocally benefit economies in transition. However, the crucial-case 
research design used in this thesis allows us to generalise the findings of the case of Kazakhstan 
to all transition economies by showing that the main obstacle to the successful transformation 
of former centrally-planned economies into open market economies lay not so much in the task 
of changing their formal structures, as in making them fit with well-established informal 
elements, embedded in the mindsets of domestic actors. The reforms in Kazakhstan were 
implemented more gradually then in all other transition economies – its accession taking 19 
years – which makes it the longest in the history of the WTO. Accordingly, among all transition 
economies Kazakhstan had the biggest potential to avoid systemic problems, caused by a 
mismatch between formal structures that the government set up in the process of implementing 
WTO-plus demands, and well-established informal elements. Moreover, WTO officials 
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portrayed Kazakhstan’s experience as the most successful amongst transition economies, 
linking its alleged successes to the benefits of accession (WTO 20181). Nevertheless, the 
findings of this thesis suggest that Kazakhstan was unable to overcome such systemic problems 
because the mindsets of domestic actors are sticky, path-dependent, and extremely resilient 
even to the most skilful and targeted governmental intervention. Therefore, the findings of 
these thesis can be used by the governments of transition economies in order to defend their 
interests. As Flyvbjerg (1998, p. 229) puts it: “In a democratic society, rational argument is one 
of the few forms of power the powerless still possess”. Being latecomers and having no real 
bargaining power, transition economies, nevertheless, can raise their awareness and appeal to 
reason.  
The governments of transition economies need to understand that their actions should 
be based on comprehensive analysis and well-elaborated plans rather than visions of desirable 
futures. As a means of making transition economies follow the agenda of the WTO, 
sociotechnical imaginaries proved to be extremely potent as they do not set limitations on what 
can be said by holding those forming them accountable for what they promise, or requiring 
them to provide evidence that it is truth. The following quotation demonstrates how convincing 
can be rhetoric based on imaginaries. WTO’s Deputy Director-General Alan Wolff claims: 
“There is no better place to demonstrate the dividends of a long and hard WTO accession 
process than in Kazakhstan. It was a long journey of nearly 20 years for Kazakhstan to join the 
Organization in 2015.  But, it has helped transform Kazakhstan from a poor country with GDP 
per capita at USD 1,350 in 1996 to a modern economy, with sophisticated management based 
on knowledge and skills, with GDP per capita peaking at nearly USD 14,000 in 2013” (WTO 
20181). What the governments of former centrally-planned economies need to remember is that 
although imaginaries can be very attractive, they have nothing to do with what really needs to 
be done. In order to mitigate the impact of radical transformation from central planning to 
market relationships, the authorities need to adopt measures which will reduce mismatch 
between formal set-ups and informal elements. These measures include the need to reduce 
complexity of national legislations, increase transparency of governmental decision-making, 
raise entrepreneurial spirit, change attitudes of public sector managers towards 
entrepreneurship, and introduce checks and balances by providing freedoms to civil society 
and mass media. Implementation of these measures is a long-term endeavour that requires 
careful, balanced, step-by-step approach in order to avoid the danger of turning them into 
another means of achieving ulterior goals through populist statements or actions.  
Neoliberal ideas seem very attractive to the governments of transition economies as 
they suggest that open market relationships offer a fast, free ride towards the successful 
transformation of former closed, centrally-planned economies into knowledge-based, outward-
oriented economies. Proponents of neoliberal ideas insist that an intensified formation of 
border-crossing networks of finance, production and trade turns the world economy into a 
unified global market (Wriston 1992). According to their argument, globalisation rapidly 
transforms the contemporary world, leading to the ‘denationalisation’ of sovereign states. 
Neoliberalists claim that a rise in the power of multinationals and intergovernmental entities 
has blurred borders between nation states, turning contexts of individual nations into obsolete 
and even irrelevant units in today’s boundless world. For instance, Kindleberger (1969, p. 207) 
states: "the nation state is just about through as an economic unit". Similarly, Kenichi Ohmae 
(1995, p. 11) argues that the “nation-states have already lost their role as meaningful units of 
participation in the global economy of today’s borderless world”. Accordingly, the 
governments of transition economies tend to focus on attracting FDI rather than creating an 
environment that would facilitate the capability building of domestic firms. In reality, the 
national dimension becomes even more important after a country opens up to outside 
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competition. Porter (1990, p. 19) argues: “The role of the home nation seems to be as strong or 
stronger than ever. While globalization of competition might appear to make the nation less 
important, instead it seems to make it more so. With fewer impediments to trade to shelter 
uncompetitive domestic firms and industries, the home nation takes on growing significance 
because it is the source of the skills and technology that underpin competitive advantage”. 
Therefore, the important implication of this thesis is that the governments of transition 
economies should first and foremost pursue policies that lead to an upgrade of national R&D 
and industrial players, rather than following neoliberal ideas that promise quick results. The 
problem with pursuing such policies is that building the competitive advantage of national 
R&D and industrial players is a very slow process that may take decades of hard work because 
the mindsets of domestic actors are locked-in on the old ways of doing things. For policymakers 
it might be a hard call to make because it means that they will not be able to demonstrate results 
of their work within the lifetime of their carriers.  
7.4. Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Whereas this research explains the causes of systemic problems in transition economies 
and puts emphasis on what needs to be done, it does not clarify how it should be done. My 
research interests lay in a deep contextual examination of the experiences of transition 
economies rather than in making universal generalisations. As Ragin (1987, p. 6) puts it: “the 
goals of comparative social scientists typically extend beyond an interest in simply cataloguing 
and explaining cross-societal similarities and differences. Most comparativists, especially 
those who are qualitatively oriented, also seek to interpret specific experiences and trajectories 
of specific countries (or categories of countries). That is, they are interested in the cases 
themselves, their historical experiences in particular, not simply in relations between variables 
characterizing broad categories of cases”. Attention to specificities of the context of transition 
economies helped me to understand the main cause of systemic problems in transition 
economies. Accordingly, in this research I have drawn attention of the reader to the fact that 
the imposition of the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus by the WTO was 
fundamentally wrong because the mindsets of domestic actors were not adapted to the ways 
things are done in the open market relationships. I argued that a mismatch between formal 
structures that the government set up in the course of reforms and well-established informal 
elements caused various systemic problems. I then emphasised that the government should 
reduce the complexity of regulations, focus on making society more entrepreneurial, abstain 
from attempts to replace weak and sluggish market forces with extensive state intervention. I 
also demonstrated that ‘borrowed’ policy instruments that bring positive results in the contexts 
of mature market economies do not fit well with the routines, norms, practices and codes of 
conduct inherent to transition economies. However, I did not suggest any alternative policy 
instruments that could be successfully used specifically in the contexts of transition economies. 
One of the reasons for this is my firm belief that by ‘borrowing’ policies we overlook the 
‘bigger picture’ of creating ‘learning organisations’. Another reason is potential mismatch to 
the ‘real world of policymaking’. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that the main limitation of my 
thesis is an absence of analysis on which policy instruments can be used in the context of 
transition economies, something which simultaneously offers great potential for future 
research.  
Examining the experience of a country that undergoes the process of transition provides 
an opportunity to advance our understanding of the causal links between institutions and 
technological change. In this thesis I demonstrated that there is a lack of understanding about 
the role of institutions amongst policy-makers, by showing how the tendency of the WTO to 
disregard the importance of interplay between formal institutional arrangements that the 
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government were required to set up in the process of reforms and informal institutions affected 
Kazakhstan’s technological development. I have also shown that the research literature does 
not provide any insights on this matter, because the discussion of the role of institutions in the 
scarce field of innovation policy is rarely based on empirical evidence with attention being paid 
mostly to developed countries (Chaminade et al. 2012). Convergence of the institutional 
arrangements under examination creates an impediment to understanding the effects they have 
produced on the process of technological catch-up. Scott (1995, p. 146) argues: “It is difficult 
if not impossible to discern the effects of institutions… if all our cases are embedded in the 
same or very similar contexts”. Given that most existing research takes place in developed, 
market-driven economies, examining a country that has distinctively different institutional 
arrangements would allow for variation in institutional contexts. Moreover, I believe that such 
a study would offer great opportunities for the field of innovation policy as the role of 
institutions is highly salient in the transition economies because scope and pace of institutional 
change is unprecedented. For instance, Lundvall et al. (2006, p. 1) define transition as “a 
process where one constellation of institutions is turning into a different constellation of 
institutions”. Radical institutional transformation implemented in a very limited time frame 
brings out issues associated with path-dependence and stickiness of institutions, revealing how 
institutional change shapes the behaviour and performance of economic actors.  
When I started this research project, the thing that surprised me the most was that even 
though innovation systems scholars typically seek explanations in institutional, organisational 
or other systemic characteristics, they have tendency to cluster countries by their aggregate 
economic characteristics. Clustering countries together is a frequently used strategy, allowing 
to reduce complexity and establish a cross-national analytic framework. Clustering allows us 
to highlight the most salient patterns within the data and produce a parsimonious explanation 
of observable phenomena. However, the problem is that the process of clustering in innovation 
studies is often taken as given and not explicitly discussed. There are two types of clustering 
in social science: empirical clustering and typologies. Empirical clustering is based on patterns 
within statistical data. It talks about ‘similar cases’ at an aggregate level (e.g. large high-income 
countries, small lower-income countries, etc.). Meanwhile, typologies include references to 
theory, generate statements of interconnectedness, consistency and organic unity about 
‘structural wholes’. One of the most notable examples of country clustering based on the use 
of typologies is the book of Francis G. Castles (1998) ‘Families of nations. Patterns of public 
policy in western democracies’. Castles distinguishes four ‘families of nations’ among 21 
highly industrialised and democratic OECD countries. The clusters of countries within the 
‘families of nations’ typology are based on long-standing common institutional, cultural, and 
historical experiences. Accordingly, the English speaking ‘family of nations’ consists of 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the USA. A Continental 
‘family of nations’ includes Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. A 
Scandinavian ‘family of nations’ consists of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. A 
Southern ‘family of nations’ comprises Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Only Japan and 
Switzerland did not fit into any of these four families. Castles demonstrates that nations within 
each family manifest very similar public policy outcomes whereas ‘families on nations’ differ 
from each other significantly in respect of policymaking. I believe that seven decades of 
common history, during which transition economies were parts of the Soviet Union not only 
led to establishment of similar institutional and organisational arrangements, but also formed 
common values, attitudes and views of the world, defining the ways things are done in these 
countries. Therefore, I argue that transition economies represent another ‘family of nations’, 
the examination of which can be very beneficial to the field of innovation policy due to 
homogeneity and representativeness of its cases.  
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Groups of countries differ from each other significantly in terms of ideologies, 
traditions, social, and economic experiences. Inability to take this simple fact into consideration 
may cause some serious repercussions. A central reason why this research project was 
undertaken was to draw attention to the problems experienced by former centrally planned 
economies when being forced to set-up formal institutional and organisational arrangements 
inherent to open market economies during their accession to the WTO. This thesis illustrates 
that the tendency by intergovernmental organisations to impose reforms without taking into 
consideration informal constraints, entrenched in the mindsets of domestic actors is highly 
irresponsible. Thinking holistically about cases under observation helps to avoid such mistakes 
and offers vast research opportunities for extending the most important, albeit overlooked 
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